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Introduction
On the evening of March 11, 1919, a minor scuffle broke out 
between a handful of plain-clothed Japanese police officers and U.S. 
Army personnel outside a Korean brothel in the Japanese concession 
zone of Tianjin, China. According to U.S. sources, the violence esca-
lated at around midnight the next evening, when “a large group of ex-
cited Japanese civilians carrying clubs and pistols invaded the French 
concession.” Following the mob into the French concession, “the acting 
Japanese consul, mounted on a horse, led a body of more than one hun-
dred Japanese troops and officers armed with rifles with fixed bayo-
nets.”1 In the ensuing melee, two American soldiers found themselves in 
the custody of Japanese consular police forces. One had been struck on 
the head by a Japanese soldier outside the Empire Cinema, a local movie 
house in the French concession, and then transported to the Japanese 
consular police station, during which time a Japanese mob thrashed 
him with sticks. The second had been overwhelmed, while trying to es-
cape, still half-dressed, from a Chinese brothel in the French conces-
sion, by a mob of close to sixty Japanese civilians who beat him severely. 
After taking him into their custody, a small band of Japanese soldiers 
later delivered him to the Japanese consular police station too.2
A pair of American military officers soon arrived at the Japanese con-
sulate and demanded that any Americans being held in the jail be released 
immediately, but the Japanese police chief refused to take any action. Japa-
nese consul Kamei Kanichirô further explained that he could not do any-
thing before consulting with his American counterpart, Consul Stewart P. 
Heintzleman. By the time Heintzleman arrived, however, Kamei had al-
ready gone home. When Heintzleman nonetheless inquired as to the 
whereabouts of the two American soldiers, consular police chief Kaneko 
denied that any Americans were being held in his facility. Moments later, 
however, no doubt much to Kaneko’s chagrin, one of the Americans who 
had accompanied Heintzleman “discovered Corporal Rohner lying almost 
stark naked in a side courtyard” bleeding severely from several bayonet 
wounds to his back, and “a search of the place resulted in the discovery of 
Corporal DeCordova in a cell. In the office of the chief of police was found 
the hat of Corporal DeCordova and the clothes of Corporal Rohner.” The 
two men were then released into Heintzleman’s custody, and the remnants 
of the Japanese mob stoned the American consul’s car as it drove off.3
2 | Introduction
Numerous dimensions of treaty port life in early Republican China are 
revealed in the episode described above. It is, for instance, a vivid portrait 
of an international and multicultural urban milieu in which American sol-
diers visiting Korean brothels in the Japanese ward of a Chinese city could 
be chased down Asahi-gai until it became rue de Chalyard, and then 
beaten outside a movie house in the French concession, where Vietnamese 
patrolmen of the French police force finally cleared the crowd. It is also 
indicative of how simmering tensions among the civilian residents, govern-
ment officials, and military forces of each national group could quite easily 
erupt into outbursts of violence. One of the most striking images, however, 
is that of a Japanese consul on horseback boldly leading a contingent of 
soldiers and police officers down an avenue ostensibly to protect Japanese 
residents of the city from attack by American soldiers. Who were these po-
lice forces that operated out of the Japanese consulate in Tianjin? On what 
legal basis did the Japanese Foreign Ministry establish such a security force? 
On what legal authority did these police believe they could arrest, detain, 
and physically abuse U.S. military personnel within the confines of the 
politically exclusive French settlement? It was with questions such as these 
that the research leading to this book first began.
What that research revealed was a story of roughly sixty-five years dur-
ing which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushô) maintained 
an independent police force within the space of Japan’s informal empire 
on the Asian continent rooted in a controversial interpretation of extrater-
ritorial privilege. Justified as a logical and legitimate corollary of treaty 
agreements with Korea and China, and charged with a duty to “protect and 
control” civilian Japanese communities on the Asian mainland, this Japa-
nese consular police force possesses the longest uninterrupted history of 
any Japanese colonial institution. The opening anecdote may give the im-
pression that these consular policemen did little more than help keep the 
peace within the volatile urban setting of the foreign concession zones, and 
that in doing so they were often at the center of local jurisdictional con-
flicts with the other foreign powers in treaty port China. The Foreign Min-
istry’s police force in continental East Asia, however, evolved over the course 
of those six decades from a relatively benign public security organization 
into a full-fledged political intelligence apparatus devoted to apprehend-
ing Korean, Chinese, and Japanese purveyors of “dangerous thought” 
throughout the empire. Consequently, its history principally concerns the 
course and character of interactions between the societies of East Asia, and 
as such, it sheds critical light on the broader politics of public memory, co-
lonial victimization, and war responsibility that have such a powerful im-
pact on international relations in East Asia today.
In his description of the Japanese presence in China’s treaty port com-
munities, one scholar has identified the police forces maintained by Japan’s 
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consulate offices as “the largest and, to the Chinese, the most outrageously 
provocative of all the foreign gendarmeries.”4 Similarly, another has re-
marked that, of all Japan’s armed fists, “at least before the Manchurian In-
cident, it was the consular police who were singled out by the Chinese for 
the greatest condemnation.”5 It is remarkable indeed, then, that so little is 
known about a Japanese police force that many contemporary Koreans 
and Chinese (and Japanese!) viewed as one of the most odious tools of 
Japanese state oppression during the first half of the twentieth century. In 
fact, statistics reveal in no uncertain terms that Japan’s consular system, 
and even the Foreign Ministry itself, was largely defined during the prewar 
and wartime eras by its role as an institution designed to exercise functions 
of both social management and ideological control. From 1922 on, for ex-
ample, consular police officers comprised no less than 40 percent of all 
Foreign Ministry employees. By 1933, that percentage had climbed to as 
high as 62 percent.6 When one looks at the numbers of Foreign Ministry 
staff stationed in overseas facilities, the statistics are even more striking. In 
1921, for example, 560 of 1,133 Foreign Ministry personnel overseas were 
police officers, roughly 49 percent. By 1936, the ratio climbed as high as 
1,794 of 2,557, or just over 70 percent.7 Obviously, then, the Japanese For-
eign Ministry police was an institution whose history should no longer be 
overlooked. While a handful of East Asian historians have made initial for-
ays into the topic, even with these valuable works our understanding of 
what part Japan’s consular police played in shaping the Japanese colonial 
presence in northeast Asia is minimal.8 The present study is the first in 
English to fill that void, and in telling the story of how the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry crossed the edge of empire through the actions of its consular 
police forces this book challenges a number of deeply ingrained paradigms 
related to Japanese colonial expansionism. 
The dramatic events of September 18, 1931, when rogue agents of the 
Japanese military in China blew up a section of railway near Fengtian and 
then used the staged explosion as a pretext for the occupation by force of 
south Manchuria, occupies a prominent space in popular historical mem-
ory both within and beyond East Asian society. It is most often remem-
bered as the moment at which the wild imaginings of Kwantung Army 
general Ishiwara Kanji and his ultranationalist cronies hijacked the direc-
tion of an otherwise liberal Japanese interwar foreign policy. Internation-
alist diplomats in Tokyo, confounded by a military fait accompli, had little 
choice but to acquiesce to army interests, since failure to do so would re-
veal to the world that Japan’s civilian government had almost no capacity 
to rein in its own military forces in the field. While on some levels this nar-
rative does reflect historical reality, in painting a picture of indisputable 
villains and victims it is also a view of history inextricably informed by the 
need to advance a certain narrative of prewar Japanese politics that would 
4 | Introduction
both vindicate American destruction of that polity and exonerate “ordi-
nary” Japanese from responsibility for that destruction.
The research of professional historians evaluating these events some 
thirty years later often substantiated and reflected this narrative in which 
Japan’s peaceful internationalism of the Taishô era was violently usurped 
by the aggressive militarism of the early Shôwa period.9 The notion that 
the contest between the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Army was some 
kind of Manichean struggle between the forces of dark conquest and lib-
eral accommodation, however, is no longer widely accepted. Historians 
studying specifically the inner workings of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 
for example, have done much to reveal the great diversity of views within 
its many levels of bureaucracy.10 Furthermore, others have pointed out, in 
exposing the Machiavellian stratagems of many interwar diplomats, that 
“Antimilitarism did not necessarily imply opposition to military interven-
tion and aggression, or resistance to the diplomacy of fait accompli.”11 De-
spite these developments in the historiography, however, the Gaimushô is 
still often characterized as an advocate of “liberal” or “progressive” ap-
proaches to international relations in contradistinction to the Imperial 
Army, which was driven by unilateral security prerogatives and reckless 
ideological ambition. In that narrative, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 
especially stands as a watershed moment in modern East Asian history 
when Japan returned to a policy of acquiring formal colonial territory. As 
one preeminent scholar has put it, “ just when Japan appeared to be emerg-
ing as the paramount foreign economic power in China within the frame-
work of the treaty system, it embarked on a new policy of establishing 
direct political control over Manchuria” in the late summer of 1931.12 Even 
in deemphasizing the drama of the Manchurian Incident by describing it 
as a “shift in the equilibrium of an existing dualism rather than a revolu-
tionary break,” other analyses of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in the pre-
war state still seem trapped in a paradigm of dualism.13
To understand fully the complicity of the Foreign Ministry in the 
structures of Japanese imperialism demands more than mere recogni-
tion of internal factionalism within its bureaucracy, the opportunistic 
realism of its diplomatic agents, or its jurisdictional battles with other 
arms of the Japanese imperial state. What the history of the Japanese 
consular police reveals is that at the local level in continental East Asia 
the Foreign Ministry did not only react passively to the proactive initia-
tives of other imperial agencies but, rather, actively promoted colonial 
expansionism in accordance with its perceived political security prerog-
atives. For more than a decade before the Kwantung Army launched its 
unilateral campaign to defend Japan’s geopolitical security in 1931, the 
Foreign Ministry had been engaged in a war of its own against radical 
Korean nationalists operating in exile in treaty port China and through-
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out Manchuria. Those nationalists had taken their struggle against for-
mal empire to battlefields in the informal empire, and when Japanese 
police of the formal colonies could not fight them there, the Japanese 
consular police took up the cause. Furthermore, just as the emergence 
of international communism sparked efforts by civil and judicial author-
ities at home to crush nascent left-wing movements in Japan proper, so 
the Foreign Ministry took on the same task throughout northeast Asia 
and pursued that aim as well through its consular police forces. 
The history of the consular police thus suggests that the piecemeal 
encroachment by Japanese authorities upon Chinese sovereignty during 
the interwar years was not only the consequence of the clashing interests 
of Chinese nationalism and Japanese empire building. It was also a mani-
festation of political and ideological conflict within metropolitan Japa-
nese society during the 1920s. The struggle between conservative state 
authority and liberal social forcesa struggle in which the metropolitan 
police performed the most significant coercive functions of state 
powerwas also played out in the colonial periphery, where the consular 
police became the imperial state’s armed fist within noncolonial space 
and systematically targeted for suppression any individual or organization 
engaged in activity deemed hostile to the empire/nation. The sustained 
campaign by Japanese consular police forces in China and Manchuria to 
snuff out Korean resistance was more than a mere counterinsurgency pro-
gram. When viewed alongside the Foreign Ministry’s concomitant efforts 
to police Japanese leftists in China, it can be understood as one part of a 
larger state-organized policy aimed at crushing ideological threats to the 
kokutai (national polity), colonial or metropolitan.14 
This is significant, because historians of Japanese foreign relations 
during the first half of the twentieth century often fail to recognize the in-
terconnectivity of foreign policy and domestic society as an operative force 
in Japanese social and political life. As one critic has recently suggested, 
most work on Japanese imperialism “splits the narrative of modern Japan 
into two solitudesthe first, a domestic history untainted by interactions 
with the continent, and the second, a history of the colonies penetrated by 
the forces of the metropolis.”15 The problem with this approach is that in 
such metrocentric history “the transnational processes inherent to empire 
are truncated, reinforcing assumptions about national subjectivity and en-
suring that history remains in service to the nation.”16 Scholars of Euro-
pean colonialism have for many years now been engaged in the sort of 
research that breaks these state-centered boundaries.17 Fortunately, recent 
years have also seen the production of several studies that begin to inte-
grate the colonial and metropolitan history of modern Japanese society in 
meaningful and important ways, but much more still needs to be done.18 
The work of intellectual, social, and labor historians of modern Japan 
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during the past twenty years has pointed the way forward in this respect by 
reframing domestic history in terms that transcend the simplistic dualism 
of a helpless society victimized by an oppressive state. More specifically, 
scholarship has come to emphasize the need to appreciate the subtle ne-
gotiation and collaboration between social groups and state power, rather 
than accept a one-dimensional portrait of popular victimization by an au-
thoritarian government and its bureaucracies.19 As Sheldon Garon con-
tends, for example, social liberalism and political fascism were not 
mutually exclusive in prewar Japan, and consequently “progressive indi-
viduals and groups cooperated with the authoritarian state on a wide-
spread basis between 1931 and 1945.” Significantly, Garon continues, 
these alliances “first arose during the peaceful decade of the ‘liberal 
1920s,’ not in the heat of the Fifteen Years’ War.”20 
A situation like this unlikely marriage of liberalism and authoritarian-
ism in domestic society was also at work regarding the Gaimushô’s posi-
tion in imperial Japan’s institutional machinery of foreign policy. The 
Gaimushô, through its consular system in Northeast Asia, acted in a man-
ner identical to other administrative ministries in the Japanese state. Its 
duty was to intensively manage the everyday workings of civilian Japanese 
communities on the Asian mainland, and police work was a vital part of 
that mission. The pressures linked to managing those residents drove the 
Foreign Ministry to take measures that often far exceeded the interna-
tionally recognized parameters of treaty port imperialism in China. Fur-
thermore, while the official voice of the Foreign Ministry proclaimed 
Japanese commitment to internationalism and mutual economic prosper-
ity among the Great Powers in East Asia, at the local level the Gaimushô 
was engaged in a war during the 1920s against destabilizing political ide-
ologies and their proponents. In contrast, then, to the notion that the 
Foreign Ministry had been forced to the periphery by the army on matters 
of continental policy by the early 1930s, the war on radical politics waged 
by the consular police after 1919 represents a dimension of Gaimushô in-
terests that closely resembled the priorities of more conservative bureau-
crats and the military. This is not to argue that the Foreign Ministry was 
necessarily a vanguard force behind aggressive expansionism; rather, its 
commitment to fighting communism through its consular security forces 
explains why the Gaimushô was not a consistent opponent of military ex-
pansionism and why in some cases it must even be understood as an advo-
cate of that expansionism.
In addition to the interconnectivity of domestic politics and foreign 
policy, the history of the Foreign Ministry police also reminds us to appre-
ciate the impact of both global international forces and local regional re-
lationships in fomenting Japanese colonial expansionism. The trend in 
recent scholarship concerning the driving ideological energies of Japa-
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nese imperialism has been to emphasize the impact of contemporaneous 
efforts by Japan’s ruling elite to fully integrate post-Tokugawa Japan into 
the international community of the late nineteenth century by mastering 
the practice and rhetoric of empire building.21 Many dimensions of con-
sular police history support this line of argumentation, but that history 
also suggests that the particular regional dynamics of East Asian society 
should not be entirely discarded by giving primacy to the global context. 
Just as the contours of East Asian modernity itself can (and must) be 
located in the centuries preceding the era of intense Western pressure 
during the nineteenth century, the dynamics of Japanese responses to 
political convulsions on the continent from the 1850s on cannot be iso-
lated from patterns of continental influence with deep roots.22 From the 
seventh-century Taika Reforms designed to bolster the nascent imperial 
institution on the archipelago in response to the rise of a strong and 
expansive Tang dynasty, to the early-seventeenth-century Ming−Qing 
conflict and its reverberations on the consolidation of power over the 
islands by the Tokugawa clan, changes within China’s political and so-
cial order have consistently influenced transformations of the Japanese 
polity. By the early twentieth century, many within the ruling elite of 
Japan similarly viewed the internal disorder of continental Asian society 
as a threat to Japan because it left the entire region vulnerable to the 
social disease of Marxism, an illness that threatened to destabilize the 
political power structure on the home islands.
The intention here is not to offer an apologetic justification for Jap-
anese aggression in China by historically contextualizing it. It would be 
a ludicrous argument indeed to contend, for example, that because Chi-
nese society failed to unify itself efficiently after the collapse of imperial 
Confucianism in 1912, the Japanese were left with little choice but to 
seize control of the mainland themselves. Even so, the Japanese logic of 
pursuing an aggressive policy on the continent for the sake of its own 
domestic security cannot simply be dismissed as nothing but cynical, 
self-serving imperial rhetoric. To do so is to ignore centuries-old pat-
terns in Japanese society’s relationship with the twists and turns of con-
tinental political life. As one historian of China has recently argued, for 
example, one can only begin to meaningfully explore the complexities 
of Chinese collaboration with the Japanese military after 1937 by con-
sidering “the understanding Chinese have developed over at least a mil-
lennium about how local authority and elite representation are 
constrained by, but also must coexist interactively with, state author-
ity.”23 Likewise, another historian has argued persuasively that the Japa-
nese Imperial Army’s invasion and conquest of Manchuria in 1932 was 
successful in large part because of the collaboration of local Chinese 
elites, and the ideology of resistance to Japanese aggression in northeast 
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China then developed outside of the region itself as a “resistancialist 
myth.”24 This is a thesis that moves beyond the simple dualism of Japa-
nese brutality and Chinese victimization to identify the reasons for local 
Chinese collaboration with Japanese authorities in Manchuria, namely 
the belief among many local Chinese landlords and entrepreneurs that 
Japan was “bringing modernity at a time when native Chinese govern-
ments seemed incapable of doing so.”25 Analytical approaches such as 
these help one to move beyond the historiographical politics of postco-
lonialism and examine local colonial and wartime Sino-Japanese rela-
tions on their own contemporary terms. 
Similarly, one must consider the logic of Japanese aggression in pre-
war China in the context of long-standing patterns of Japanese domestic 
political life that were intricately connected to the internal social order 
and disorder of Chinese society. On the surface this logic might seem to 
echo the arguments of early postwar Marxist scholarship in Japan that lo-
cated a dark inevitability within the Japanese conquest of continental East 
Asia. Alternatively, one might hesitate to accept this premise because it 
can be easily twisted into a kind of rationalistic apologia for Japan’s inva-
sion of China. I do not contend that these regional security anxieties con-
stituted the principal context of Japanese expansionism. They formed, 
however, a significant context that shaped the Foreign Ministry’s actions 
in Northeast Asia, and thus they should not be ignored. In other words, 
what I mean to propose is a more specific formulation germane to the East 
Asian regional context of what Ronald Robinson has termed an “excentric 
theory” of imperialism in which the driving energy of expansionism is lo-
cated neither at the colonial periphery nor in the metropolitan core but in 
the relationship between the two.26 In broader terms as well, failing to ap-
preciate this interconnection by overemphasizing the global context of 
Western imperial models is to neglect the regional dynamics of East Asian 
society that have been at work for thousands of years and thus privilege 
the power of the past two centuries over that of the past few millennia.
This book is based upon on a wide variety of primary and secondary 
sources, but the analysis and interpretations put forth here are drawn 
heavily from my reading of a collection of documents first assembled as 
the Gaimushô keisatsushi (A History of the Foreign Ministry Police). Con-
sisting of over 72,000 pages, this collection is the largest and most sig-
nificant source for exploring the history of Japan’s consular police in 
northeast Asia.27 Its compilation began when, in light of the anticipated 
abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo at the end of 
1937, the Gaimushô deemed it both appropriate and necessary to begin 
assembling a documentary record that would trace the role played by its 
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consular police forces in the construction and execution of Japanese 
policy in Manchuria during the more than thirty years since the end of 
the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. In April 1937, Suematsu Kichiji, an in-
fluential figure whose role in the evolution of the consular police will be 
considered later, was selected to head the project, and on May 12, For-
eign Minister Satô Naotake sent an order to all Japanese ambassadors 
abroad instructing them to begin collecting for submission to Tokyo any 
and all documentary records relevant to organization, deployment, and 
reform of Japanese consular police forces in Manchuria.28
Initially, this “history of the Foreign Ministry police” was intended to 
be a history of solely those consular police forces in Manchuria, however, 
at some point during the first few exploratory sessions of the editorial 
committee, the scope of the project was expanded to include all consular 
police forces from their origins in treaty port Korea until the present day. 
By early May, Suematsu had selected two police veterans to begin gather-
ing documents from various Tokyo area archives, and later that summer 
Japanese authorities in Korea started assembling consular police materi-
als there. Progress was slow, however, since the second Sino-Japanese War 
erupted in the summer of 1937 and the exigencies of that conflict de-
manded the time and resources of everyone in the Foreign Ministry. The 
project nonetheless lumbered along for seven years, when in 1944 an index 
was finally produced and Suematsu took measures to make copies of the 
documents and protect them from air-raid conflagrations in Tokyo.29
What motivated the editors of the Gaimushô keisatsushi to persevere 
for over seven years for the sake of creating this body of source materi-
als? The police veteran editors claimed that the primary reason for the 
project was to “convey our glorious history to future generations.”30 As 
Aiba Kiyoshi explained in greater depth in April 1944, by focusing on 
the consular duties of protecting Japanese civilians overseas the project 
would reveal changes over time in political affairs, popular conditions, 
economics, customs, and social life in general throughout the empire. 
However, as something that was much more than just a history of the 
consulates, Aiba believed that the project would be a guidebook better 
than any other for those of future generations who aim to study the 
“real history” of the Japanese empire.31 
That the project was left incomplete due to the chaos in urban Japan 
during the final months of the war also helps to explain why historians 
have not explored these materials in a sustained and meaningful way.32 In 
fact, most of the documents survived in a rather raw, unfinished state; 
scanning the pages, for example, one quickly notices numerous instances 
where characters have been scratched out and corrected, awaiting later 
stages of editorial production. These sources thus represent an exciting 
opportunity to gain a new perspective on the local dynamics of Japan’s 
10 | Introduction
colonial presence in East Asia. As many critics have pointed out, however, 
historical scholarship on the Japanese empire that follows such a close 
reading of official colonial archives can often become “colonized” by the 
ideological constructs of the original colonizers themselves.33 In the Gai-
mushô keisatsushi, for example, there is the obvious problem that any set of 
sources produced by an institution to tell its own history must be tainted 
to some extent by self-serving motives. Choices were made by the editors 
regarding which documents to include and which to leave out, and in 
those choices the values and interests of the editors are surely revealed. 
Japanese colonial sources such as these must therefore be treated criti-
cally, and the conclusions evident in those materials not simply accepted 
as true and accurate accounts of colonial conditions. By the same token, 
however, one should not be too quick to simply dismiss every explanation 
given by Japanese colonial actors as nothing more than deliberately cyni-
cal hyperbole. To do so is to employ an equally ahistorical line of reason-
ing. The most interesting and important question to explore is why 
Japanese authorities made the claims they did. Whether those claims were 
“true” or not is of less relevance than what these claims can reveal about 
the impact of the colonial experience on Japanese society. 
The book is organized into five chapters that follow a chronological pro-
gression. The analysis is deliberately broad, because my goal was to 
sketch out a portrait of trends in the development of the consular police 
system over the course of more than half a century. To delve inside every 
topic in microhistorical detail would demand a book many times the 
size of this one. Instead, I encourage future investigators to pick up and 
expand upon the many specific story lines and comparative possibilities 
I introduce here. The aim in the first two chapters is to describe both 
how the consular police as an institution came to be and the implica-
tions of that process for interpreting Japan’s place in the system of infor-
mal treaty port imperialism in East Asia. Chapter 1 locates patterns 
found in later processes of imperial encroachment within the evolution 
of the Japanese consular police in preannexation Korea and also ties 
them to developments on the home islands. Chapter 2 then shifts to the 
establishment of Foreign Ministry police forces in mainland Chinese 
treaty ports and the Manchurian frontier in China’s northeast, where I 
explore and assign great significance to the dispute between the govern-
ments of China and Japan over the propriety and fundamental legal le-
gitimacy of the consular police. 
With that background, the next three chapters then present the most 
significant interpretive threads of this book. Chapter 3 explores the pro-
found importance of the Korean independence movement in exile and 
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the emergence of formal communist organizations on the home islands, 
in response to which political intelligence work began to occupy a greater 
and greater portion of consular police resources. Chapter 4 continues the 
analysis of the relationship between consular police forces and elements 
of Korean resistance in China, but the story also reveals how Gaimushô 
police in the field came increasingly to favor unilateral solutions to the 
security crises posed by Korean resistance in China and its connections to 
domestic Japanese left-wing politics. The fifth and final chapter explores 
the period from 1932 until the end of the Second World War, an era of 
both cooperation and conflict between Foreign Ministry police and the 
Japanese Army. By highlighting efforts of the consular police to continue 
the execution of security measures born of the 1920s while still protecting 
their jurisdictional prerogatives against infringement by the military, the 
commitment of the Foreign Ministry to resisting militaristic expansion-
ism is called into question. Finally, the Conclusion offers several broad 
themes related to how the history of the Japanese consular police in North-
east Asia makes it possible to begin transcending boundaries of both po-
litical geography and historical imagination.
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1
Patterns of Police Work 
in Late Chosõn Korea
As Japan’s first modern colonial acquisition, Taiwan served as a 
critical testing ground for many early formations of Japanese colonial 
policy. Undoubtedly, the lessons learned through successes and failures 
during the first ten years of colonial rule there proved valuable in facili-
tating Japan’s subsequent colonial annexation of Korea between 1905 
and 1910. It would be logical to expect, for example, that Japan’s colo-
nial police institutions in Korea were closely derived from the experi-
ence of colonial police in Taiwan.1 However, what historians have long 
neglected to recognize is that there had been quasi-colonial Japanese 
police in Korea since 1880, fifteen years before the acquisition of Tai-
wan in 1895. Therefore, when Japan’s ruling elite made Korea a protec-
torate after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, beginning the eventual 
process of outright annexation, Japanese police had been operating in 
Korea for a quarter of a century. These were the consular police forces 
attached to and maintained by Japan’s Foreign Ministry offices through-
out the Korean peninsula.2
This chapter will first explore both the reasons for the initial estab-
lishment of consular police forces in the port cities opened by Japan’s 
unequal treaties with Korea during the early 1880s, and the general 
characteristics of the police force and the nature of their activities. After 
describing the rapid increase in consular police personnel after the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894−1895, I will then focus on the expansion of 
consular police infrastructure from 1902 to 1905, which greatly facili-
tated the establishment of an official colonial police organization dur-
ing the protectorate period. This first stage in the history of the Japanese 
consular police demonstrates three key points: first, the Japanese For-
eign Ministry played an active, if unwitting, role in paving the way for 
the colonial acquisition of Korea; second, the demands of common Jap-
anese resident communities were instrumental in motivating the For-
eign Ministry to expand its police presence in Korea; and, third, the 
pattern of consular police expansion followed by colonial conquest set a 
precedent for Japan’s imperial project in Manchuria and China proper 
years later. The overarching aim is to explain why the Foreign Ministry 
created a consular police corps to play the role of protectors of civil 
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order, and how in the process those police became handmaidens of co-
lonial conquest. That this semicolonial mission to bring civil stability 
under a central authority in treaty port Korea took shape just as the na-
scent Meiji regime in Tokyo was trying to accomplish the same goal in 
Japan itself is also a matter of critical significance in appreciating the 
interrelated political and social dynamics at work in this early stage of 
modern Japanese expansionism.
Treaty Port Origins and Activities
The Kanghwa commercial treaty of 1876 marks the starting point in the 
history of what one might call “modern” Korean-Japanese relations. The 
ruling elites of both societies had maintained official diplomatic con-
tacts throughout the Tokugawa period, but circumstances of the mid-
nineteenth century dictated a realignment of inter−East Asian relations. 
Just as the United States, followed by other Western powers, had done to 
Japan in the early 1850s, the Japanese in turn imposed an unequal treaty 
relationship upon the Korean court before its own fledgling Meiji state 
had even reached its tenth birthday. The southern Korean city of Pusan 
was the first to be “opened” by this treaty system, and the Meiji govern-
ment soon sent a small staff of official representatives to the city. In ad-
dition, Japanese civilian merchants and settlers quickly arrived in 
modest numbers, and this mix of government bureaucrats and common 
citizens made up the burgeoning Japanese treaty port community.3 
During the late 1870s, the treaty port environment in Pusan was a 
rough-and-tumble one. Poverty was high, as was the petty crime rate, 
with burglary, gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking standing out 
as the most common urban security problems. Without any initial sup-
port from their government, the Japanese resident community at-
tempted to establish a volunteer community security force to deal with 
these concerns. In response to the demands of his local constituents, 
Kondô Masaki, the official Japanese representative in Pusan, soon asked 
for budgetary assistance from his home government to support a group 
of six patrolmen to walk the beat in the concession neighborhood after 
hours, recommending that the costs be spilt evenly between Tokyo and 
the local resident association.4 By 1880, an official Japanese consulate 
office had been opened in Pusan and Kondô became its first appointed 
consul. While his earlier request had been granted, the resident Japa-
nese population had continued to grow during the first few years after 
the opening of the concession, leading Kondô to believe that a more 
permanent police force was necessary. Arguing in March 1880 that not 
only the Japanese community but also the broader port population had 
risen greatly since 1876, bringing with it more crime and other urban 
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social problems, Kondô made a request to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo 
for a small consulate police force of eleven men; one at the rank of in-
spector (keibu), and the other ten as patrolmen (junsa).5 Arriving in 
Pusan a few weeks later, these eleven men were the first Japanese con-
sular police officers in continental East Asia.
Pusan was not the only port opened by the requirements of the un-
equal treaty system. In the early spring of 1880, the coastal town of Wõn-
san was also being prepared for treaty-port status, and even before the 
port was officially opened in May the Gaimushô representative there, 
Inoue Kaoru, took the cue from Kondô in Pusan and made a request of 
his own for a small police contingent to be attached to the Wõnsan consul-
ate upon its establishment.6 For reasons that are not entirely clear, Inoue 
asked for a much larger force than what had been sent to Pusan: two in-
spectors and twenty-nine patrolmen. Nonetheless, his request was granted, 
and those thirty-two consular police arrived in Wõnsan by late April. The 
port at Inch’õn, where a consulate was set up in 1882, had a police staff 
similar to the one in Pusan by July of that year, but the capital at Seoul was 
a somewhat different case. In November 1880 a Japanese embassy was es-
tablished in the city complete with a police contingent of eleven officers, 
but that force was then bolstered with an additional seventeen patrolmen 
during and after 1882.7
This was in response to two serious episodes of urban violence in 
Seoul that took place during the first few years of consular police de-
ployment on the peninsula, which undoubtedly served to further Japa-
nese claims that their security forces in Korean cities were needed to 
maintain public order. The first was the so-called Imo Mutiny of 1882 
during which Korean soldiers in Seoul attacked officials of the Min 
court and local Japanese diplomatic authorities. The Min court had re-
cently succeeded in forcing the ultraconservative regent known as the 
Taewõn’gun into the sidelines of Korean foreign-policy making and ad-
opted a more conciliatory approach to the Japanese. Korean soldiers 
embittered by the presence of Japanese military officers in the capital 
forced Ambassador Hanabusa Yoshimoto to flee the city under the pro-
tection of military and police personnel.8 Only two years later a second 
outbreak of chaos in the capital erupted during an attempted coup 
d’état by the Japan-friendly reformer Kim Ok-kyun and his supporters 
in 1884. When Queen Min’s security forces crushed the movement, 
sending many of its leaders to exile in Japan or a death sentence at home, 
the Japanese consulate in Seoul was attacked by riotous mobs, resulting 
in the death of several police officers. Much of this violence reflected, of 
course, the larger factional struggles both within the ruling Korean elite 
and between the governments of China and Japan. The Sino-Japanese 
treaty at Tientsin in 1885, however, temporarily cooled the rivalry be-
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tween the two empires over influence in Korea, and the Japanese con-
sular system on the peninsula stabilized for the next decade or so.9
By 1885, then, the overall strength of the Japanese consular police 
in Korea was roughly fifty men in the three treaty ports of Pusan, Wõn-
san, and Inch’õn, as well as the capital city of Seoul, and this total num-
ber did not change dramatically until a steep and rapid increase during 
and after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895. Fifty men may seem like 
a force too small to be of any real significance, but it is in the nature of 
their activities, as well as the police infrastructure they began to create, 
that one can begin to see their true importance.
When the first Japanese consular police took up their duties in Pusan 
and elsewhere during the 1880s, the modern police apparatus of the Meiji 
state throughout the home islands was itself still quite young. Japan’s new 
leadership after the Restoration created a civilian police force that would 
work to maintain public security, health, and social order, as well as help 
enforce the political will of the new regime.10 The consular police in Korea 
were simultaneously charged with similar responsibilities. One of their 
earliest and perhaps most mundane duties was simple administrative re-
cord keeping. The consular office and its police staff kept track of local 
births and deaths among the resident Japanese community, and also the 
registration of newcomers from the metropole.11 As many scholars have 
noted, the first wave of Japanese settlers in Korea often included variously 
disreputable social deviants and petty criminals as well as honest mer-
chants and shopkeepers.12 So the consular police, just like their domestic 
counterparts back home, made a serious effort to maintain a clear picture 
of exactly who was living in the concession community at any given time. 
To that end, travel within Korea, especially when it involved moving deeper 
into the interior of the country, was also closely monitored by the consular 
police, as those wishing to make such a journey had first to obtain official 
permission from the consulate.13
Responsibility for the management of public health and sanitation in 
the concession also fell upon the resident consul and his police staff. For 
example, the police often organized and supervised vaccination programs 
that were implemented to prevent outbreaks of cholera and similar condi-
tions related to poor sanitation infrastructure.14 As preventative measures 
against such diseases, the consular police also maintained street cleaning 
and sewage disposal facilities, and to protect the general health of resi-
dents they routinely conducted health inspections of local bars and res-
taurants, as well as issuing regulations for the drinking-water supply, 
public bathing facilities, and milk and meat processing.15 Public health 
also often embraced matters of public security, and in this respect the 
consular police devoted considerable attention to controlling the number 
of privately owned weapons in the concession. In most cases, the consular 
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police completely banned firearms within the concession area, and there 
were also numerous issuances prohibiting the brandishing of swords and 
knives. It was possible, however, for those residents who wanted to hunt for 
small game beyond concession borders to register their weapons with the 
consular police and obtain a special permit.16 
One issue that often combined problems of health, social order, and 
crime was prostitution. In Korea, as was the case in most early Japanese 
settler communities along the northeast Asian coast during the late nine-
teenth century, young Japanese prostitutes comprised a considerably large 
percentage of the local Japanese civilian population. In fact, consular po-
lice regulations concerning prostitution are the most common items to be 
found in the source materials. Many regulations were drafted to establish 
basic standards for the living and working conditions of the women in-
volved in the business; however, the potential for outbreaks of sexually 
transmitted diseases such as syphilis was perhaps the major concern of the 
police. Initially, local Japanese consular authorities sought to control the 
public health impact of the sex trade by managing a system of licensed 
prostitution in treaty ports. After 1881, for example, brothels could obtain 
legal permission to operate in the Japanese concessions of Pusan and 
Wõnsan, and consequently the prostitute population in those cities grew 
dramatically during the next few years. However, Japanese authorities re-
versed their policy on this matter when they began to examine how other 
foreign powers in Korea ran their concession properties, in most cases 
making prostitution officially illegal. Japanese consulates soon thereafter 
abandoned the former practices, therein creating, of course, the new 
problem of how to best “manage” the unlicensed sex trade.17
In time an elaborate system of punishments—fines, expulsion, and 
imprisonment—took shape to discourage both practitioners and patrons 
of the brothel network. But there was more to this policy shift than simple 
matters of local public health. In 1883, Consul Kobayashi at Inch’ŏn ex-
plained that nations engaged in the business of bringing “civilization” to 
as yet “uncivilized” societies, such as what he viewed Japan bringing to 
Korea, should not be involved in the official supervision of the flesh trade. 
Ten years later Foreign Minister Enomoto Takeaki directed all consuls in 
Korea on a similar theme. In explaining new measures to be taken to stem 
the tide of unrestricted emigration of Japanese women to Korea, Enomoto 
argued that the population explosion of Japanese prostitutes in the treaty 
ports was damaging the reputation of the entire Japanese overseas resi-
dent community, as well as sullying the honor of the Japanese empire as a 
whole. Some women made the trip in order to work hard and earn an hon-
est living, according to Enomoto, but those involved in the sex trade gave 
them all a bad name. Significantly, Enomoto also argued that the empire’s 
grand scheme of extending its influence across Asia was being compro-
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mised by the public relations mess created by Japanese women entering 
the sex industry wherever they went.18
In the four cities where Japanese consulates maintained police forces, 
they also helped establish public hospitals open to all port residents, and 
these facilities were usually joint ventures, funded in roughly equal parts 
by the local Japanese Residents’ Association and the local consular of-
fice.19 Jurisdiction and managerial authority over the hospitals, however, 
rested entirely with the local consul and his police staff, while day-to-day 
operation of these clinics was left to the local Japanese resident commu-
nity. In fact, consular authorities attempted to place the burden of main-
taining such facilities on the shoulders of the resident community to the 
greatest degree possible, since fiscal restraints made it difficult for the For-
eign Ministry to completely fund public health institutions in the conces-
sion neighborhoods.20 Even so, the fact that the editors of the Gaimushô 
keisatsushi chose to assemble a section of documents specifically related to 
hospitals clearly indicates a belief on the Japanese side that the mainte-
nance of public health was an integral part of the consulate’s duties within 
the treaty port community. Motivations behind the establishment of medi-
cal clinics, however, also reflected more self-serving aims. Commenting 
on Japanese hospitals in Pusan during the summer of 1885, for example, 
Foreign Minister Inoue explained that an important benefit of setting up 
clinics was, of course, the greater ease with which the physical health of 
Japanese residents could be maintained. Beyond that, however, Inoue 
went on to argue that by exposing the local population to Japanese medi-
cal practices, even those “stubborn Koreans” could be made to see the 
great efficacy of modern Japanese medicine. As such, public health clinics 
in Korean treaty ports could provide Japanese authorities with a “short-
cut” to opening up the country even more.21
To facilitate the execution of their duties in all these areas, local con-
suls made various efforts to imbue their police officers with local language 
skills.22 During the first decade of consular police operations in the treaty 
ports, patrolmen were strongly encouraged, if not required, to acquire at 
least a functional ability in conversational Korean. Officers in Seoul, for 
example, pursued a one-year language course complete with textbooks, 
from which they had to “graduate” in a timely manner, while those who 
were studying other languages such as English could temporarily post-
pone their Korean lessons.23 By the mid-1890s, language acquisition had 
been upgraded to an even higher priority. With greater numbers of Japa-
nese civilians arriving in Seoul in 1894–1895, for example, Consul Uchida 
explained that the frequency of confrontations between Japanese, Ko-
rean, and Chinese residents was on the rise. While consular police could 
quickly respond to the scene when situations arose, not enough of them 
had adequate language skills to act as effective mediators. This had to be 
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remedied, in Uchida’s view, so that the Japanese consular police could ef-
fectively keep the peace among the city’s complex and multicultural com-
munity.24 In other cities, Masan in particular, Russian-language ability was 
also a valuable skill for more practical and political reasons. One report 
from Masan in 1901 suggests, for example, that because of the numerous 
Russian ships docking in that port, consular police there needed Russian-
language skills in order to foil the efforts of Russian “spies” carrying out 
surveillance in the concession.25
Finally, it is worth noting that these numerous programs of consular 
police development were not always instigated solely through official 
government directives. As noted earlier, the Japanese resident commu-
nity of Pusan played a key role in initiating the creation of a Japanese 
police force there during the late 1870s, and throughout the 1880s and 
early 1890s, Japanese civilian groups continued to pressure their con-
sular representatives to improve security in their communities. In No-
vember 1892, for example, several leading members of a Japanese 
business organization in Seoul submitted petitions requesting an in-
crease in Japanese police personnel, even offering to contribute finan-
cially to an expanded consular police budget if it would mean more 
officers on the streets of their neighborhoods.26 Both settler community 
activism and state-centered geopolitical ambition, then, provided an ini-
tial impulse for the expansion of these early Japanese security networks 
throughout the Korean treaty port system.
Why Consular Police?
Before we examine the dramatic expansion of consular police facilities in 
Korea that followed the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, several ques-
tions concerning the reasoning that supported the establishment of For-
eign Ministry security forces in Korea deserve consideration.
In a study of Japanese police forces in formal colonial territories, one 
historian argues that, because “in the Japanese view, management of colo-
nial peoples resembled management of society in early Meiji . . . the colo-
nial police came to play a role in the colonies very similar to that played by 
the Japanese police at home.”27 As this chapter has already begun to re-
veal, almost every facet of more well-known colonial and metropolitan po-
lice activity can be just as easily discerned in a survey of the Foreign 
Ministry’s police forces and their operations. Consular police history, 
however, poses a particular problem in that the consular police performed 
these duties in legally noncolonial but unquestionably extranational 
space. In other words, the consular police were colonial police in just 
about everything but name. It is with this paradox in mind then that the 
function of the consular police in Korea must be considered.
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The duties of the Japanese consular police in Korea during the 1880s 
and early 1890s incorporated a vast set of responsibilities, and these duties 
were not necessarily intended for the sole protection of resident Japanese 
civilians. In fact, the consular police defined their obligations in much 
broader terms characterized by an inclusive rhetorical commitment to 
“protect anyone in trouble, while making no distinction between Japanese 
and Koreans.”28 Despite this expression of high-minded nobility of pur-
pose, average Korean residents likely viewed the activities of Japanese po-
lice in their communities with more than a little suspicion. 
Indeed, the problem of how to correctly define the identity of the 
Japanese consular police in the eyes of local Koreans and other foreign 
treaty port residents emerged as a matter of debate among Japanese offi-
cials early on. In particular, patrolman uniforms became a focus of con-
cern. In an 1884 report, for example, Inch’õn Consul Kobayashi suggested 
that consular police in Korean treaty ports should have similar if not iden-
tical uniforms to those of police on the home islands. He reasoned that 
unique uniforms for consular police would distinguish them as some sort 
of extraordinary quasi-colonial security force, likely thus provoking criti-
cism from other foreign residents in the concession.29 His Foreign Minis-
try superiors agreed, and early renderings of consular police attire thus 
look strikingly similar to that of Home Ministry police officers in 1880s 
Tokyo. The significant point here is that Kobayashi made a deliberate ef-
fort to deemphasize the distinction between foreign and domestic spheres, 
or gaichi and naichi in later colonial parlance. Ironically, they did this in an 
effort to deflect potential criticism of the Foreign Ministry police institu-
tion as a tool of Japanese imperial encroachment. In later years, the fact 
that Japanese consular police in Manchuria were largely indistinguishable 
from the police forces of the army and the Kwantung colonial government 
was a target of heated protest by local Chinese authorities. It is evident 
from even these earliest of years, however, that the consular police by their 
very nature blurred the borders of colonial authority even in the minds of 
their Japanese inventors.
Furthermore, some Japanese even had their doubts about the propri-
ety of the new consular police institution itself. Despite the fact that the 
consular police in Korea during the 1880s were still quite small in total 
manpower, one official Japanese observer made an especially prescient 
comment in 1886 about the potentially problematic issue of legitimacy in 
terms of international law. Questioning the jurisdictional propriety of one 
person—namely a Japanese consul—possessing both judicial and investi-
gative powers, Akabane Tomoharu argued that judges and police officers 
should not be the same people.30 The foundations of consular police le-
gitimacy, then, seemed already to rest on rather shaky ground. Akabane’s 
point, however, was merely to draw attention to such possibly problematic 
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conflicts of interest, not to undermine the consular system itself. Still, that 
he would even raise the question reveals the existence of uncertainty, if 
not outright doubt, concerning consular police legality, opening the door 
for more forceful criticism to come when Gaimushô police would make 
their appearance in treaty-port China a decade later.
It is in the shadow of such doubts concerning legitimacy that one 
must begin to explore the logic behind the creation of the consular po-
lice system, and turning to the emergence of domestic security networks 
is the first step. The creation of a nationalized police system in Japan 
proper did not itself begin until after the establishment of the Home 
Ministry in 1874, and consequently the first officers to take up positions 
as consular policemen in treaty port Korea from 1880–1884 were drawn 
from a metropolitan police force still very much in its infancy. To trans-
fer metropolitan police officers to serve in consular outposts would not 
have been unusual during the 1880s, because at that time the “diplo-
matic and consular officers were in no way different from the ordinary 
administrative officers in other departments” of the civilian bureau-
cracy. Not until 1893, in fact, were reforms put into place “whereby dip-
lomatic and consular officers were confined to those who successfully 
passed examinations and the system of free transfers from the ordinary 
civil service to the diplomatic and consular service and vice versa was 
abolished.”31 Furthermore, the cost of maintaining domestic police 
posts during the first decade of Meiji was split evenly between the com-
munity and central government resources.32 Likewise, in the Japanese 
communities of Pusan, Inch’õn, and Seoul, fiscal burdens fell to a large 
extent on the residents themselves, and the same would be true in Chi-
nese cities such as Tianjin and Nanjing after 1896. What all of this sug-
gests is that a similar process of creating the institutional apparatus for 
the efficient and “modern” administration of localities unfolded along 
similar lines, and almost simultaneously, in both provincial Japan and 
throughout the nascent informal empire. In some sense, then, this pro-
cess is one that transcends sharp distinctions between techniques of es-
tablishing and enforcing metropolitan and semicolonial sovereignty.
It is also possible, and perhaps critically important, then, to see that, 
while the Japanese state was laying the groundwork for not just social 
control but also political authority on the Korean peninsula, the same 
task was under way on the home islands. Indeed, as one scholar has 
noted, “Japan colonized Korea, but the Meiji government also colonized 
Japan from within.”33 On this point, recent scholarship has revealed that 
the Meiji government modeled its 1874 police force on British colonial 
models as much as, if not more than, the 1870s French model in Paris.34 
Why was the colonial police model more appropriate than that of met-
ropolitan France? The answer lies in the fact that the Meiji Restoration 
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was quite literally a conflict as a result of which the samurai elite of the 
southwestern Satsuma-Chôshû domain clique conquered and “colo-
nized” their enemies and their territory.35 This fact is reflected dramati-
cally in the makeup of the early Meiji police force, which consisted 
substantially of former samurai from Satsuma. Of course, army and navy 
officer ranks were also dominated by former samurai from the south-
west, but the lower ranks in those groups were largely commoners con-
scripted from around the country. In the metropolitan police ranks, on 
the other hand, Satsuma samurai dominated all levels of personnel, giv-
ing the metropolitan police an insular and more militant character. 
They were, in a sense, colonial security forces watching over Tokyo.36 
The logic behind the expansion and escalation of Japanese consular 
police in Korea, then, can be understood as a correlative process, not an 
end result, of the simultaneous construction of powerful security net-
works on the home islands.37
Some characteristics of the early metropolitan and consular police 
systems were nonetheless indicative of the influence that continental 
European models of police systems (largely French and German), rather 
than those of Great Britain or the United States, had on the formation 
of Meiji police institutions. As Elise Tipton has argued, “Meiji founders 
employed the term ‘police’ in the broad seventeenth and eighteenth 
century sense of all internal administration rather than the narrow 
sense of crime prevention and detection.”38 In the language of the For-
eign Ministry, the duties of consular police in Korea were often summa-
rized with the phrase hogo torishimari, translatable as “to protect and 
control,” and the term captures well the nature of Japanese police busi-
ness both at home and overseas. In both locales, police served as a tool 
for facilitating social management and maintaining public security. 
This comprehensive social approach to police work was certainly evi-
dent in the evolution of consular police networks in treaty port Korea, 
and it would also be true in China and especially Manchuria during the 
early decades of the twentieth century. 
If an appreciation of the domestic context of early Meiji-era police 
work can shed explanatory light on the perceived necessity for consular 
police in Korea, why was it that the ruling elite of Japan also believed that 
the creation of consular police was perfectly legitimate within the context 
of international law? Here the key can be found in considering Japan’s re-
lationship with the Western powers at the same historical moment of the 
1870s. Most of the major states of Europe and North America possessed 
small settlements in Japanese ports where they enjoyed extraterritorial 
rights and maintained their own modest police forces. After obtaining 
similar extraterritorial privileges in 1876, Japan began to do the same in 
Korea. For just over twenty years (1876–1899), then, the Japanese state was 
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both subjected to and exercised the prerogatives of unequal treaty rela-
tionships, and this duality poses a number of vexing problems.39
Looking at the foundation of the Tokyo metropolitan police, for ex-
ample, the young Meiji government’s introduction of a new police force 
was driven in part by its recognition of Japan’s own semicolonial status, in 
that the inability of that Japanese state to prevent violence against foreign-
ers and maintain civil order within their own cities undermined the desire 
of the Meiji regime to attain treaty revision with the Western powers.40 A 
modern nation was defined by its ability to maintain control over its citi-
zenry, and thus Japanese demands for equality with the West would carry 
more persuasive power once Meiji government’s own domestic authority 
had been unquestionably secured. The irony, of course, is that while Japa-
nese political elites were striving to attain treaty revision with the West in 
order to regain their own national sovereignty on the home islands, they 
simultaneously took successive steps to encroach upon the national sover-
eignty of Korea. This does shed important light, however, on the matter of 
why Japanese authorities insisted upon their right to maintain consular 
police forces. In their view, it was the inadequacy of “native” Korean police 
institutions that made Japanese consular police necessary. The Koreans 
would thus first be rquired to prove themselves capable of protecting the 
lives and property of foreign residents in the treaty ports before extraterri-
torial police power would be relinquished—an obviously self-serving logic 
that Japanese consular authorities would again employ in China after 1896. 
In short, just as recent scholarship has emphasized how Japan’s ruling elite 
carefully and deliberately constructed the rhetoric of Korean annexation 
in 1910 to give it an internationally recognized veneer of legal legitimacy, 
so as early as the 1880s Japanese consular authorities followed a similar 
strategy in order to justify the maintenance of its consular police force.41 
Expansion during the Sino-Japanese War Era
During the 1880s, the Foreign Ministry viewed the operation of consular 
police forces as essential until the Korean government could organize ef-
fective security forces of its own. The notion that consular police were a 
temporary necessity but not a permanent institution remained the domi-
nant view from Kasumigaseki until the mid-1890s. At that point, however, 
the meaning of “protect and control” changed, and with that the consular 
police came to be understood as highly useful, if not quite indispensable, 
in facilitating larger geopolitical goals. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 
was the turning point that solidified that transformation.42
The consular police institutions that had taken shape during the early 
1880s remained largely unchanged in terms of manpower until the mid-
1890s. At that time, domestic unrest in Korea as well as rising tensions be-
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tween Japan and China over their respective influences on the peninsula 
contributed to a growing sense of crisis facing the Japanese treaty port 
community, and the end of the war also saw a dramatic influx of new Japa-
nese residents to Korean treaty ports.43 Consular leadership and their po-
lice forces responded to all of these challenges by expanding the numerical 
and geographical scope of their presence. As early as June 1894, fifteen 
police officers from the police bureau of the Home Ministry were trans-
ferred to the Foreign Ministry in order to bolster its forces in Korea, and of 
those fifteen men ten were sent to Inch’õn and five to Pusan. By February 
1896, the consul at Inch’õn sought an even greater increase when he asked 
for a staff of thirty patrolmen in his station, a staffing level it nearly reached 
by the spring of 1897. Wõnsan and Pusan also grew considerably during 
the immediate postwar years, but Seoul was a somewhat unique case. Both 
the embassy and the consulate had maintained a small police force in the 
capital since the early 1880s, but budgetary restrictions put in place in 
1889 had forced the embassy to transfer its officers to the consulate office 
in early 1892.44 That force then continued to grow until it became the larg-
est consular police contingent in Korea by the late 1890s, with three detec-
tives and fifty patrolmen.45
The exigencies of the Sino-Japanese War not only brought increases 
in already established consular police facilities; the postwar period saw 
several new consulates and subconsulates emerge on the scene. The ex-
pansion of consular facilities was seen as a necessary step in response to 
the rapid increase in Japanese resident populations after the war, as sub-
consulates at Mokp’o (1897), Chinnamp’o (1897), and Masan (1899) 
were all elevated to full consulate status by 1900. Additional subcon-
sulates at Kunsan, Songjin, and P’yõngyang opened in 1899, bringing 
the total number of Japanese consular offices in Korea to ten. When the 
police personnel increases at the four original offices are combined with 
the police stationed in the six new offices, the increase in Japan’s con-
sular police in Korea between 1894 and 1899 amounts to a rise from 52 
to 134, or roughly 250 percent.46 
During this period of expansion the Japanese consular police also 
initiated a practice that would prove to be one of the most controversial in 
its future activities in China. As Japanese civilians began to move beyond 
the confines of the treaty port concession regions and into the Korean in-
terior, the consular police felt bound to follow. Since they could not set up 
a consulate or subconsulate in every town where Japanese residents set-
tled, they instead began establishing hashutsujo (police boxes) and chûzaijo 
(police substations) in more remote interior locations, a process not un-
like what metropolitan police throughout the home islands had begun to 
do roughly a decade prior.47 Usually staffed by a single officer, these out-
posts of consular police surveillance sprang up wherever Japanese civil-
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ians staked a claim to residence. In this sense, Japanese merchants, 
business owners, and farmers and the consular police worked hand in 
hand to expand Japanese influence in and control over local Korean com-
merce and trade.48
During the Sino-Japanese War, the consular police were also in-
volved in a Japanese attempt to place advisers in the Korean government 
as a means of directing policy and reforming Korean administrative in-
stitutions.49 These efforts were led by a highly placed police official in 
the Home Ministry police bureau named Takehisa Katsuzô. Takehisa 
and the men under his command spent two years training and advising 
Korean police in Seoul, and while their attempt ultimately came to 
naught, they set a precedent for a more aggressive policy of institutional 
advisers that would follow the Russo-Japanese War ten years later.
The Korean capital in the late summer of 1894 was an environment 
brimming with tensions of all sorts. The Korean government was under 
siege from Tonghak rebels across the country, and China and Japan 
were busy jockeying for position for influence over rulership in the Ko-
rean court. The Japanese resident population in Seoul was one of the 
largest in Korea at the time, and as a preparatory measure the Japanese 
Home Ministry decided to dispatch an emergency police force of roughly 
a hundred men to Korea in August 1894.50 Takehisa held command over 
this force, and they were charged with the duty of protecting Japanese 
civilian life and property, most of them being sent to Seoul while some 
went to Wõnsan. It was not long before the duties of this emergency po-
lice force expanded beyond the simple protection of Japanese civilians. 
By October 1894, Takehisa’s term of service had been extended indefi-
nitely, and the mission’s purpose came to include training and advising 
Korean police in the capital. In November, there was even talk of send-
ing more police into those areas of nearby Chinese territory that had 
been occupied by the Japanese army.51
While the initial expeditionary police force was comprised entirely of 
officers from the police bureau of the Home Ministry, there were of course 
already Japanese consular police in Seoul when the metropolitan police 
arrived. This gave rise to a sensitive and complicated administrative prob-
lem.52 The consular police in Seoul had had years of local experience, so 
they were naturally called upon by Takehisa and the Home Ministry po-
lice for assistance in the training of Korean officers. However, consular 
police were paid out of the consular budget, and Home Ministry police 
salaries were the responsibility of the Police Bureau back in Tokyo. It soon 
came to light that Home Ministry police were being paid roughly twice as 
much as consular police for the same work.53 The controversy soon died 
down, however, because by December 1894 a large percentage of those 
officers dispatched to Korea as part of the emergency force in August had 
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been transferred to the Seoul consular police, while others were sent back 
to Tokyo in January and February 1895. Takehisa himself remained in 
Seoul throughout 1895 and worked with the consular police there as ad-
visers to the Korean government. By July, almost all the original emer-
gency police had returned to Japan, except for those who had been 
transferred to the consulate or who had volunteered to stay on as advisers 
under Takehisa’s charge. Because the Korean court came to feel a closer 
affinity to the Russian consular authorities in Seoul during 1896, Takehisa 
was dismissed from his advisory position in the Korean government.54
This era of police reform under the Takehisa and the Seoul consular 
police can be viewed in a number of ways. It is quite easy, for example, to 
condemn it as a fait accompli imposed upon the Korean court in the midst 
of Japan’s emergency dispatch of police to Seoul in 1894, in that the Ko-
rean leadership was forced by Japan to accept as police advisers a group of 
police officers who had already been placed in their capital.55 Alternatively, 
one cannot completely discount the fact that the Japanese community in 
Seoul did indeed face a significant amount of danger in the second half of 
1894. That being the case, one might argue that the Foreign Ministry had 
both a right and an obligation to take steps necessary to ensure the security 
of its resident nationals. However, the work of Takehisa and his group of 
police advisers including those from the Seoul consulate, can also be 
viewed as a part of the Kabo domestic reforms that came in the wake of the 
social and political disturbances caused by the Tonghak Rebellion.56 Many 
of the pro-Japanese Korean progressives of the 1880s were placed back into 
power when Japan seized control of the Korean government during the 
spring of 1894, and while the Japanese certainly kept a close watch over the 
Korean cabinet, the reforms “were by no means merely a narrow imperial-
istic device.”57 With the pro-Chinese Min oligarchs and the conservative 
Taewõn’gun temporarily removed from positions of influence, the new re-
form-minded Korean leadership unleashed a series of wide-sweeping re-
form programs in the fields of commerce, industry, judiciary, and police 
work. It was as a part of this program that Takehisa was involved in assisting 
the establishment of a centralized police department in Seoul in 1894, and 
the consular police in Seoul were no doubt indispensable to Takehisa’s mis-
sion. They had had almost fifteen years of local experience when Takehisa 
and his men arrived in the summer of 1894. It was their knowledge of local 
conditions as well as their ability to effectively communicate with Korean 
police, that made the advisory program possible.58 
Interwar Growth and Conflict
Japan’s victory over China in 1895 and the peace settlement that fol-
lowed in 1896 put an official end to Sino-Japanese rivalry over influence 
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on the Korean peninsula, but this did not mean that Japanese suzer-
ainty would go unchallenged. The next and much more powerful rival 
was imperial Russia, and the contest with Russia, among several other 
factors, brought another wave of growth and change for the Japanese 
consular police in Korea during the first few years of the new century.
As noted earlier, the population of civilian Japanese residents in Ko-
rean port cities grew rapidly after the Sino-Japanese War, and by 1900 the 
Pusan consulate was expressing its need for more and better trained offi-
cers in the city. Citing remarkable growth in the local Japanese commu-
nity, especially in residents engaged in the fishing industry, as well as the 
need for staff equipped to manage relations with Korean residents, one 
report complained that the current staff level was both too small and un-
derqualified to deal with increasingly complex problems.59 Local Japanese 
resident associations in other areas took it upon themselves to demand 
more and better police protection in their neighborhoods too. In October 
1903, for example, representatives of the newer Japanese community in 
P’yõngyang, a community much smaller by comparison than well-estab-
lished ones in cities such as Pusan, petitioned for an increase of ten con-
sular police patrolmen in their concession, arguing that it was because 
they constituted a mere three hundred or so Japanese in the midst of 
thousands of Koreans that more needed to be done to provide for the 
protection of their lives and property in the event of an emergency.60 Judg-
ing from the impatient pleas of these Japanese residents, the expansion of 
civilian Japanese settlements throughout postwar Korea was far outpacing 
both the financial and manpower resources of the consular system.61
Korean treaty port settlements in general also grew after the war as 
more foreign nationals of several different countries took up residence in 
concession areas, and as these urban centers expanded in size, a need for 
a general concession police system arose.62 The administration of civil ser-
vice institutions in Korean as well as Chinese treaty port concessions was a 
complicated matter, because decisions were made and a budget produced 
by a local administrative body comprised of representatives from all the 
countries involved. On the issues of concession police, most treaty port 
communities maintained a rudimentary police force staffed and paid by 
the local international board. As the foreign treaty port community grew, 
however, many local European diplomatic representatives quickly recog-
nized that the Japanese consular police were a highly organized, well-
trained, efficient, and effective local police organization. Since negotiating 
a budget for international concession police could be such a complicated 
chore, in many instances local foreign consulates simply opted to recog-
nize the Japanese consular police as the de facto concession police. The 
case of Inch’õn is indicative of the general pattern evident elsewhere, as 
the local international resident council determined that to establish an 
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independent security force would simply create too heavy a financial bur-
den. Therefore, they acceded to the notion of the Japanese consular po-
lice serving as the general concession security force, to the extent that it 
did not become troublesome for Japanese authorities.63
The apparent enthusiasm with which other foreign governments 
welcomed the activities of the Japanese consular police was, however, 
rather short-lived. In particular, the attitude of fellow imperial powers 
in treaty port Korea began to change after Japan’s victory over China in 
1895, with many Western representatives growing more suspicious of 
Japanese intentions in Korea. For example, at Inch’õn in 1897 there 
were several episodes of protests by American and German diplomatic 
representatives that seemed to reveal a growing resentment toward Ja-
pan’s control over local security operations.64 Similar disputes erupted 
in Chinnamp’o in 1899, where the other foreign authorities were grow-
ing increasingly uncomfortable with having uniformed Japanese police 
roaming the concession neighborhoods.65 No foreign power was more 
opposed to the idea of Japanese consular police as general concession 
security forces than imperial Russia, as the case of the Russian consulate 
in Masan illustrates vividly. In 1902 a dispute erupted between the Rus-
sian consul there and the Japanese consular representatives over the 
propriety of the Japanese consular police, with the Russians arguing 
that internationally recognized concession laws forbade the community 
from relying on the police forces of any one country for protection of 
the whole; police apparatus was, rather, the responsibility of the conces-
sion’s local international administrative board. In fact, what the Rus-
sians really objected to was the idea that Japanese consular police would 
be the sole law enforcement body in a port that the Russians were eager 
to build up as a naval stronghold in the Pacific.66
The interwar period also saw another burst of consular police expan-
sion in geographical terms, and this growth was linked with the construc-
tion of a railway line between Seoul and Pusan.67 Construction began on 
this new line in 1901, but as Japanese concerns over Russian designs in the 
region intensified, the pace was accelerated in 1902–1903. The construc-
tion project brought about significant population changes as the result, 
both of the recruitment and transportation of thousands of railway work-
ers to the Korean interior where the construction would take place, and of 
the arrival of common merchants, shopkeepers, and other business adven-
turists, who soon began to set up shop in the small towns along the planned 
rail line, towns that were sure to grow once the project was completed.68 
On the issue of railroad-related police expansion, Seoul Ambassa-
dor Hayashi Gonsuke explained in a report to Foreign Minister Komura 
Jutarô in May 1903 that the private railroad companies involved in the 
construction projects were hardly capable of providing adequate secu-
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rity on their own. Should disturbances break out, Hayashi reasoned, the 
local Japanese community might be in danger, Japanese companies 
would lose money, and a more widespread general disorder would be 
the result. All of these potential consequences, according to Hayashi, 
would reflect poorly on the dignity of the Japanese empire. Therefore, 
the best course of action would be to station consular police along the 
rail lines, with financial support from the railroad corporations, and to 
supervise security operations as a whole.69 Hayashi, however, was a man 
of foresight, and he clearly recognized the opportunity at hand. To be 
sure, the presence of Japanese police along the rail lines would likely 
help prevent disputes between local Japanese and Korean residents, and 
it was indeed in the best interests of the empire to do whatever possible 
to avoid potential public relations problems caused by poor security in 
the construction zones. Nonetheless, Hayashi also clearly viewed the 
railroad expansion as a convenient and effective excuse for intensifying 
Japan’s police presence throughout the Korean interior.70
This railway-related growth accounted for the last substantial increase 
in consular police personnel in Korea before the outbreak of war with 
Russia. More important, it facilitated the expansion of a Japanese security 
infrastructure that would come to serve quite effectively the creation of a 
protectorate state on the peninsula under Japanese overlordship after 
1905. While the construction of the Seoul–Pusan railroad had justified 
some of that growth, by July 1904 local consular leadership was pushing 
for even more. Consul Ariyoshi in Pusan argued that the population of 
Japanese civilians in the Korean interior had grown dramatically because 
of the railroad and its associated opportunities for profitable commerce, 
and as subjects of the empire police protection of these settlers had to be 
a high priority. To wait for a troublesome incident to erupt and then send 
in military police to quell the situation was not enough, in Ariyoshi’s view. 
He argued instead that Japan needed to have officers—consular police 
officers that is—on the scene in the localities in order to best deal with 
situations as they arose.71 A preemptive escalation of sorts, Ariyoshi clearly 
advocated the need to expand the physical presence of Japan’s consular 
police before military exigencies made it inevitable by 1905.
To facilitate the kind of expansionism Ariyoshi advised, during the 
years leading up to the war with Russia the consular police also con-
ducted extraordinary amounts of research on local social and economic 
conditions throughout the Korean peninsula. Dozens, if not hundreds, 
of the reports produced during these investigative expeditions survive, 
and a careful examination of them reveals the tremendous extent to 
which the Japanese government sought detailed knowledge of the natu-
ral and human resources available in Korea.72 The most common type 
of research trip was carried out by two or three consular police officers, 
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who would make a journey of two to three weeks around a small region, 
and their reports typically included a narrative of their activities, statis-
tics on local demographics, and carefully hand-drawn maps of the areas 
they visited. In many ways, the reports foreshadow the kind of research 
work carried out in China and Manchuria during subsequent decades 
by students of the East Asian Common Culture Academy (Tôa Dôbun 
Shoin) in Shanghai or the Research Section of the South Manchuria 
Railway Company. While the ostensible purpose of these research expe-
ditions was most likely related to immediate strategic concerns about a 
future conflict with Russia, they also certainly reflect a desire for knowl-
edge of regional conditions in order to better plan for Japan’s long-term 
goals on the peninsula.73
Integration during the Russo-Japanese War Era
The Russo-Japanese War, a watershed for so many things in modern Japa-
nese history, also marks the initiation of the final phase in the develop-
ment of the Japanese consular police in Korea. Just as the Sino-Japanese 
War had done ten years earlier, this period of conflict created a justifica-
tion for the expansion of the size and scope of consular police activity. 
Furthermore, it created the environment in which the very nature of the 
institution would be transformed into a pillar of Japanese colonial control 
over the entire Korean peninsula.74
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, the unique 
qualities of consular police field experience became clear to Japan’s mil-
itary planners as dozens of local Gaimushô police officers were enlisted 
by the army to serve as interpreters on the battle front and in occupied 
territories.75 The language skills of consular police officers in Korea 
were apparently unrivaled by anyone in military intelligence. It seems 
clear, then, that the police officer language-training programs culti-
vated in the Korean consulates since the 1880s had produced a crop of 
patrolmen with considerable proficiency in spoken Korean. 
The outbreak of war, however, meant much more than just new oppor-
tunities for consular police officers to tag along on army reconnaissance 
expeditions. In late 1904, the Japanese ambassador at Seoul, Hayashi Gon-
suke, argued that current conditions in Korea demanded a drastic change 
in Japan’s police presence there. Citing the dramatic increase in the resi-
dent Japanese population since the completion of the Seoul–Pusan rail-
way, Hayashi sketched out an ambitious three-part plan for expansion of 
the consular police network. First, he recommended that the number of 
police stations, substations, and police boxes throughout the country be 
increased by a total of forty-one new facilities, secondly bolstering that in-
frastructure with an additional seven inspectors and one hundred and 
 Patterns of Police Work in Late Chosõn Korea | 31
seven patrolmen to be stationed in extant and newly constructed consular 
police facilities. Finally, he argued that a high-ranking police superinten-
dent (keishi) be assigned to both the Seoul and Pusan consulates.76 
Foreign Ministry leadership back in Tokyo did not accept all of 
Hayashi’s suggestions, largely because of budgetary restraints, but they 
did agree with the basic assumption that Japan’s police forces in Korea 
needed to be reinforced and the first step in that direction was the cre-
ation of a new position in the consular police hierarchy. Up until that 
point, there had only been inspectors and patrolmen, with the consul 
being the immediate superior in charge of both. A new position of “sta-
tion chief” (shochô), was instituted at those consulates with more than 
one inspector, and the offices that fulfilled that requirement were in 
Seoul, Pusan, Inch’õn, and Wõnsan. Tokyo also acquiesced to Hayashi’s 
request for a resident police superintendent, assigning a former metro-
politan police inspector from Nagasaki, Kameyama Riheita, to the Seoul 
embassy as a superintendent in early January 1905.77
Although the Foreign Ministry had rejected the idea of an outright 
escalation of consular police personnel in Korea, Hayashi and Foreign 
Minister Komura had been in discussions since December 1904 about 
an alternative method for strengthening the position of Japanese police 
on the peninsula. A Korean-Japanese agreement in September 1904 had 
provided for Japanese advisers to “serve” the Korean government on 
matters of finance and foreign affairs, and Hayashi and Komura planned 
to create a new position of police adviser along these same lines. This 
strategy would bring about a greater Japanese influence over police mat-
ters without a direct increase in consular police personnel. The man se-
lected for the job was a veteran police inspector from the Home Ministry 
named Maruyama Shigetoshi, and his contract with the Korean govern-
ment, orchestrated to appear as though he was coming at the behest of 
the Koreans, was put into action in late January 1905.
Before describing the activities of Maruyama and his cadre of police 
advisers, it is illustrative to note an exchange between Hayashi and Ko-
mura about the nomenclature of their police adviser program. Hayashi 
made the case that instead of the term adviser, or komon, the Japanese 
should insist that Maruyama be referred to as a councilor (sanyo) or even 
manager (kantoku). He argued that “adviser” was too benign a term, and 
that it would not sufficiently encompass the full scope of direct involve-
ment he expected Maruyama to have. Komura, however, responded that 
komon was indeed the proper term, because the financial and foreign-
affairs advisers were also known as komon. Komura reasoned that keep-
ing Maruyama’s position on an equal footing with the other advisers 
would grant him legitimacy. Furthermore, the term “adviser” was broad 
enough to include a vast range of possible areas in which Maruyama 
32 | Crossing Empire’s Edge
could involve himself and his staff. Komura’s judgment ultimately won 
out, and Maruyama was from then on referred to as Kankoku keimu 
komon (adviser on police affairs in Korea).78 It is important to note, how-
ever, that even though Hayashi and Komura disagreed on what would 
be the best term for his position, they both agreed that Maruyama 
needed to have the greatest latitude possible in his job description so 
that the Japanese government could have as much hands-on influence 
over police policy as possible.
Maruyama took up his new position in late January 1905.79 One of 
his major overall goals was to create a nationwide network of police ad-
visers, all responsible to his headquarters in Seoul. That network even-
tually came to consist of five police stations in the city of Seoul itself, 
while a system of thirteen field offices, one in each of the thirteen major 
provinces, was also put in place. Each of these regional branches was 
staffed by one superintendent, one inspector, three patrolmen, and one 
interpreter; these six officers in each of thirteen provinces amounted to 
seventy-eight men.80 In the capital itself, Maruyama also devoted a con-
siderable amount of resources to police training schools. In these small 
academies, Japanese police officers in the role of instructors conducted 
classes for Korean police from the Korean central police department. 
One source describes a Monday–Saturday curriculum with four hours 
of instruction each morning including physical conditioning, instruc-
tion in investigative techniques and criminal law, basic police duties and 
regulations, and Japanese-language practice.81
Where did the Japanese police who staffed all of these new positions 
come from? Many were transferred from positions in the Home Minis-
try police bureau or from various metropolitan police departments all 
over Japan. In fact, concerning the police adviser program under Mar-
uyama, historian Ogino Fujio suggests that the plan to employ “police 
advisers” from metropolitan Japan was driven by the Home Ministry’s 
desire to station its own security forces directly in Korea, and thereby 
more directly facilitate Japanese control over the internal conditions of 
Korean society.82 However, Maruyama also relied heavily on the Japa-
nese consular police who had already been operating in Korea for over 
twenty years when he arrived. Consular police officers in the capital 
could be put to good use in cultivating cordial relations with Korean 
government because of their language skills, and they also were natural 
candidates for positions as police work instructors.83 Police officers from 
the Seoul consulate were indeed often recruited as instructors in Mar-
uyama’s training academies, and they also served in the five main Seoul 
police stations and the thirteen provincial branch offices. Personnel sta-
tistics indicate that Maruyama consistently incorporated consular po-
lice into his cadre of advisers specifically because they often had finely 
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honed Korean-language skills, something that the fresh arrivals from 
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagasaki rarely, if ever, possessed. This police ad-
viser network continued to expand and diversify its activities through-
out 1905, and there were one hundred seventeen Japanese police officers 
officially employed in the keimu komon program by the end of the year. 
Significantly, twenty-one of those officers were consular police, repre-
senting roughly 18 percent of the total.84 The skills and experience of 
the consular police obviously proved quite valuable to Maruyama and 
the entire police adviser system.
It was not simply their practical skills, however, that made the con-
sular police useful members of Maruyama’s adviser system. The cover of 
legal legitimacy that their status as consular employees could provide, as 
well as their physical proximity to provincial areas, also had important 
benefits. In describing his plan to provide consular police inspectors with 
joint appointments as “assistant police advisers” (keimu komon hosakan), 
Ambassador Hayashi pointed out quite bluntly that local consular police 
captains were in the best possible position to undermine the authority of 
provincial Korean officials. Furthermore, because their presence in the 
countryside as consular staff was less conspicuous than having metropoli-
tan police from Japan dispatched to those same areas, the “vanity” of the 
central Korean government, according to Hayashi, could still be satis-
fied.85 This reliance on local consular police, however, did not last long, as 
only thirteen of the forty-three advisory officers posted to local areas in 
June 1905 were consular police officers. This shift can be explained at 
least in part by the fact that Maruyama was rather disappointed with the 
personal character of some Foreign Ministry police officers after they had 
assumed positions in his advisory force, and the Foreign Ministry itself 
even admitted that there were problems with the attitude and morale of 
their consular officers.86 Nonetheless, even while recognizing these short-
comings, it cannot be denied that the mere existence of consular police 
forces in Korean treaty ports for over twenty years significantly facilitated 
the Japanese assumption of all police power in Korea by 1910, beginning 
with the police adviser system under Maruyama in 1905.87
It is also useful at this point to make some comparisons between the 
attempts at police reforms under the direction of Takehisa Katsuzô in 
1894–1896 and those of Maruyama Shigetoshi and the keimu komon system 
in 1905.88 In the documents related to both episodes the most common 
phrase used to describe their goals in Korea was keisatsu kaizen, an im-
provement of domestic Korean police institutions. However, during Take-
hisa’s tenure at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese police 
involved in efforts at reforming Korean police organizations were most 
often refereed to as ôen keisatsu, or “support police.” In addition, the com-
mon use of the phrase rinji haken, or “temporary deployment,” to describe 
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their mission implied a clear limit to their term of service. Of course, Take-
hisa and the consular police who worked for him might well have contin-
ued to advise the Korean court if the Russians had not replaced them as 
more trustworthy supporters. Nonetheless, most of those Japanese police 
sent to Korea in late 1894 were eventually sent back to Japan by the middle 
of 1895. The nature of the police deployments in 1905 under Maruyama 
was quite different. The assignment of large numbers of Japanese police 
to various new positions and locations was never referred to as “tempo-
rary.” Clearly, this time the Japanese police were there to stay. 
The careful and deliberate planning that went into creating Maruy-
ama’s police advisory system thus on some level indicates its position in 
a larger program of enhancing Japanese control over the peninsula. At 
the same time that Maruyama and his cadre of police advisers were ex-
ecuting their mission of reforming Korean police institutions, however, 
a high-level police commissioner from Tokyo arrived in Seoul in the 
summer of 1905 to evaluate the effectiveness of Japanese police forces in 
Korea. In a summary report on his findings in September, he identified 
ten general areas of Japanese police operations that required immedi-
ate attention, and among his list were such things as unification of po-
lice duties, revamping overall management strategies, clarifying the 
limits of police duties, setting standards and rules of police behavior, 
standardizing staff and personnel strength, better budget planning, 
salaries and promotion schedules, and improving jail facilities.89 These 
are hardly the observations of someone who found a well-oiled system 
rooted in a long-term plan for the destruction of Korean independence. 
What his recommendations suggest, rather, is that the consular police 
system in Korea and the subsequent police adviser programs took shape 
in a highly haphazard and ad hoc manner. Hardly a decades-long and 
carefully calculated program of encroachment on Korean sovereignty 
by hijacking its public security apparatus, Japanese police institutions in 
late Chosõn Korea had evolved in a fractured and piecemeal way. The 
protection and advancement of Japanese interests were always the top 
priority, but the path toward that goal was a shaky and contentious one 
constantly shaped by the forces of contingency and opportunism.
The disorganized manner through which Japanese authorities came 
to control all police functions in Korea is also reflected in relations be-
tween the consular police and the Japanese army during 1905. Along with 
the Japanese consular police, protectorate police, and police advisers, 
there was one more foreign security force operating on the Korean penin-
sula in the milieu of the immediate post–Russo-Japanese War era: the ken-
peitai, or military police. Perhaps not surprisingly, army leadership argued 
for placing local consular police under kenpeitai control in areas under 
military occupation, largely because consular and military police forces 
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had frequent jurisdictional clashes. The Foreign Ministry, however, re-
sisted attempts to incorporate their police forces into the military police.90 
Guidelines worked out between the two sides dictated that on matters of 
public security in areas under army control, the kenpeitai would have ulti-
mate jurisdiction, with local consular police answering to military author-
ities. However, in matters of normal police business, the consular police 
retained their jurisdictional prerogatives except in cases directly related 
to the army, wherein the consular police and the kenpeitai would work 
closely together.91 Even though the line between army and Foreign Minis-
try authority was hazy, and perhaps because of that fact, the consular po-
lice were determined to hold on to their position.
The role of the consular police in the system of police advisers under 
Maruyama came to an end in late 1905. In November a new treaty agree-
ment between Korea and Japan mandated that Korea become a protec-
torate under Japanese authority, and during the following month new 
administrative institutions were developed. In February 1906, all of Ja-
pan’s consulates and the embassy in Korea were closed, as the functions 
of the Foreign Ministry in Korea were now under the control of the new 
protectorate institutions. At that time there were roughly 270 Japanese 
consular police in Korea, and while a few of those officers were trans-
ferred to consulates in China, most were incorporated into the protec-
torate police organization.92 With that move, the twenty-five-year history 
of the Japanese consular police in Korea came to a close.93
Concerning the transfer of all consular police in Korea to the juris-
diction of the protectorate administration in December 1905, the key 
point is that once the imperial Japanese state seized power over Korean 
foreign relations through the Second Japan–Korea Agreement, Japa-
nese diplomatic offices on the peninsula became obsolete. Likewise, the 
logical and legal justification for Japanese consular police protecting 
and controlling Japanese residents also ceased to exist, in that the Ko-
rean peninsula was no longer “foreign” territory.94 It is especially inter-
esting to note that this process was almost identical to what would occur 
in December 1937 when extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo was abol-
ished. In that case, however, the consular police were dissolved in order 
to create the fiction of Manchurian independence. In the earlier sce-
nario, of course, they were disbanded in Korea to do the opposite—
namely, to initiate the destruction of Korean sovereignty.
A collection of memoirs from the period of police advisers under 
Maruyama Shigetoshi reveals one last significant point to be mentioned in 
this chapter. As later discussion will show, the Japanese consular police in 
China and Manchuria gradually assumed duties of political policing in 
the informal empire, especially after 1919. Evidence suggests, however, 
that the so-called kôtô keisatsu (high-level police) of the consular police 
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had even earlier origins. Apparently, the Seoul consular police were also 
engaged in the surveillance and suppression of “villainous” (burai) Japa-
nese citizens in Korea, most likely referring to the rônin adventurer types 
engaged in surreptitious activities designed to undermine the Korean 
government.95 Among the earliest targets of politically driven Japanese 
consular police action, then, were Japanese nationals. Put differently, what 
made someone a target of consular police surveillance and suppression 
was behavior that posed a threat to the political will of the imperial Meiji 
regime. Targets of that sort could be Japanese just as easily as Korean.
Conclusions
Within this introductory survey of the Korean origins of Japanese con-
sular police institutions four main themes are worth revisiting. First, this is 
the story of Japan’s earliest quasi-colonial organization in northeast Asia. 
Extensive colonial police forces were a hallmark of Japan’s rule over the 
formal empire in both Taiwan and Korea, but fifteen years before Japan 
acquired Taiwan and thirty years before the full-scale annexation of 
Korea, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had established a police 
Commemorative photo of the Japanese consulate staff at Chinnamp’o on the occa-
sion of the office’s closing, February 1, 1906. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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network that performed many of the functions normally associated with 
the apparatuses of colonialism. In everything but name the Japanese con-
sular police on the Korean peninsula from 1880 to 1905 were a colonial 
public security institution. Therefore, in the search for precedents related 
to Japanese colonial security policy, we must recognize that Taiwan was 
not only the testing ground; treaty port Korea was as well. In addition, the 
steps taken by the Foreign Ministry police to secure control over treaty 
port society in late nineteenth-century Korea transpired simultaneously 
with like-minded efforts on the Japanese archipelago, reminding us of the 
need to place early police work in both its proper international and do-
mestic contexts.
Second, the story illustrates how large a role the Foreign Ministry 
played in facilitating the eventual annexation of Korea. In the broadest 
view, the Japanese consular police created a peninsula-wide infrastructure 
for police surveillance through their establishment of police substations 
and field offices, and the police forces of the colonial government-general 
thus had a headstart on building the physical tools of police control. The 
consular police also conducted extensive field research that produced a 
massive body of empirical knowledge about local social and economic con-
ditions in Korea, and this research was surely put to use in future land-use 
policy decisions under the formal colonial regime. Their local language 
skills also proved especially useful in facilitating the elimination of autono-
mous Korean police in favor of a Japanese colonial security bureau, with 
many of the police officers who would serve as colonial enforcers after 1910 
being trained by consular police veterans. Finally, the consular police 
themselves became a part of the colonial police system in 1905, bringing 
with them twenty-five years of experience in the field.
Third, the history of the consular police makes clear the significant 
role played by Japanese residents in accelerating the complete imperial 
colonization of Korea, evident in two interrelated ways. Resident associa-
tions consistently made the first demands for a greater police presence in 
their neighborhoods. Obligated by their raison d’être of protecting Japa-
nese civilian life and property overseas, the Foreign Ministry responded to 
such requests by sending in more patrolmen whenever it was politically and 
fiscally possible. Indeed, as Alain Delissen has also concluded, the Japa-
nese community in treaty port Korea was “one of the major causes prompt-
ing increasing Japanese meddling in Korean affairs.”96 Furthermore, 
organizations of local Japanese business people directly supported the po-
lice system financially by providing in many cases as much as half of the 
expense of maintaining the consular police forces in their communities.
Finally, as later chapters will show, the history of the consular police in 
Korea was simply a prelude to what was yet to come in China and Manchu-
ria. After the political and commercial treaties of 1896 and 1915, there is a 
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clear pattern of initial consular police deployment in limited numbers fol-
lowed by gradual and contested increases in strength. Eventually, the full-
blown colonial conquest of Korea in 1910 would be repeated in Manchuria 
by 1932, and attempted in China after 1937. But, rather than reflecting a 
well-calculated and systematic program of Japanese aggression, the nu-
merous jurisdictional conflicts and institutional rivalries, especially be-
tween the Foreign Ministry and the army, reveal that there was no uniform 
voice emanating from the Japanese side. While the end goal for all parties 
was the protection and advancement of the empire’s interests, the ques-
tion of how best to achieve those ends was fiercely debated.
One last comment on what transpired during the disturbances in 
Seoul during the summer of 1882 provides a telling sign of things to come 
and an appropriate note on which to end this chapter. In the violence of 
that episode, six consular police officers in the capital lost their lives. The 
ultimate sacrifice of these six men was soon thereafter commemorated at 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the sacred space where Japan’s war dead were 
and are still remembered. The official Foreign Ministry statement on 
those memorial services described the men as brave martyrs who faced 
danger squarely and gave their lives “for the sake of the nation” (kokka no 
tame).97 This is among the earliest but certainly not the last expression of 
this sort. The consular police viewed themselves as more than mere beat 
cops and bureaucrats; their role in protecting the empire placed them 
among the ranks of honored national heroes. In tracing the evolution of 
the force over the next few decades in China and Manchuria, we shall wit-
ness this broad imperial ideology embraced by Foreign Ministry police 
becoming even more dramatic and militarized.
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2
A Disputed Presence in Late Qing 
and Early Republican China
The early history of Japan’s Foreign Ministry police in China, 
South Manchuria, and the Sino-Korean border region of Jiandao (J. 
Kantô; Kor. Gando) had two things in common with the establishment of 
the consular police in Korea. First, in all three cases the initial deploy-
ment of police forces was quite small, and their duties were limited to the 
protection and management of Japanese civilian life and property in 
open treaty port communities. Second, in each case the Japanese govern-
ment cited mutually recognized treaty agreements between Japan and 
Korea or Japan and China as the legal basis for their maintenance of po-
lice units attached to consulate offices. The greatest difference between 
the early experiences in these two regions was that in China the establish-
ment of Japanese consular police forces met with much greater resistance 
from the Chinese government and the local populations than had been 
the case in Korea. This fact is perhaps attributable in some part to more 
general and long-standing differences between Sino-Japanese and Ko-
rean-Japanese relations, but the contemporary geopolitical context is 
likely the more significant factor. East Asian international relations in the 
late 1890s were even more volatile than they had been in the early 1880s.
This chapter will explore the conditions under which the Foreign 
Ministry expanded its consular police infrastructure throughout north-
east Asia from the end of the Sino-Japanese War until the turbulent year 
of 1919, when Korean independence and Chinese nationalist movements 
began to inspire a radical transformation in the character and scope of 
Japanese consular police activities. While the overall numbers of con-
sular police personnel remained relatively small during this early pe-
riod, the dubious legality of their existence came under assault from 
numerous directions. The discussion focuses first on the Chinese treaty 
port environment and then turns to Manchuria, with special emphasis 
given to the Jiandao region. In all three places, the Foreign Ministry saw 
the legal legitimacy and jurisdictional authority of its consular police 
forces contested by local Chinese officials, other foreign colonial pow-
ers, and even rival institutions of their own imperial government; but 
the Gaimushô refused to back down. As later chapters will show, this 
controversy continued to dog the Foreign Ministry throughout the 
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1920s, until some limited attempts were made in 1929–1930 to scale 
back the numbers and activities of the consular police. While the out-
break of military hostilities in the early 1930s ultimately made such le-
galistic disputes less significant as Sino-Japanese friction had by then 
become open Sino-Japanese war, it was during this early period of 
growth that the willingness of the Foreign Ministry to bend the “rules” 
of the treaty port imperialism was already evident. Recognizing this di-
mension of Japan’s early consular system on the continent thus helps 
bring to light those characteristics that facilitated the Foreign Ministry’s 
role in transnational security operations during later decades.
The Treaty Ports: Shanghai, Tianjin, and Xiamen
The first consular police officers to be stationed in China took up their 
positions only four years after the Gaimushô had sent a contingent of pa-
trolmen to Pusan, Korea. Citing the problem of instability and popular 
unrest caused by recent Sino-French hostilities, as well as the growing resi-
dent Japanese population in the city, the Japanese consul in Shanghai re-
quested in September 1884 that two police officers be stationed at his 
consulate.1 In response, the Gaimushô arranged for two patrolmen from 
the municipal police force in Nagasaki to be transferred to the Foreign 
Ministry and then sent overseas to Shanghai as Japan’s first consular po-
lice officers in China. The size of the consular police force in Shanghai 
seems to have fluctuated between two and six officers for the next few 
years.2 In September 1888, however, the two patrolmen assigned to the 
Shanghai consulate were sent back to Japan, and from that point until the 
signing of the 1896 commercial treaty no consular police were stationed 
in Shanghai, or anywhere else.3
Sources are sketchy on what these early consular police in Shanghai 
did, but it is reasonable to assume that their daily duties were quite similar 
to those of their contemporary counterparts in Korean treaty port com-
munities. The Japanese civilian population in Shanghai was still rather 
small during the early 1880s, numbering only a few hundred residents, but 
the consul and his police staff were kept busy with the everyday administra-
tive tasks associated with overseeing the economic and social activities of 
that community.4 There was, however, one significant difference between 
the contexts in which the consular police emerged in Korea and in China. 
When the first consular police arrived in Shanghai, Japan did not possess 
an unequal treaty advantage over the Qing empire, and thus the Japanese 
did not enjoy extraterritorial privileges in China. However, since the size of 
the force at the Shanghai consulate remained so small, it does not seem to 
have stirred up too much controversy during its first decade of operation.
Japan’s defeat of Qing China in 1895 and the subsequent treaty 
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agreements of 1896 then opened the door for an expansion of the con-
sular police force at Shanghai, as well as for the establishment of new 
police offices in numerous other port cities.5 New ports opened by the 
1896 treaty included Suzhou, Hangzhou, Shashi, and Chongqing, and 
by April of that year consular police forces had been assigned to those 
four cities, as well as to the already functioning consulates in Tianjin, 
Amoy (Xiamen), and Shanghai.6 Since the Japanese government consis-
tently claimed that formally recognized treaty agreements between 
Japan and China clearly sanctified the establishment and maintenance 
of consular police forces, a closer examination of the 1896 commercial 
treaty is in order. The specific article from the treaty that relates to the 
issue of police powers reads: “It is agreed that Settlements to be pos-
sessed exclusively by Japan shall be established at the towns and ports 
newly opened to trade. The management of roads and local police au-
thority shall be vested solely in the Japanese consuls.”7
While the phrasing is slightly ambiguous, the implication is that Japa-
nese consuls are to be granted police authority within “settlements pos-
sessed exclusively by Japan.” This is the point on which the Chinese 
objections most often rested. In their view, foreign police operating any-
where beyond the specific borders of treaty port concession areas was not 
authorized by any treaty agreement and thus such forces were a blatant 
violation of Chinese sovereignty. The Japanese side, however, took the ar-
ticle to mean that wherever Japan had a consulate office it possessed the 
right to attach police forces to it.
Regardless of whether or not the 1896 treaty did indeed provide legal 
justification for the consular police, their mere presence in China’s treaty 
port communities often led to both political and physical clashes between 
Chinese and Japanese security forces, and such incidents were usually one 
of two kinds. In the first case, Japanese consular authorities complained 
that Chinese police forces consistently failed in their duty to protect Japa-
nese civilians from acts of violence perpetrated against them by local Chi-
nese. This being so, Japanese officials had no choice but to station their 
own police in any area where Japanese residents settled. In the other case, 
it was violence against Japanese civilians committed by Chinese police and 
military forces themselves that consular authorities protested. Incidents of 
this sort were, in fact, often the most inflammatory.
But, the consular police were not only a thorn in the side of Sino-Japa-
nese relations. In these early years, the Japanese consular police in Chinese 
treaty ports also clashed with citizens and soldiers of the Western powers 
with some regularity. One such case occurred in Tianjin in August 1913 
near the border between the French and Japanese concessions. A small 
group of criminal suspects, attempting to elude capture by the French con-
cession police, crossed Akiyama Street into the Japanese concession, at 
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which time they were apprehended by a group of assistant patrolman 
(junho) from the Tianjin consular police force. When the French officers 
caught up with their suspects already in Japanese custody, a brawl between 
the two groups of policemen ensued in which the French assistants in-
flicted a harsh beating on a number of the junho from the Japanese side. 
Later on, a large group of Japanese residents organized a rally to protest 
the treatment of their policemen, and when the group met with French 
military forces, a number of Japanese civilians were injured in the melee. 
In the diplomatic discussion that followed, it was decided that henceforth 
the Japanese police would have jurisdiction over Akiyama Street.8
The fracas between Japanese consular police and soldiers of the 
United States Army in Tianjin in the spring of 1919 described in the open-
ing paragraphs of this book was a similar case.9 Japanese and American 
diplomats argued over a resolution to the incident for months on end, the 
sticking point in the negotiations being which side bore ultimate respon-
sibility for the violence. Another factor at the root of the prolonged nego-
tiation was that, according to the American side, the Japanese consular 
police possessed absolutely no authority to arrest and detain soldiers of 
the United States military, or any American citizen for that matter. Not 
only had they overstepped their already dubious jurisdictional footing, 
the American consul in Tianjin was also personally furious that he had 
been lied to by the Japanese consular police chief when the consul first 
arrived at the Japanese police station and inquired as to the whereabouts 
of the missing American soldier.10 
Clashes of these sorts with French and American officials in Tianjin 
provide ample evidence of the boldness of Japanese consular police activi-
ties. Furthermore, these incidents suggest that the legal position of the 
consular police was in doubt not only in rural areas of Manchuria. Even in 
the urban centers of large and diverse treaty ports like Tianjin, the activi-
ties of the Japanese consular police were contested by the Chinese and 
westerners alike. They also reveal, however, the simultaneous dynamic of 
local collaboration with treaty port police systems as represented by the 
junho, or assistant patrolman. In the case of the Japanese consulate in 
Tianjin, dozens of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans were organized and 
hired by the local Japanese Residents’ Association to work as assistants to 
the local consular patrolmen.11 This practice was widespread in all of Ja-
pan’s consular police forces. At times, in fact, the number of non-Japanese 
junho working with a Japanese consular police unit made up a three- or 
four-to-one ratio. To take the case of Tianjin, for example, there were fifty 
junho employed by the consulate in 1910; and this number rose gradually 
over the next decade or so to eighty-four by 1916, one hundred nine in 
1919, one hundred ninety in 1922, two hundred nineteen in 1925, and as 
many as two hundred eighty by 1928.12
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The Foreign Ministry consistently argued that its establishment of 
consular police forces was necessary for the protection of Japanese citi-
zens in China and Manchuria, but this category was not limited to ethnic 
Japanese from the home islands. The Japanese government considered 
Taiwanese after 1895 and Koreans after 1910 to be legal subjects of the 
Japanese imperial state, and as such the Foreign Ministry had an obliga-
tion to provide for the security of Korean and Taiwanese residents in 
mainland China and Manchuria as well as for ethnic Japanese nationals. 
The significance of this obligation for the Korean community in Jiandao 
was immense, but the history of the Japanese consular police in southern 
China is also filled with episodes of police action to prevent violence 
against Taiwanese residents in cities such as Fuzhou and Xiamen. Just as 
the policing of Koreans in Manchuria led to cooperation between the Ji-
andao consulate-general and the Korea Government-General, so the con-
trol of Taiwanese in the south facilitated similar relationships between 
the Taiwan colonial police bureau and their consular police counterparts 
on the mainland.13
Because native Taiwanese were subjects of the Japanese emperor after 
1895, albeit without the same citizenship rights of metropolitan Japanese 
citizens, Taiwanese residing in China were the responsibility of the local 
Japanese consulate. As such, they could count on the protection of the 
Japanese consular police in conflicts with Chinese locals and government 
officials, and this protection facilitated the creation of an environment in 
which numerous Taiwanese began crossing the straits to settle in the treaty 
ports of the south China coast.14 This Taiwanese community in south 
China and the traffic in goods and people between Taiwan and the coastal 
communities created numerous problems for Japanese police forces. In-
tercepting the trade in illegal drugs, for example, was always a daunting 
and difficult task, and police forces from both sides of the water were rou-
tinely concerned about the publication and circulation of anti-Japanese 
literature. A report produced in August 1916 by the central police depart-
ment of the Taiwan Civil Affairs Bureau also discussed the problem of pi-
rate bands, operating from base areas on the China coast and small islands 
off the coast, attacking the northwest coast of Taiwan, and even included 
a series of schematic drawings of pirate vessels to help police identify sus-
picious ships efficiently. The report also suggested the need for better rela-
tions with Chinese police in coastal areas, as the unilateral escalation of 
Japanese police there was severely problematic.15
For the first twenty years or so after the establishment of the Taiwan 
Government-General, the security forces of the police bureau (sôtokufu 
keimukyoku) operated independently on the island but also by sending a 
small number of men to the China coast. Japanese consular police, of 
course, also carried out their duties in the southern treaty port commu-
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nities, so by 1916 a move was made to coordinate the activities of these 
two forces since they both shared the same objectives. In late September 
of that year, the consuls at Xiamen and Fuzhou traveled to Taipei for a 
three-day conference with police officials in the Government-General. 
The agreements they reached in those talks facilitated the execution of 
police activities by coordinating the duties of consular police units in 
south China with those of the colonial Taiwan Government-General po-
lice bureau in a far more integrated way.
Among the new arrangements worked out in the conference, all Gov-
ernment-General police officers operating in China were placed under 
the direct supervision of the local consul. Political issues were also ad-
dressed in their decision to step up efforts to confiscate literature that 
“damages public peace,” as well as do more to stop the travel of “disrepu-
table” Chinese and Taiwanese between the coast and the island colony. 
On the piracy problem, the colonial officials encouraged consular police 
authorities to investigate the coastal base areas of pirate groups with the 
help of local Chinese police forces. Providing the results of those investi-
gations to the Government-General police and the Japanese Navy, they 
suggested, would help to eradicate the pirate threat in the region.16
These early efforts at coordinating the police activities of South 
China consulates and the Taiwan colonial police led to greater coopera-
tion as the years passed. Yet, what is most striking here is that even as 
early as 1916 it is quite clear that the Foreign Ministry was prepared to 
perform the duties of a colonial police force on sovereign Chinese terri-
tory, becoming a de facto colonial security force, and this boldness pro-
voked, not surprisingly, a rather hostile response from the Chinese side. 
For example, in making a number of contemporary observations about 
the disputed status of Japan’s consular police in China and Manchuria 
in 1920, the American legal pundit Westel Willoughby cited the example 
of the Japanese consulate in Xiamen. In response to the influx to the 
Fujian region of southern China of Taiwanese who had become natural-
ized Japanese subjects, the Japanese consulate in Xiamen rented a small 
house in 1916. Willoughby recalled that he staffed it with a handful of 
consular police officers and nailed a wooden sign above its doorway 
which read: “Police Sub-station of the Consulate of Great Japan at 
Amoy.” When local Chinese authorities protested, the consul responded 
by simply taking the sign from the doorway and hanging it inside the 
building instead—hardly an act of conciliation to the Chinese.17
Fortunately, the original source materials describe this episode in 
greater detail. The nine officers who staffed the new substation in Xia-
men, it turns out, had been dispatched from the colonial police force on 
Taiwan.18 In December 1916, the Chinese described this move as a clear 
infringement on Chinese sovereignty and a violation of well-established 
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treaty agreements, and as such it was deemed imperative to immediately 
shut it down and remove those police.19 In his response to the Chinese 
side, Hayashi Gonsuke, then China minister extraordinary and pleni-
potentiary, left little room for debate. The consular police, he argued, 
were a natural part of extraterritoriality, so no treaty agreements had been 
broken. Furthermore, the new police substation was simply a preparatory 
step to facilitating better responses to conditions faced by Japanese resi-
dents, Hayashi contended, and thus was in no way a violation of Chinese 
sovereignty.20 While this logic hardly satisfied the complaints of local Chi-
nese officials, the Foreign Ministry nonetheless continued to employ the 
same sort of justifications in many different scenarios for years to come.
Protest and Rivalry in South Manchuria
The establishment of the consular police in Manchuria followed a some-
what diverse pattern from what had occurred in Korean and Chinese 
treaty ports. In all three cases, the Foreign Ministry deployed police forces 
to the field in response to requests from local consuls who sought ways to 
manage growing Japanese civilian populations during periods of instabil-
ity and change in Korea-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations. However, 
the consular police in Manchuria were established in conjunction with 
the simultaneous acquisition of formal colonial holdings, the Kwantung 
Leased Territory, and this fact presented the Foreign Ministry with a num-
ber of difficult challenges in exercising its authority on the ground.
The Foreign Ministry had maintained a consulate office in the town 
of Niuzhuang since the late 1890s, but it had been closed down after the 
war with Russia erupted in 1904. After the Japanese Army occupied the 
area around Yingkou in July of the same year, the Niuzhuang consulate 
was reopened in August and the resident consul made a request to Tokyo 
for one inspector and one patrolman to be assigned to his office. Metro-
politan Gaimushô leadership responded by transferring two patrolmen 
out of the Tokyo metropolitan police bureau and sending them to Niu-
zhuang in September; these two officers were the first Japanese consular 
policemen in Manchuria.21 With the exception of an additional patrol-
man being assigned to the Niuzhuang office in June 1905, no new con-
sular police were assigned to Manchuria until 1906, when in May a new 
consulate was opened in Andong with a police force of two patrolmen, 
to which was added one inspector in June. Over the course of the next 
six months, the consulate office in Fengtian was staffed with a signifi-
cantly larger force of twenty-two officers and supplemented by a new 
subconsulate with six police officers at Xinminpu. Following the open-
ing of new offices in Liaoyang and Tieling, the establishment of a con-
sulate in Changchun with six officers in November brought the total 
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number of consular police in Manchuria to roughly fifty men stationed 
in seven facilities by the end of 1906.22
Along with this expansion of consular facilities in south Manchuria, 
the Kwantung Government-General (Kantô totokufu) also began opera-
tions in September 1906 to manage the territorial and railway acquisitions 
gained through the victory over Russia. Officially, its jurisdiction was to 
include the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas immediately adja-
cent to the South Manchuria Railway line that ran out from Dairen. In 
addition to its economic and administrative functions, the Kwantung re-
gime also set up its own police bureau, which had the responsibility of 
providing for security within Japanese-controlled territory and along the 
railway.23 Throughout the following year, however, the Foreign Ministry 
nevertheless continued to expand its facilities in the region by setting up 
new consulates in Harbin and Jilin, each complete with a police force of 
roughly half a dozen men. Several incremental personnel increases in 
various offices throughout 1907 ultimately brought the total number of 
consular police in southern Manchuria to roughly one hundred men by 
the end of 1907.24 
These first few years of growth and expansion in the consular police 
network in south Manchuria did not escape some conflict and contro-
versy. For example, following a pattern of dispute to be repeated in 
countless episodes over the coming decades, a violent incident on the 
part of local Chinese police against Japanese civilians near Andong in 
January 1907 sparked a heated argument over just who possessed police 
power where. Chinese authorities refused to recognize the legal propri-
ety of the new police forces deployed in the area largely because it was 
not an officially designated “commercial settlement” (shôbuchi). The 
Japanese in turn rested on the defense that in a “self-opened” commer-
cial community, Japanese police power could be exercised legitimately, 
and further they refused to accept that Chinese police could hold any 
jurisdictional power over local Japanese residents.25 Despite the dis-
agreement, local Japanese consular officials continued to press for the 
expansion of their police facilities, and in June 1907, Andong Consul 
Okabe Saburô requested an increase of twenty-two officers, justifying 
the escalation as a necessary measure for dealing with the increasingly 
complicated matter of controlling unregulated border crossing between 
the northern Korean peninsula and south Manchuria.26
As a center of Japanese political influence in the region, Fengtian also 
saw its share of early disputes over the presence of Japanese police in south 
Manchuria. In a report to Tokyo in June 1906, Fengtian consul Hagiwara 
Morikazu described the need for a large-scale increase of Japanese police 
in the area to prepare for the anticipated influx of Japanese residents and 
consequent economic development that was sure to come with the im-
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pending extension of South Manchuria Railway lines to Changchun.27 By 
August, a local Chinese warlord was strongly protesting such plans, as well 
as the general presence of new Japanese consular police substations near 
Fengtian after withdrawal of the Japanese Army once open hostilities with 
the Russians had ceased. Such complaints were answered with a bold as-
sertion of Japanese authority, as Hagiwara argued that stationing Japa-
nese police there was fundamentally necessary in order to control Japanese 
civilians. Furthermore, not only was it not a violation of Chinese sover-
eignty, as had been accused, but Hagiwara suggested that “your country is 
actually better off for it.” Hagiwara’s point was that having the consular 
police nearby made it easier to respond to and deal with incidents as they 
arose, a fact that benefited both sides.28
It was not only government officials who led the charge for a stronger 
Japanese police presence and stricter limits on Chinese jurisdiction over 
security affairs. The Japanese Residents’ Association of Fengtian, for ex-
ample, filed a petition addressed directly to Foreign Minister Hayashi 
 Tadasu in which they detailed the numerous episodes of violence perpe-
trated against their community by unruly Chinese police. Specifically, 
they asked that the ministry take four measures on their behalf: (1) forbid 
Chinese police from being armed; (2) demand compensation payments 
to Japanese residents injured by Chinese police; (3) clarify the responsi-
bilities of local Chinese police authorities; and (4) demand that Chinese 
police have absolutely no authority over Japanese residents.29 From these 
requests, it seems clear that many if not most local disputes involving Japa-
nese residents resulted, not from clashes with ordinary Chinese residents, 
but rather from what the Japanese perceived as unjust and even illegal 
harassment by Chinese officials.
Spurred on by such civilian demands, the growth of consular police 
infrastructure continued apace during 1907; but it was matched by in-
creases in Kwantung Government-General police forces, leading inevita-
bly to conflicts between the two over jurisdictional prerogatives. The 
Foreign Ministry tried desperately to protect the integrity of its authority 
in Manchuria, but the military administration in the Kwantung Leased 
Territory pressed the case for integration of Japanese police forces in the 
region. Their argument was that because Government-General police 
and the Foreign Ministry’s consular police operated under different 
guidelines and regulations, the Japanese resident community was greatly 
inconvenienced. Furthermore, this multibranch system unnecessarily 
complicated relations with local Chinese authorities.30 Ultimately, the res-
olution reached in January 1908 favored the Government-General. The 
administrative reforms enacted at that time designated that the Foreign 
Ministry would retain its authority over formal diplomatic intercourse 
with the Chinese, although it needed to consult with Government- General 
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officials on major policy decisions. As for the problem of confusion over 
overlapping police jurisdictions, the new system, through joint appoint-
ments of consular officials and police with Government-General staff, 
placed all Gaimushô police forces under the joint supervision of Govern-
ment-General police officials and their immediate consular superiors.31 
This referred specifically to the consular police forces at the six consulates 
in Niuzhuang, Liaoyang, Fengtian, Tieling, Changchun, and Andong.32 
In effect, the administrative reforms of 1908 served to greatly circum-
scribe the control of consuls in southern Manchuria over their own police 
forces. In fact, the consular police in areas under the umbrella of Govern-
ment-General jurisdiction were for all intents and purposes Government- 
General police and not Foreign Ministry police at all.33
While the 1908 resolution seemed on the surface to have solved the 
problem of multiple police institutions in South Manchuria, Gaimushô 
and Kwantung Leased Territory police officials continued to debate the 
relative merits of police integration. In 1916, Kwantung Resident-Gen-
eral Nakamura Satoru argued that the development of Japanese eco-
nomic and political interests in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia required 
a more efficient security apparatus, namely the complete integration of 
local consular police under the authority of the Kwantung government. 
He explained to Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake that the economic 
activities of Japanese residents in South Manchuria had grown nicely 
since the 1908 restructuring of Japanese police forces there, and be-
cause of the recent Russo-Japanese treaty, similar activity in North Man-
churia (Harbin, Qiqihar, etc.) had also been developing. Nakamura 
thus suggested that perhaps Japan could use new consulate offices in 
those regions, with joint appointments of police from the Government-
General, in order to expand Japanese security networks throughout 
northern Manchuria. In fact, Nakamura directly compared this plan 
with the similar practice of Korea Government-General police working 
out of the Andong consulate. In a more specific request, Nakamura 
asked that the police forces of new consulates opened in northern Man-
churia after 1915 be fully integrated with Government-General police 
for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the 1908 system.34 
During a series of multilateral talks that took place during the sum-
mer of 1917, the Gaimushô responded by agreeing that the integration 
of Japanese police in Manchuria was needed, but in their view local con-
sular police facilities were better situated to take control over all police 
matters. Representatives both from the South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany (Mantetsu) and the army argued that lack of unity between Japa-
nese police forces was particularly disadvantageous because of the 
inconvenience it caused the Japanese resident community, and on a 
larger scale that it detracted from the dignity of Japanese empire as a 
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whole. Thus, further integration of the consular police into the Govern-
ment-General security network was necessary. The Gaimushô countered 
these claims by arguing that all branches of the Japanese government in 
Manchuria could get along just fine with one another if each did its job 
properly and respected the jurisdictional prerogatives of the others. 
Certainly problems, disputes, and conflicts of various types would spring 
up now and then, the Foreign Ministry representatives agreed, but over-
hauling the whole system would create an even bigger problem. They 
argued, therefore, that simple solutions to everyday difficulties should 
be sought and no major change was needed.35 
These debates continued into the following year, and in July 1918 
the chief of the Colonial Bureau (Takumukyoku) offered a new plan to 
the Terauchi Cabinet. In short, he advised that the Korea Government-
General be granted complete police authority in Jiandao, while the 
Kwantung Government-General would assume identical powers in 
South Manchuria. Basically, the idea was to subsume all Manchurian 
consular police completely under Japan’s formal colonial apparatus, but 
the Gaimushô again countered this assault on their jurisdictional pre-
rogatives.36 Because of recent complications regarding the administra-
tion of Shandong, the Chinese side, on both official and popular levels, 
was especially sensitive to Japanese claims of jurisdictional authority on 
Chinese soil. So a complete reform of police in Manchuria, according to 
the Foreign Ministry, would be both ill-timed and destabilizing.37 By 
1918, the Gaimushô’s view had emerged as the more influential posi-
tion, and the broader liberalization of Japan’s colonial policy under the 
Hara Kei Cabinet from 1918 to 1921 returned the Manchurian consular 
police to a more preeminent position in relation to the Kwantung gov-
ernment. When that quasi-military office was in 1919 transformed into a 
civilian administrative bureau, the Kantô-chô, Gaimushô police re-
gained much of the authority they had lost in 1908.38
In the midst of these many disputes and debates, the consular po-
lice had nonetheless continued to expand since 1908.39 However, the 
opening of a new consulate in Zhengjiatun in 1914 soon met with con-
siderable opposition from the local Chinese population and the Repub-
lican Chinese government. Indeed, while problems linked to institutional 
rivalry with Kwantung Government-General police were an important 
preoccupation in the minds of consular police leadership, the growing 
volume of Chinese protests against Japanese police power in Manchuria 
was becoming an even bigger concern.
Back in Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry was sensitive to the problem of 
Chinese hostility toward the activities of Japanese police in south Manchu-
ria. In July 1913, Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki cabled the Korea 
 Government-General with his suggestions on how to best avoid the provo-
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cation of Chinese anger. In particular, Makino mentioned four scenarios 
in which Japanese police needed to take special care: (1) when detaining 
as possible suspects local Chinese of high social standing, most of all 
wealthy merchants; (2) when using borderline torture tactics during inves-
tigations of Chinese; (3) when a Chinese suspect suffered an unexplained 
death without clear cause while in Japanese police custody; and (4) when 
detaining a Chinese civilian outside the railway zone as a preventative 
step, even when there was clear criminal evidence against the Japanese 
resident involved in the matter. This sort of thing especially angered local 
Chinese police, Makino took time to note.40 Such steps were apparently 
insufficient, as two years later, in July 1915, new Foreign Minister Katô Ta-
kaaki addressed the growing problem of Chinese demands for the com-
plete withdrawal of Japanese consular police from South Manchuria. He 
directed all Japanese consuls throughout China to defend the legitimacy 
of the consular police in Manchuria based on Japan’s legal treaty privi-
leges. He went on to imply that the weakness and inadequacy of local Chi-
nese security forces made Japanese police necessary; the logical conclusion 
being that only if and when the Chinese completely revamped their own 
police would it even be possible to discuss the withdrawal of Japanese con-
sular police stations from the interior.41 Even if local Chinese authorities 
had been capable of making such improvements, however, it seems un-
likely that the Japanese authorities would have immediately withdrawn 
their consular police from South Manchuria. By the late 1910s their use-
fulness had become all too clear.
Jurisdictional Ambiguity in Jiandao
As was the case in south Manchuria, the consular police in the Jiandao 
region also took shape under a unique set of circumstances. In fact, the 
history of the consular police in Jiandao was treated by the original edi-
tors of the Gaimushô keisatsushi as a separate and distinct institution within 
the general history of the Foreign Ministry police.42 The uniqueness of 
their situation and activities was due to the inextricable link between the 
administration of the Jiandao region of Manchuria and colonial Korea it-
self. The necessity of protecting and controlling Korean subjects in both 
areas demanded an extraordinary degree of cooperation between Jiandao 
area consulates and the colonial Korean Government-General.43
By the early years of the twentieth century, the Jiandao region had 
become the focus of a politically complicated set of territorial ambiguities 
in Chinese–Japanese–Korean relations. The Qing dynasty had long re-
stricted the settlement of non-Manchu peoples in Manchuria, but those 
limits had weakened considerably by the late 1890s. Consequently, Korean 
immigrants began to flow into the area in ever larger numbers. Actually 
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encouraged by the Qing state to develop this rustic frontier, the hope was 
that these Korean migrants would help ward off further Russian encroach-
ment in the Qing northeast.44 After Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and 
the creation of a protectorate state on the Korean peninsula, Jiandao also 
became a keen concern of the Japanese government. The noted Sinologist 
Naitô Konan was sent to the area in 1906 at the behest of the Gaimushô to 
investigate local conditions in an effort to formulate an official Japanese 
policy on the question of Jiandao as a historically Chinese or Korean terri-
tory. For obvious reasons, the Japanese preferred to think of it as a natural 
extension of Korea, since this would bolster the claims of protectorate of-
ficials regarding the logical expansion of Japanese authority there, and 
Naitô’s reports did indeed confirm this view.45 Interestingly, even some 
contemporary Korean historians advocated the notion of Jiandao as a his-
torically Korean region, though for different reasons than the Japanese. 
Sin Ch’aeho, for example, argued vociferously that Korea should not be 
thought of in exclusively peninsular terms, citing archeological evidence 
of Korean kingdoms in Jiandao from many centuries past.46
The matter became an especially pressing concern when, in the after-
math of the establishment the Korean protectorate in 1905, numerous Ko-
rean resistance fighters fled to the neighboring region of Jiandao to escape 
capture by Japanese police and military forces in Korea. The Japanese army 
in Korea set up a temporary field office in Jiandao in 1907 to prosecute 
their mission of eradicating opposition to the protectorate.47 This was not 
accomplished, however, without some resistance from the Qing govern-
ment; indeed, by 1909 the Jiandao problem had become a major issue in 
Sino-Japanese relations.48 A treaty agreement reached in that year at-
tempted to resolve the conflict by providing for the establishment of a Japa-
nese consulate-general in Longjincun, along with four subconsulates in 
Juzijie, Toudaogou, Hunchun, and Baicaogou, through which the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry could exercise its jurisdiction over Korean residents in 
the immediate region.49 From their opening each of these facilities was 
staffed with a consular police staff: forty-two officers at the consulate-gen-
eral in Longjincun, and roughly six officers each at the four subconsulates. 
In accordance with the 1909 treaty, local Chinese authorities also estab-
lished their own police forces in the same areas, and the duty with which all 
of these Japanese and Chinese police were charged was the maintenance 
of public security for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese residents alike in vari-
ous local Jiandao region “commercial settlements.” It surely did not come 
as a surprise to anyone, however, when these various police forces clashed 
over issues regarding just who had jurisdiction where.50
Interpreting the historiographic meaning of the Jiandao Agree-
ment of 1909 has become an important matter of discussion among 
Japanese and Korean scholars, with the debate centering on whether or 
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not it was a deliberately expansionistic move on the part of Japanese au-
thorities.51 Whatever the real nature of the agreement, however, the 
overwhelming Korean resident majority in the Jiandao region remained 
the fundamental source of Sino-Japanese conflict in the area.52 On the 
issue of jurisdiction over the Koreans, the Chinese side maintained that 
Japanese authority was limited to the shôbuchi areas, outside of which 
the Chinese held the only legitimate police power. The Japanese side, 
however, reasoned that the consular police had a legitimate right to en-
force law and order wherever Japanese residents resided. The Koreans 
in Jiandao were considered to be imperial subjects, and the consular 
police thus had a duty to protect them and their interests. The problem 
with this logic was that most Koreans did not live in the shôbuchi settle-
ment areas. However, since nothing in the 1909 treaty specifically lim-
ited the scope of consular police authority, the Foreign Ministry refused 
to back down in the conflict over legitimate police jurisdiction.
A characteristic Sino-Japanese jurisdictional clash in the region oc-
curred in January 1910. The local Chinese police had determined that 
the business of a local Japanese resident named Koga Shôjirô was illegal, 
so they set out to shut down his operation, while Koga in the meantime 
called upon his local consul for defense and protection. On January 28, 
local Chinese authorities and the Japanese consular police argued over 
Koga’s case, and a brawl erupted between them, in which one Japanese 
consular patrolman was injured and a Korean assistant patrolman lost 
his hand from a sword blow. The local Japanese consul demanded that 
the Chinese police responsible for the violence be punished and repara-
tions to the injured Japanese patrolmen be paid, but the only Chinese 
response to materialize was instead an increase in their local police 
force from thirty to sixty men.53
Clashes such as these continued sporadically over the next few years, 
but when the Japanese government presented the Yuan Shikai regime 
with its infamous Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the deadlock over po-
lice authority in Jiandao was broken.54 In the new treaty agreements that 
were negotiated out of the original demands, the 1909 Jiandao treaty 
was abrogated in favor of a new one that gave the consular police a much 
stronger hand in the region. As a result the number of consular police 
in the Jiandao region grew to just over one hundred men after 1915.55 It 
is also clear that as early as December 1911 the Korean Government-
General was already requesting cooperation from newly established 
Jiandao consulate police office to assist in political security operations. 
The Jiandao office arrested and deported several suspects in an assassi-
nation plot against Governor General Terauchi Masatake, for example, 
in early 1912, and between 1910 and 1915, it became increasingly com-
mon for the Police Bureau of the Korean Government-General to send 
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security teams across the border to gather intelligence with the support 
of local consular police officers.56
What is most important to note here is that the evolution of Japa-
nese consular police forces in Jiandao cannot be separated from the 
development of the formal institutions of Japanese colonial control of 
the Korean peninsula and the larger twists and turns of Sino-Japanese 
relations during the late Qing and early Republican eras. The early ex-
perience of the consular police in Jiandao also demonstrates two criti-
cally important characteristics of the Foreign Ministry police in general. 
First, they were committed to protecting Japanese civilian life and prop-
erty in any location, without regard for whether or not they possessed an 
internationally recognized legal right to do so. Second, the Chinese gov-
ernment and local Chinese populations resisted this encroachment on 
their national sovereignty at every turn, leading to episodes of violent 
conflict on a regular basis. Also important is the fact that in both China 
(South China in particular) and Manchuria, the jurisdictional bound-
aries between consular and colonial police were more than a little hazy, 
since managing non-Japanese imperial subjects demanded close coop-
eration between the Foreign Ministry and colonial administrative re-
gimes. But this cooperation was not always easy to come by, as institutional 
rivalries also drove the policy decisions of all the offices involved. 
The Zhengjiatun Incident
What happened in 1916 at the Manchurian town of Zhengjiatun is repre-
sentative of the wider Sino-Japanese conflict over who held legitimate au-
thority over police activities within and beyond concession areas designated 
by mutually recognized treaty agreements, so it is worth considering in 
some depth.57 In early August 1916, a Japanese businessman who had been 
physically abused by local Chinese security forces in Zhengjiatun called on 
his local consul to take his complaint to relevant Chinese authorities. When 
consular police sent to investigate the matter encountered their local Chi-
nese counterparts, an armed clash ensued during which twelve Japanese 
were killed, including a consular police patrolman named Kawase Matsu-
tarô.58 A lengthy diplomatic dispute followed in the wake of the incident, 
with Japanese officials arguing that the violence was clear proof of the ne-
cessity for Japanese police forces in the southern Manchurian interior. 
They went even further in strengthening their position by demanding that 
Japanese police advisers should also be placed in Chinese police organiza-
tions. The Chinese side rejected these claims outright. The source of the 
dispute was in how each side interpreted the 1915 treaty agreements that 
provided for the security of Japanese civilians who settled in interior re-
gions of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. The Chinese argued that Japa-
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nese police jurisdiction was limited to the areas immediately adjacent to 
Mantetsu rail lines, and Zhengjiatun clearly did not fit that description; in 
areas beyond the railway concessions, only local Chinese authorities pos-
sessed legitimate police power. However, the Japanese consistently main-
tained that the 1915 treaty empowered consular officials with the right to 
station police wherever Japanese residents lived. In their view, the consular 
police were merely a natural extension of extraterritorial privileges.
In an effort to clarify the intended function of Foreign Ministry po-
lice and soothe Chinese anger over the issue, Japanese officials spelled 
out in specific terms the precise duties of the consular police in Man-
churia: (1) to prevent Japanese subjects from committing crimes; (2) to 
protect Japanese subjects when attacked; (3) to search, arrest, and es-
cort Japanese prisoners under the jurisdiction of a Japanese consulate; 
(4) to attend to the enforcement of consular orders in connection with 
civil cases, such as the duties of the registrar; (5) to investigate and su-
pervise the personal standing of Japanese subjects; (6) to control and 
discipline Japanese subjects who violated the provisions of treaties be-
tween Japan and China; (7) to see that Japanese subjects abided by the 
provisions of Chinese police regulations when the agreement between 
Japan and China respecting the same should actually come into force.59
The Chinese refused to accept this position because the 1915 treaty 
had stated that Japanese civilians residing in the interior would be sub-
ject to the police and taxation regulations of the local Chinese govern-
ment. The Japanese consular police were thus ipso facto a violation of 
Chinese sovereignty. As the Chinese response stated:
As the seven principal functions of the Japanese police officers . . . are 
those which should properly belong to the Chinese police . . . there is 
no necessity for the establishment of a Japanese police force. Hence, 
the question of police cannot be associated with extraterritoriality and 
the Chinese government cannot recognize it as a corollary of the right 
of extraterritoriality. Ever since the conclusion of the extraterritoriality 
treaties between China and the foreign Powers for several decades, no 
such claim has ever been heard.60
To that charge, Japanese authorities reiterated their earlier position, add-
ing to it that while the Chinese government considered whether or not to 
grant its consent to the presence of Japanese consular police, “the Impe-
rial Government will nevertheless be constrained to carry it [i.e., the sta-
tioning of additional consular police forces] into effect in case of 
necessity.”61 In other words, whether the Chinese recognized their legiti-
macy or not, the consular police would continue in their activities.
Not only did the local Gaimushô police forces remain on duty, but the 
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Japanese government also put forth an extensive list of demands in the 
wake of the disturbance at Zhengjiatun, including (1) employment of Japa-
nese military advisers in Manchuria-Mongolia; (2) employment of  Japanese 
military officers as public school instructors; (3) Zhang Zuolin’s officers in 
Mukden were to apologize in person to Japanese authorities there; and (4) 
monetary compensation was demanded for the families of dead Japanese. 
In addition, they added four smaller provisions: (1) the punishment of the 
regional commanding Chinese officer; (2) the dismissal and punishment 
of officers and men directly involved in the incident; (3) all Chinese troops 
in Manchuria and Mongolia were ordered not to interfere with Japanese 
civilians, police, or military in any way; and (4) unconditional recognition 
of Japan’s special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, namely local po-
lice power and Japanese police advisers in South Manchuria.62
Japanese authorities clearly used the clash at Zhengjiatun as a conve-
nient excuse for extracting further concessions from the Chinese, but 
such pressure did not come only from official channels of the Japanese 
government. Prominent members of the local Japanese community in 
Manchuria also recognized a clear opportunity taking shape during the 
discussions over how to best resolve the affair. For example, the editorial 
pages of the Dairen-based periodical Tairiku featured a variety of proac-
tive positions in the weeks immediately following the incident.63 Editor-in-
Chief Yamada Takeyoshi began by describing the incident itself, including 
the gruesome mutilation of the Japanese victims by Chinese soldiers. He 
then went on to say that the incident had clearly marred the prestige of 
both the nation and the army, so a decisive retaliation was necessary. The 
root cause of the affair, Yamada explained, was the poor quality of Chi-
nese security forces and the weak authority of the Chinese government it-
self in Manchuria. This incident, then, was a chance to take steps toward 
fundamentally fixing those problems. He contended that Japan had 
shown in Taiwan and Korea that it knew how to rule well, and Chinese in 
the Japanese-controlled Kwantung region were thriving in a stable and 
secure environment. Recognizing Japanese power in Manchuria and 
Mongolia was clearly the best option for Chinese and Japanese alike, in 
Yamada’s view. If disorder was allowed to continue in the interior, no one 
would succeed. If the Chinese government was serious about Sino-Japanese 
friendship and local security, he concluded, they would accede to Japa-
nese proposals. 64
Other pundits adopted a more hostile tone. Itô Kazuya, a local lawyer, 
claimed, “we ought to grab Zhang Zuolin by the scruff of the neck and use 
our Army to let him know who the boss is in Manchuria.” But Itô also rec-
ognized that such a solution was not diplomatically feasible, so he urged 
the Japanese government to use diplomatic discussion to achieve a firm 
and final solution to these problems.65 In one of the boldest editorials, 
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Nakanishi Masaki raged that Japan’s army and empire had been insulted 
by Chinese impudence. “Why the hell do we even have a colonial govern-
ment here? An army in Manchuria?” Nakanishi pondered cynically. He 
went on: “It’s quite unbearable that our government won’t take necessary 
steps because of needless fears about Western opinion.” He explained fur-
ther that because the Western powers were busy destroying each other in 
the Great War, only Japan was in a position to dominate in Asia. With 
more than a little contempt in his tone, Nakanishi concluded: “At first 
glance, China seems like a splendid country, but it really is an especially 
troublesome place. . . . The central government has no grip on the north-
east, and as such it is overrun by banditry and warlords like Zhang Zuo-
lin. . . . The whole place should be under Japanese control.”66
As Nakanishi’s comments indicate, what position the Western pow-
ers would take on the affair was of considerable interest to both the 
Japanese and the Chinese. An editorial piece from the Peking-Tientsin 
Times gives some indication of the Western view on the episode. “If one 
assumes that the Chinese were entirely at fault in this matter,” it read, 
“the Japanese demands, harsh though they may be, would not be open 
to serious criticism.” However, the author went on to say that this was not 
a reasonable assumption. In short, what both sides needed was an im-
partial investigation and a mutually acceptable resolution. The article 
concluded with the notion that instability in China served no one’s in-
terests: “self-respect is an extremely important factor in the development 
of nations; where it is constantly wounded from abroad one cannot ex-
pect to find health in the body politic. . . . That being so, there should be 
a limit to the humiliations they [the Japanese] inflict upon it [China].”67 
A local Chinese commentator in the Peking Gazette also made it clear 
that securing the sympathy of the Western powers was critical. He char-
acterized Japanese demands in the wake of the incident as “an attempt 
to repeat what was done by the Japanese in Korea when the administra-
tion of justice and prisons in that country was extorted under the Con-
vention of 1909, that is as a measure to be followed inevitably by the 
annexation of the regions at some later and more convenient date.” He 
went on: “Alone and unaided, we are powerless to contest with the Japa-
nese on any matter on which they are insistent”; so, “let it once be made 
clear that China is resolved officially to consult the Powers guaranteeing 
her independence and territorial integrity.” Only this would keep the 
rapacious aggression of the Japanese in check, the writer concluded.68
Western commentators looking back on the incident several years 
later were divided in their opinions. The American scholar Westel Wil-
loughby, a one-time adviser to the Republican government in China, saw 
the disturbances at Zhengjiatun as the result of Japan’s incorrect interpre-
tation of the 1915 treaty stipulations regarding police jurisdiction in the 
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Manchurian interior. He described the negotiations over the incident in 
this way: 
Little imagination is required to perceive that, had these Chengchia-
tun demands and desiderata been granted by China, Japan would have 
been enabled, without much further claims of right, to obtain effective 
military and police control of the Manchurian provinces. Fortunately 
for China, however, Japan did not at this time deem it advisable to en-
force her demands. . . . The whole “incident” is, however, of significance 
in that it indicated what, at that time, were the further wishes of Japan 
with regard to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.69
Contrary to Willoughby’s case that the Foreign Ministry’s insistence 
on police jurisdiction in Manchuria was part of a much larger and more 
sinister subimperialist plot, another American scholar of East Asian in-
ternational relations, C. Walter Young, took a different stand on the sig-
nificance of the Zhengjiatun incident and its larger corollary issues of 
police prerogatives in Manchuria. Pointing out that Japanese claims of 
inadequacy in local Chinese public security institutions were not en-
tirely unfounded, Young wrote:
Candor must compel the honest student of this subject to admit that 
the picture of continual banditry and disorder painted by Japanese 
writers on South Manchuria is much too highly colored, but fairness 
must compel him in the same breath to say that, while Manchuria as a 
whole has been better governed than most provinces of China, and 
there have been fewer major civil disturbances there than in almost any 
other part of China, yet, as anyone who is really familiar with Manchu-
ria must admit, banditry has not been stamped out, even in the territo-
ries lying adjacent to the Kwantung leased territory itself.70
Postwar historical studies of the Zhengiatun affair most often con-
clude that it was the Chinese who had the stronger case on purely legal 
grounds in the jurisdictional dispute. In fact, even Kajikawa Masakatsu, 
editor of the postwar consular police commemorative history, admitted 
that the Japanese position on the legitimacy of consular police in the 
interior was “extremely delicate (kiwamete bimyô de atta).”71 Looking at 
long-term patterns of consular police expansion in South Manchuria, 
Tanigawa Yûichirô has also pointed out that among the thirty-eight po-
lice boxes linked to nine consular offices in Manchuria (excluding 
Jiandao) in 1923, only fifteen publicly displayed signs that identified 
their building as a police facility. Furthermore, almost all of those 
twenty-three police boxes that did not identify themselves publicly had 
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been established after the Zhengjiatun Incident of 1916.72 Clearly, then, 
while the incident did not slow down the pace of consular police escala-
tion in Manchuria, it certainly caused the Foreign Ministry to expand 
their police networks in a more surreptitious way, suggesting that per-
haps Japanese authorities recognized the dubious international legality 
of consular police operations in China. Indeed, Tanigawa ultimately 
concludes that the deliberately secretive expansion of Japanese consular 
police facilities throughout the Manchurian interior between 1915 and 
the early 1920s clearly indicates that Japanese authorities knew such es-
calation rested on exceedingly weak legal grounds.73 The Japanese gov-
ernment believed that its imperial prerogatives justified the use of 
consular police regardless of specific legal semantics, and, as Ogino 
Fujio maintains, the Foreign Ministry never even considered withdraw-
ing its consular police forces during the 1910s because it saw the institu-
tion as one particularly useful dimension of extraterritorial rights that 
could serve as a tool for the deliberate penetration of Chinese 
sovereignty.74 
The Debates Continue
While it will stretch beyond the chronological parameters of the present 
narrative, it is nonetheless useful to follow the debate over consular police 
legitimacy as it evolved during later decades. Quite striking is the fact that 
later defenders of Japan’s right to station consular police throughout 
China were not only to be found within the Foreign Ministry, for Japanese 
legal professionals and academics often wrote to defend the institution 
against its Chinese and Western critics. One such author was Koga Motok-
ichi. A prominent lawyer and China affairs enthusiast in Tokyo, Koga pub-
lished a lengthy analysis of the problems associated with the operations of 
foreign police in China in the pages of Shina kenkyû (China Studies). In 
fact, in the first article of his six-part series, Koga kicked off his argument 
by citing Westel Willoughby as his model foreign critic of the consular po-
lice.75 Refuting the points made by Willoughby in his Foreign Rights and In-
terests in China, Koga nonetheless stressed the need to explain the Japanese 
position to the international community as it had become a focal point of 
foreign criticism. 
Shinobu Junpei also addressed the problem of police legitimacy dur-
ing the Manchurian crisis of the early 1930s.76 He began by surveying the 
long history of treaty agreements that provided for the legal underpin-
nings of police forces operating from Japan’s consulate offices, even citing 
Article 14 of the 1858 treaty between the Qing Empire and France as the 
first to establish an important precedent. That article stipulated that mat-
ters of legal jurisdiction not specifically addressed by the treaty would au-
 A Disputed Presence in Late Qing and Early Republican China | 59
tomatically fall to French authorities. Japan, according to Shinobu, 
reserved the same right, which made consular police unquestionably legal 
under formal treaty agreements with China.77 After reviewing the history 
of controversies regarding Japanese police power in China, including the 
incidents of Chinese protest at Xiamen in 1916 and the Zhengjiatun af-
fair, Shinobu turned to the pressing debate over the abolition of Japanese 
extraterritoriality in China. Citing the crucial need for adequate security 
to protect the lives and property of Japanese civilians, especially in the 
Jiandao region, Shinobu concluded that even if extraterritorial rights 
were relinquished, making the maintenance of consular police untenable, 
Japan would still need to take measures to facilitate the reform and im-
provement of Chinese police organizations, perhaps by compelling the 
employment of Japanese police advisers along the lines of men like Kawa-
shima Naniwa, founder of the Peking Police Academy. Beyond that, 
 Shinobu even suggested that Japan follow the model of French colonial 
authorities in their revamping of police institutions in Morocco, some-
thing that he had studied on his own in an attempt to devise a plan for 
solving the police problem in China and Manchuria.78
When circumstances in 1932 compelled the Western powers finally 
to pass judgment on the validity of Japanese actions in Manchuria, Chi-
nese spokesmen seeking Western sympathy often made reference to the 
long-standing controversy surrounding Japanese consular police forces. 
The Japanese government’s persistence in maintaining this security ap-
paratus of dubious legality was clear evidence, such advocates argued, of 
Japan’s blatant disregard for Chinese sovereignty dating back almost 
two decades. Hsu Shushi, a Yenching University professor of political 
science, for example, referred to the Zhengjiatun Incident of 1917 in cit-
ing the ubiquitous presence of Japanese consular police throughout 
China’s interior as one of many “questions awaiting solution” in Sino-
Japanese relations at the time of the Manchurian Incident.79 The official 
Chinese representative to the Council of the League of Nations, V. K. 
Wellington Koo, also pointed out to the Lytton Commission the prob-
lematic status of Japanese police boxes in Manchuria, which in his view 
were “illegally established and without treaty basis whatsoever.”80 
Despite the strongly worded statements of these and other Chinese 
representatives, however, the report of the Lytton Commission did not 
make a clear condemnation of the Japanese consular police as illegal. The 
foreign observers only went so far as to say that the Japanese practice of 
establishing police units in its consular facilities throughout China ran 
“contrary to the general practice of countries having extra-territorial trea-
ties.”81 Consistent with the overall tone of the commission report, blanket 
rejections of Japanese contentions were avoided. However, the commis-
sion did include the removal of “special bodies” of Japanese police forces 
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from the Three Eastern Provinces among its many suggestions for bring-
ing about a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution to the Sino-Japa-
nese conflict in Manchuria.82 This would seem to have been, however 
vaguely phrased, recognition that Japanese claims to the legitimacy of 
consular police in Manchuria, if not unfounded, were nonetheless the 
cause of considerable and reasonable Chinese resentment.
In the wake of the Manchurian Incident, the Lytton Commission 
report, and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, 
Koga Motokichi again took up the cause of defending Japan’s special 
brand of extraterritoriality in China that warranted the maintenance of 
consular police there. Here, too, he made reference to Willoughby as 
the de facto spokesman of Anglo-American criticism.83 In discussing the 
ramifications of abolishing extraterritoriality in China and Manchuria, 
Koga took on the system’s critics. Foreign scholars such as Willoughby, 
Koga maintained, were wrong to conclude that extraterritorial privilege 
undermined the administrative integrity of China. In fact, the opposite 
was true. Koga argued that extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdic-
tion made it possible to hold Chinese society to the recognized legal 
standards of the international community. To relinquish those rights 
before Chinese institutions were able to adequately guarantee the prop-
erty rights and personal liberty of foreign nationals residing within her 
borders, Koga reasoned, would actually work to hinder China’s integra-
tion into the modern nation-state system.84 This logic seemed to suggest 
that by exercising their extraterritorial rights, Japan and the other for-
eign powers were actually doing the Chinese a favor.
Self-serving argument as it clearly was, Japanese defenders of the con-
sular police were not the only ones to make it. American, British, and 
other Western nationals, particularly those in the business of trade and 
commerce, were just as apt as their Japanese counterparts to tout the ben-
efits of extraterritorial rights for the Chinese themselves. In an extensive 
editorial from the Peking and Tientsin Times, for example, H. G. W. Wood-
head produced a litany of examples to illustrate the inadequacy of the 
Chinese legal system in 1929, concluding that the government of China at 
that moment was one “in which, apparently, elementary rights and liber-
ties are in abeyance, or subject to the whims of Kuomintang committees.”85 
An ardent opponent of abolishing extraterritoriality, Woodhead finished 
his tirade with a sentiment remarkably similar to that of Koga a few years 
later. “The premature abolition of extraterritoriality,” Woodhead con-
cluded, “would operate most disadvantageously towards the Chinese 
themselves for it would remove a strong incentive to judicial reform.”86 To 
make this point even more dramatically, Woodhead included the poi-
gnant words of Arnold Foster, a late veteran missionary, who once lec-
tured, “Let every patriotic Chinese then look today, not with envious and 
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resentful eyes, but with eyes gleaming with gladness and expectation, on 
the privileges that Western nations enjoy in China.” The joys of freedom 
and security experienced by people in the West, the good preacher in-
sisted, were what the Chinese themselves had to strive to obtain from their 
own rulers. They could not gain those benefits, Foster concluded, “by de-
priving the foreigner” of them, or “subjecting him to all the injustice” rou-
tinely meted out by Chinese officials upon their own people.87 
What links the contentions of Koga and Woodhead here is their 
shared faith in the propriety of international standards to which all na-
tions must be held accountable. Elaborating on this notion of broad in-
ternational consent, one of the most fascinating Japanese interpretations 
of consular police legitimacy was advanced by Shihozawa Kita, a Foreign 
Ministry Asia Bureau adviser, in 1938. Shihozawa explained it this way:
That the consular police operate within the parameters of inter-
national consent does not mean that they operate according to inter-
national consent; while the origins of police power are based in 
international consent and developed from it, the use of police power 
already cannot be restrained. That is to say that police power is limited 
by the extent to which consular jurisdiction can be exercised, and con-
sular jurisdiction is something which operates according to treaties 
and precedent, and those treaties and precedents constitute inter national 
consent. There are clear cases and unstated cases of international con-
sent, but in either case, the effect is not controllable.88
In other words, Shihozawa argued that, in broad conceptual terms, con-
sular police power was justified by the treaty port system. The specific 
form through which that power was exercised, however, was determined 
solely by consular jurisdiction. Framed in this way, the Japanese con-
sular police could operate freely despite any protests related to specific 
circumstances, because the larger system of treaty port imperialism 
sanctioned their actions, in Shihozawa’s view, by an inherent form of in-
ternational consent.
Even as late as 1943, Japanese academics were still arguing for the ne-
cessity of consular police in China because of the peculiar exigencies 
faced by Japan on the continent. For example, when Keiô University pro-
fessor Hanabusa Nagamichi summarized the controversy, he made the 
same arguments that Koga had pursued fifteen years earlier. Also like 
Koga, Hanabusa cited Westel Willoughby specifically as an important 
voice of foreign criticism.89 (One cannot help but wonder if Willoughby 
ever realized that his views had such an impact on so many Japanese.) In a 
lengthy review of the history of Sino-Japanese conflicts over the legitimacy 
of the consular police, Hanabusa cited the clashes at both Xiamen and 
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Zhenjiatun as cases in point, and in addressing the criticisms of European 
and American pundits such as Willoughby, Hanabusa suggested that the 
difference between the sizes of their national populations in China was 
the source of their different interpretations of consular police legality. It 
was because English, French, and American resident communities were so 
much smaller than Japanese communities that westerners did not appre-
ciate the necessity for consular police forces in the Japanese case.90
A theme that runs through all of these Japanese defenses of Foreign 
Ministry police legitimacy from the 1920s until the 1940s is the notion that 
Western criticisms of Japan on this matter revealed to Japanese observers 
the hypocrisy of the modern international treaty system in East Asia. It was 
a system created by the Western powers to justify and legitimize their pred-
atory economic relationship with the Qing Empire, but once Japanese soci-
ety had remade itself through the Meiji transformation and joined that 
circle of imperialist powers, it seemed the rules of the game were changed 
and the rug pulled out from under them. There is in the discussion from 
the Japanese side a pervading sense of frustration with Western criticism 
because it reflected the larger refusal of the Western powers to truly treat 
Japan as an equal. As for Chinese criticism, the Japanese argued along 
similar lines, suggesting that only if China could strengthen itself enough 
to join the international system would it be able to free itself from the 
abuses that system inflicted upon it. There is no doubt, of course, that both 
government officials and private-sector pundits sought to expand and pro-
tect Japan’s interests in China at the expense of their Western rivals. But 
along with that competition and rivalry was a longing for recognition and 
legitimacy. In this sense, then, the debate over consular police legitimacy 
was also a stage upon which much larger issues of frustration and friction 
in imperial politics were being played out.
Conclusions
In his final analysis of the disputed legitimacy of the Japanese consular 
police, Willoughby offered the prescient comments of a Dr. C. C. Wu, 
who wrote in 1917:
From actual experience we know that the activities of these foreign po-
lice will not be confined to their countrymen; in a dispute between a 
Chinese and Japanese, both will be taken to the Japanese station by a 
Japanese policeman. This existence of an imperium in imperio, so far 
from accomplishing its avowed right of improving the relations of the 
countries and bringing about the development of economic interests, 
to no small degree will, it is feared, be the cause of continual friction 
between the officials and peoples of the two countries.91
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Dr. Wu did not know how right he was. It is clear that the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry understood that its position on the establishment of con-
sular police throughout China and Manchuria rested on shaky legal 
ground from the very beginning. Why, then, did the Gaimushô press its 
claim for legitimate police power in the face of such opposition from the 
Chinese side? 
Did the construction of new police substations and the gradual en-
largement of police personnel constitute a calculated program of en-
croachment upon Chinese sovereignty? Or were these developments 
reasonable ad hoc responses to conditions faced by an overseas Japanese 
community in a region lacking effective public security institutions? 
What the evidence suggests is that a combination of factors moti-
vated the Foreign Ministry to deflect the incessant criticism and insist 
on the legitimacy of their consular security forces. Consular police 
forces could certainly play an important role in facilitating the advance-
ment of Japanese strategic and financial interests on the continent. 
Local Japanese residents, however, also demanded that they receive bet-
ter protection from their consular officials, and increases in the numeri-
cal strength of consular police forces almost always came in response to 
specific incidents of violence in which Japanese civilian life and prop-
erty had been destroyed. Finally, it is also quite obvious that the Foreign 
Ministry defended its right to consular police forces in an effort to main-
tain its jurisdictional prerogatives in the face of challenges from rival 
Japanese administrative bureaucracies. It is worth remembering, too, 
that these very same factors were evident in the pattern of consular po-
lice expansion in treaty-port Korea. 
The Japanese consular police were just one of many armed flanks that 
once roamed Japan’s continental empire, all of which Albert Feuerwerker 
has condemned as “blatant infringements of China’s sovereignty.”92 The 
numerous diplomatic arguments between officials and physical clashes be-
tween police officers in the field in this early period may have eventually 
motivated the Foreign Ministry to reconsider its position on police jurisdic-
tion when the framework of the so-called Washington System was worked 
out after the First World War. The rise of Korean and Chinese nationalist 
movements, however, as well as the burgeoning threat of international 
communism after 1919, made such a reversal highly unlikely if not impos-
sible. Indeed, before 1919 the imperial Japanese government viewed the 
consular police as a clearly useful tool for expanding and protecting Japa-
nese interests on the continent, but not necessarily as an absolutely vital 
branch of the imperial bureaucracy. This understanding had begun to 
change by 1920, as the imperial state faced serious threats on both foreign 
and domestic fronts from international communism and Korean national-
ism. In this new environment, Foreign Ministry police forces became a cru-
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cial weapon in the state’s war on colonial resistance and political dissent; 
they were critical in maintaining the integrity of Japanese colonial rule in 
Korea, as well as in suppressing the Japanese left. As such, the Foreign Min-
istry came to play an active role in securing colonial power abroad and au-
thoritarian power at home. The matter of how and why this transformation 
took shape in the way it did is the subject of the next three chapters.
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3
Policing Resistance to  
the Imperial State
Until the end of the First World War, the Japanese consular po-
lice in northeast Asia had been a relatively small organization, focused 
on the duty of managing the public welfare of Japanese resident commu-
nities on the continent. As such, their daily activities consisted primarily 
of mundane administrative tasks and the execution of basic public health 
and security measures. The eruption of the Korean independence move-
ment on March 1, 1919, and the emergence of an international commu-
nist movement centered in Moscow, however, both inspired a radical 
transformation in the perceived mission of the Japanese consular police. 
The treaty port environments of China provided Korean independence 
activists with a safe haven of sorts to organize and execute their plans for 
resistance to Japanese imperialism because there they were beyond the 
reach of colonial Japanese police in Korea and could thus operate with 
relative freedom.1 In a short time, however, as their activities quickly 
came under the surveillance of Japanese consular authorities, the sup-
pression of Korean nationalist and communist movements in China and 
Manchuria became the overwhelmingly dominant theme in consular po-
lice activities during the 1920s.2 
Unfortunately for the Japanese, however, just as the March First Move-
ment in Korea created this new security crisis, Chinese resentment con-
cerning the dubious legality of Japanese police operating on Chinese soil 
also boiled over following China’s own nationalist awakening of May 
Fourth. With widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations rocking almost 
every major city in China during the summer of 1919, this was clearly not 
an environment in which one could expect Sino-Japanese police coopera-
tion to improve. What then compounded the difficulty even further for 
Japanese authorities was their perception that the need to crush the Ko-
rean nationalist movement in China was more than just a matter of con-
solidating overseas colonial authority; the connections between Korean 
independence activists and Japanese socialists made policing political re-
sistance to the imperial Japanese state throughout the informal empire in 
China a task with domestic as well as international consequences.
This chapter turns first to the nature of colonial resistance and politi-
cal dissent in Chinese treaty ports, particularly Shanghai, where the con-
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sular police initially sought solutions based on cooperation with other 
foreign powers in the city, especially France. The focus then shifts to Ji-
andao, where a combination of strong Chinese resistance to the expan-
sion of consular police facilities and more radicalized expressions of 
Korean resistance pushed the Gaimushô toward more unilateral policies. 
Third, the analysis will delve deeply into an attempt by the Fengtian con-
sular police to cultivate local Korean collaborators in their fight against 
violent Korean resistance, and finally, the discussion will examine a series 
of interrelated political security agreements in 1925 that began to set con-
sular police evolution on a new course. What runs through the entire 
chapter, however, is the central theme of consular police action against 
ideological threats to the imperial state, whether those threats were posed 
by nationalists or communists, Koreans or Japanese. 
Politics and Terrorism in the Treaty Ports
The challenge posed by the Korean independence movement in exile first 
made itself known in the foreign concession districts of urban Shanghai. 
The French Concession in particular quickly evolved after 1919 into a hot-
bed of Korean anti-Japanese organization and activity. Throughout the 
1920s, both the colonial Korean Government-General and the Home 
Ministry in Tokyo engaged in coordinated actions with Foreign Ministry 
police in Shanghai to acquire intelligence about and execute the arrest of 
participants in these “subversive” movements.3
The most visible target of Japanese consular police concern in Shang-
hai was the Provisional Government of Korea, formed in exile during the 
spring of 1919.4 Generally speaking, moderate resistance organizations 
such as the Provisional Government aimed to achieve independence from 
Japanese colonial domination by seeking support from and obtaining le-
gitimacy through the recognition of the Western international commu-
nity. Seeking financial aid from both the Soviet Union and the United 
States, the leaders of this government body in exile made their headquar-
ters in the French Concession of Shanghai, where they enjoyed a reason-
able degree of free movement and expression because Japanese police 
could not act unilaterally within the French Concession. An international 
settlement police force, which did include dozens of Japanese, operated in 
other areas of the port, but the French zone was exclusive, making it the 
favored staging ground for Korean independence activists.5 In addition to 
the Shanghai government in exile, other moderate independence activists 
set up similar bodies in Irkutsk and Vladivostok.6 The Shanghai branch, 
however, was the largest and most visible, with many of the most interna-
tionally recognized Korean independence leaders being affiliated with 
the Shanghai group. Nonetheless, the varied nature of Korean resistance 
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as reflected in the large number of exile organizations contributed to con-
flict and competition between them for financial and logistical support 
from foreign governments.
As early as July 1919, when the independence movement was still 
only a few months old, the Korean Government-General had provided 
Foreign Ministry police in Shanghai with a detailed list of Korean activ-
ists to be arrested and detained or deported as soon as possible. The list 
included twenty-two men, ranging in age from the late thirties to mid-
fifties, all residents of the French Concession, and the description of 
their crimes contained charges of conspiring to undermine Japanese 
colonial rule in Korea by fomenting dissent among overseas Koreans 
and pursuing the acquisition of money and weapons to be used against 
Japan.7 Assistance in apprehending these “criminals” was not often 
forthcoming from Chinese authorities in the city, perhaps understand-
ably so, but it was cooperation from the French government that the 
Japanese consular police needed most.8 
By June 1920, the consular police in Shanghai had independently as-
sembled a vast amount of information on the organization and member-
ship of the Provisional Government.9 As early as October 1919, however, 
evidence suggests that preliminary efforts toward Japanese–French coop-
eration in suppressing the Korean Provisional Government were also al-
ready taking shape. What brought the two sides together at this early stage 
was the mutual recognition of their shared problems related to colonial 
security; French authorities wanted the metropolitan Japanese govern-
ment to hand over Vietnamese revolutionaries in Tokyo, while Japanese 
officials wanted help in cracking down on these Korean activists in Shang-
hai.10 The possibility of collaborative police action was evident during the 
latter half of 1920—for example, when French concession authorities co-
operated with Japanese police by seizing the printing equipment of a pro-
independence Korean newspaper and closing down its office. When the 
same paper was back in business by December, however, Japanese police 
then again pressed their French counterparts for assistance.11
In fact, the activities of Korean radicals in the French Concession 
quickly emerged as a thorn in the side of Japanese diplomacy with France. 
One consular official complained in August 1922, for example, of what 
seemed to him French duplicity in anti-Japanese Korean activities. “On the 
surface they offer assistance,” he explained, “but then they do not follow 
through with their promises and there is no sincerity in their words.” More-
over, this official also claimed that French concession authorities even 
sometimes went so far as to provide protection for Korean radicals.12 While 
international cooperation was thus not always forthcoming, the Japanese 
consular police nonetheless did attempt to forge such ties early on.
Shanghai was not the only treaty port environment where Korean in-
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dependence activism began to occupy a great deal of consular police time 
and resources; Tianjin also emerged as a center of organizational opera-
tions behind the Korean independence movement. As early as August 
1920, Tianjin consular police office began reporting on the movements of 
“rebellious groups” (futei dan) in their concession neighborhoods.13 By the 
spring of 1921, police were making arrests of suspected radicals when pos-
sible and carrying out surveillance of others, such as An Chang-ho, when 
they made public speeches.14 Pockets of Korean resistance groups in Pe-
king also soon spoke up in opposition to Japanese colonial policy on the 
peninsula. In March 1921, Peking consular police placed several dozen 
local Korean residents on a list of suspects targeted for surveillance, and a 
year later police introduced a more formal plan for the control of “rebel-
lious Koreans.” As explained in the plan description, the growth in num-
bers of radical Korean activists in North China since 1919 far outpaced the 
numbers of Japanese police there to control them, but the current staff 
pledged to do as much as they could while seeking out the cooperation of 
local Chinese security forces.15
The increasing significance of anti-Japanese activism among over-
seas Koreans was not limited to North China. Consular police in several 
southern Chinese cities also reported trouble in their neighborhoods. 
Several examples from Nanjing and Canton stand out in particular. 
Consular police in Canton reported to Tokyo on the local activities of 
prominent independence activist of Yõ Un-hyõng in May 1921.16 Later 
that year in September, concern also grew over how best to control a 
local organization called the China-Korea Assistance Association (Chû-Kan 
kyôkai), established to facilitate mutual assistance between local Chi-
nese and Korean residents.17 A similar group, China-Korea Mutual Aid 
Society (Chû-Kan kokumin gojosha sôsha), had been formed a year ear-
lier in Shanghai, so the consular police had already been alerted to the 
problem of potential ties between discontented Chinese and Korean 
residents that shared animosity toward Japan.18
The anti-Japanese activism of moderate political independence orga-
nizations and mutual assistance associations was undoubtedly a major 
source of consular police anxiety and a primary target of consular police 
surveillance, but more radical Korean activists took center stage during 
the early 1920s. Specifically, an organization known as the Üiyõldan soon 
became an equally if not more important target of Gaimushô police ac-
tion in Shanghai.19 The Üiyõldan, founded and headed by Kim Wõn-bong, 
was an organization committed to the physical destruction of Japanese 
power in Korea, and its members carried out bombings of colonial offices 
on the peninsula as well as attacks on symbols of Japanese authority 
throughout northeast Asia. They also engaged in tactical assassinations of 
Japanese colonial officials, and it was their attempted assassination of 
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General Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai in the spring of 1922 that brought the 
Üiyõldan to the forefront of consular police strategy.20 Until that time, 
Üiyõldan operations had been largely limited to targets within the Korean 
peninsula, but when they took their brand of anti-Japanese terrorism to 
Shanghai, Kim Wõn-bong and his associates became the problem of Gai-
mushô police. In fact, it was the Shanghai consular police who arrested 
several members of the plot against General Tanaka.21
Much as they had done following the establishment of the Provisional 
Government, the Shanghai consular police quickly assembled an extraor-
dinary amount of information about Üiyõldan organization, leadership, 
and ideology.22 The Üiyõldan was particularly adept at assassination via 
strategically planted explosive devices, so the consular police made pre-
venting the group from acquiring such materiel a high priority. In the fall 
of 1923, the Shanghai police scored a significant victory in this mission 
when an undercover sting operation resulted in the seizure of fifty bombs 
from the Üiyõldan in the French Concession. This episode reveals more, 
however, than just the efficacy of consular police tactics in Shanghai. The 
investigation also revealed that Üiyõldan activists were working hand in 
hand with rebel groups from western Jiandao and other parts of Manchu-
ria. Furthermore, it is important to note that the details of these arrests 
were first made known to Kasumigaseki by the Korea Government-Gen-
eral police bureau chief, not the Shanghai consul; compelling evidence 
indeed of how deep the hands of colonial authorities in Korea could reach 
into Gaimushô police affairs in China.23
The activities of the Üiyõldan are especially significant because they so 
effectively illustrate the complexity of imperial resistance and Japanese at-
tempts to crush it. Üiyõldan fighters targeted symbols of Japanese power 
from Seoul to Shanghai to Osaka. In turn, metropolitan police forces in 
Tokyo compiled intelligence reports on the group, just as colonial security 
forces did in Korea and consular police departments did in China.24 The 
Foreign Ministry police were thus one link in a transregional chain of politi-
cal security institutions stretching across northeast Asia by the mid-1920s. 
In 1924, Shanghai consular police made an important advance in their ef-
forts against politically subversive and terrorist organizations, especially the 
Üiyõldan. Using information obtained through “interrogations” of several 
Üiyõldan members in police custody, Shanghai officers executed several 
sting operations in January, netting additional key intelligence and making 
more arrests. Despite that progress, however, the greatest obstacle standing 
in the way of Japanese plans to crush movements such as the Üiyõldan was 
the lack of cooperation from French concession security forces.25 
In fact, the problem of police collaboration was severe enough to 
reach the highest levels of Japanese–French diplomacy. In 1924, for ex-
ample, Shanghai consul Yada Shichitarô asked French authorities to 
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banish “recalcitrant Koreans [futei Senjin]” from the Shanghai conces-
sion to the greatest extent possible and by whatever means available. He 
also then pressed the French to allow for the arrest of suspects directly 
by Japanese police authorities, and even further urged that France ap-
prove of Japanese police being armed in the concession area. If that just 
was not feasible, then the French should offer as much police muscle as 
possible in support of Japanese security sweeps. Finally, Yada stressed 
the need for good intelligence from French police on the known ad-
dresses of suspected Korean independence agitators. 
The French response was carefully crafted. As for the first point, the 
French ambassador explained that banishing someone not clearly en-
gaged in activity that created disorder in the concession was problematic. 
He then continued to point out that, regrettably, even when including 
Vietnamese and Chinese assistants, the French concession police force 
had only six hundred men and that fact made it difficult to support Japa-
nese police operations with large numbers of officers. Finally, he added 
that French intelligence on addresses of local Koreans was not up-to-date 
and would be of little use to Japanese police. In short, the French ambas-
sador stonewalled every point put forth by Consul Yada.26
How can this French reluctance to provide greater assistance be ex-
plained? It must be pointed out that during earlier years (especially before 
1910), the Japanese had been less than eager to help the French crack-
down on Vietnamese activists in Tokyo.27 The revolutionary Phan B¿i 
Châu among others was of particular concern to French authorities, who 
well knew that he was living in protected exile in Tokyo during the years 
following the Russo-Japanese War.28 For many in Japanese diplomatic cir-
cles, the idea of helping a European colonial power to suppress the na-
tional aspirations of a fledgling Asian independence movement put them 
in an awkward position, to say the least. Many Gaimushô officials were also 
involved (or had been) with the East Asia Common Culture Academy 
(Tô-A Dôbun Shôin), an institution devoted to pan-Asian progress and 
education.29 As such, many were quite friendly with Vietnamese national-
ists in exile, and helping the French government to arrest them would 
have been unthinkable. After the 1910 annexation of Korea, however, the 
Japanese state, of course, had its own anticolonial resistance to worry 
about. A decade later, when the independence movement of 1919 had 
come to pose a serious security problem in Shanghai, the Japanese now 
needed French help. Perhaps understandably, then, the French did more 
than a little foot dragging when it came to Japanese requests for help 
against Korean exiles in Shanghai. It is important to remember, however, 
that French reluctance to provide assistance in the suppression of Korean 
resistance cannot necessarily be interpreted as a form of French support 
or sympathy for Korean independence activists. French authorities would 
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have quite readily turned over valuable intelligence information to their 
fellow colonial overlords in Tokyo if only Japanese security forces had re-
ciprocated with information on exiled Vietnamese revolutionaries.30
Even if French help had been more forthcoming, Korean indepen-
dence activists were not the only problem in Shanghai. A series of reports 
from the early 1920s also indicates the concern expressed by colonial au-
thorities in Korea regarding Shanghai as a site where Japanese, Korean, 
and Chinese “extremists” might find common ground and begin to pool 
their resources. One of the earliest warnings came in May 1920, when the 
Government-General warned of Bolsheviks arriving in Shanghai from 
Vladivostok and a meeting between a Japanese socialist named Kita Kijirô, 
Korean revolutionaries, and anti-Japanese Chinese.31 A July 1921 docu-
ment further suggested that Korean communists in Shanghai might con-
spire with Japanese communists and acquire from them much needed 
financial support.32 Another report from November 1921 identified a par-
ticularly suspicious Japanese communist in Shanghai named Aoyama, and 
then cited evidence that certain Koreans had recently traveled to Tokyo to 
establish links with the nascent Japanese Communist Party (JCP).33 
As George Beckmann and Okubo Genji made clear in their classic 
study of the Japanese Communist Party, the Comintern played a critical 
role in facilitating the initial creation of the official party organization. It is 
not insignificant that the part of intermediary between Moscow and Tokyo 
was played by Korean communist agents, whose connections to the Comin-
tern had already been established. Between the late spring of 1920 and the 
summer of 1921, several meetings between Japanese communists such as 
Ôsugi Sakae and Kondô Eizô and Korean agents took place in Tokyo and 
Shanghai.34 Metropolitan police authorities in Tokyo knew quite well that 
leading leftists such as Ôsugi Sakae, Yamakawa Hiroshi, and Katayama Sen 
had connections with Korean communists and Soviet agents in Shanghai.35 
The consular police there served in effect as the local branch office of 
homeland state authority, seeking to stifle voices of political dissent well 
beyond the borders of domestic society. The nature and progress of Ko-
rean resistance in Shanghai, then, was much more than a just threat to 
Japanese colonial control over the peninsula. The success of the Korean 
communist organization in Shanghai with the aid of the Comintern posed 
a direct threat to the stability of metropolitan society itself.
Vice Home Minister Kobashi Ichita articulated this fear dramatically 
in April 1921, arguing that because the world had seen a widespread esca-
lation of Russian extremism since the end of the First World War, domes-
tic security forces had taken steps to bolster and unify their intelligence. 
Because Russian, Chinese, and Korean “plots” against Japan could find in 
Shanghai fertile ground in which to blossom, Kobashi claimed, stronger 
steps toward intelligence integration were needed. To that end, he in-
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structed that experienced intelligence officers from the Korea Govern-
ment-General and the Home Ministry be stationed within the Shanghai 
consular police force to oversee that integration. The Foreign Ministry’s 
Asia Bureau responded in June by approving the joint appointment of a 
Home Ministry police superintendent as a consular police superintendent 
in Shanghai, suggesting important links between domestic and foreign 
police work at a time when formal communist parties were taking shape 
on both fronts.36
The substantial number of Korean students in Japan during the early 
1920s and the efforts of metropolitan police to keep a close eye on their 
political activities is a further reminder of the transnational dimension of 
the colonial security problem.37 The most well-known example of both of-
ficial and popular conflation of Korean nationalist activism and left-wing 
Japanese dissent took place in the aftermath of the Great Kanto earth-
quake of September 1, 1923. Suspicious of their inciting insurrection amid 
the chaos of the quake-ravaged capital, metropolitan police and vigilante 
gangs murdered thousands of resident Koreans and detained thousands 
of Japanese leftists and labor leaders, a number of whom also died in po-
lice custody. The case of Japanese anticolonial anarchist Kaneko Fumiko, 
who was arrested along with her romantic and revolutionary Korean part-
ner, Pak Yõl in the course of post-quake police action, also seemed to con-
firm the potential for collaboration between rebellious Koreans and 
Japanese in the eyes of police authorities.38 Perhaps the more revealing 
case, however, was that of Sano Manabu earlier that year. Sano was a cen-
tral leader in the Japanese communist movement, and in May 1923 metro-
politan police raided his Waseda University office, eventually turning up 
lists of all JCP members. Shortly thereafter, police began arresting its 
members in a series of nationwide actions during June 1923. Sano was 
among those to escape the dragnet, and it is worth noting that he fled to 
Shanghai, where he then became the concern of the Japanese consular 
police.39 Because socialism was thus considered an ideological threat that 
crossed national boundaries and identities, the boundaries of Japanese 
police power needed to be just as flexible and porous. It was the Foreign 
Ministry police that made such a security network possible.
Resistance and Counterinsurgency in Jiandao 
Like Shanghai, the Jiandao area became a hotbed of revolutionary anti-
Japanese activity after the eruption of the Korean independence move-
ment of 1919. Unlike Shanghai, however, most Korean organizations in 
Jiandao and throughout Manchuria were prone almost immediately to 
develop more radical forms of resistance against Japanese colonialism. 
Because of its strategic location across the Korea-Manchuria border, Ko-
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rean guerrillas could conduct operations on Korean territory and then 
quickly retreat to the refuge offered on the Chinese side of the bound-
ary. Cities in the Manchurian frontier and the Russian Far East also of-
fered refuge for the strategic planning of Korean independence groups 
committed to violent resistance. Before the year was out, the Gaimushô 
clearly recognized the critical severity of this problem. Foreign Minister 
Uchida Yasuya ordered the consuls in China, Manchuria, and Vladi-
vostok to do everything possible to crush rebellious Korean organiza-
tions within their jurisdiction. Significantly, Uchida also directed them 
to execute this objective through cooperation with local Chinese (or 
Russian) authorities.40 A multilateral framework was thus the preferred 
option of the Foreign Ministry early on, and this was a policy that con-
sular police leadership would attempt to employ for as long as possible.
The police force of the Korea Government-General, however, surely 
had the greatest interest in and motivation for the suppression of Korean 
radicals in Manchuria, as its ability to rule was directly undermined by 
their activities. Therefore, on several occasions in late 1919 and early 1920, 
police bureau detachments from the northern portions of the Korean 
peninsula crossed the border and conducted raids on suspected radical 
base camps in Jiandao and elsewhere. These border crossings were illegal, 
of course, since the Korea Government-General had no legitimate juris-
diction within sovereign Chinese territory. When such operations did take 
place, local Chinese authorities responded, and rightly so, with protests 
and demands for an immediate end to such incursions.41
With the political limitations facing colonial police from Korea and 
the physical retribution that often fell upon local Korean collaborators, 
the pressure to crush Jiandao-based guerrilla activity increasingly came to 
rest on the shoulders of the Jiandao consular police force.42 The Jiandao 
consular police chief, Suematsu Kichiji, made numerous arguments based 
on his deep understanding of local conditions regarding the threat of in-
creasing levels of “Bolshevization” in Korean communities. Financial and 
human resources then available in Jiandao to combat this threat, Sue-
matsu claimed, were not nearly adequate.43 This was the beginning of a 
long and contentious battle between consular police leaders in the field 
and their Tokyo-based supervisors. In the summer of 1920, Suematsu pro-
vided the Gaimushô with even more warnings about the increasing radi-
calization of Jiandao Koreans and the evolving influence of Soviet 
communism in Jiandao.44 Still, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats in Kasumi-
gaseki refused requests from the field for more staff on the grounds that 
an increase in police personnel would only further aggravate the Chinese 
side. Their suggestion, instead, was that the Jiandao consular police force 
work diligently to foster cooperation with local Chinese police in control-
ling the security crisis in the region.45 
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Local Jiandao consular police did indeed attempt to develop coopera-
tive solutions with local Chinese security forces. For example, during July 
and August 1920, several programs to loan weapons and other equipment 
to Chinese police were put into place.46 However, problems in communica-
tion and coordination between the two sides persisted, as evidenced by an 
incident during which three Japanese patrolmen on an undercover as-
signment disguised in Korean and Chinese dress were arrested and de-
tained by Chinese police.47 Regional Japanese branch offices of the Jiandao 
consular police network also held meetings to better integrate their intel-
ligence and make what little they could do against the insurgency more 
effective.48 However, without sufficient manpower, the limits of consular 
police efficacy were obvious to those at the local level.
Events during the fall of 1920 placed intense new pressures on the 
Jiandao consular police to expand their capabilities when in mid- 
September a “bandit” force several hundred men strong attacked the 
town of Hunchun. In their raid, the attackers burned several consular 
buildings, looted local shops, and murdered a number of local Japanese 
and Korean residents. A handful of consular police officers were also 
Jiandao consular police 
chief Suematsu Kichiji, 
1920s. (Photo courtesy of 
the Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs diplomatic 
archives, Tokyo)
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wounded and killed during the battle.49 In response to the attack at 
Hunchun, elements of the Japanese Army in Korea crossed the border 
and joined Jiandao region consular police forces in what came to be 
called the Jiandao Expedition.50 From late 1920 through the early spring 
of 1921, army and police forces carried out “search and destroy” patrols 
that included numerous on-site executions as well as arrests. Foreign 
criticism of Japanese tactics during the expedition was severe, and West-
ern Christian missionaries in Korea, mostly Americans, were especially 
harsh in their public condemnation of Japanese brutality.51 However, 
the Japanese defended their actions as a necessary response to lawless-
ness on the Manchurian frontier. In fact, several Japanese defenders of 
the expedition drew a direct comparison between it and the United 
States invasion of northern Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, whose 
armies had terrorized American communities in the southwest.52
The exact story of what happened on the night of September 12, 
1920, in Hunchun is a matter of heated controversy. Many Korean schol-
ars, and some Japanese, argue that the Hunchun attack was most likely 
staged by agents of the Japanese Army in Korea to provide a reason for 
large-scale military operations in the area against any and all anti-Japanese 
elements there. Other Japanese historians have argued that the conspir-
acy theory is patently false. They stress that Jiandao was indeed a lawless 
frontier region in which bandit gangs routinely terrorized local commu-
nities. Thus, they argue that the Japanese response, if a bit too severe, 
was ultimately justified.53 Perhaps it is also significant to consider the 
timing of the Hunchun attack in evaluating the Japanese response to it. 
Earlier in 1920, there had been a massacre of Japanese civilians by Rus-
sian bandits in Siberia at the village of Nikolaevsk. In fact, the Seoul-
based Japanese periodical Chôsen oyobi Manshû ran an editorial in Octo-
ber 1920 asking if the Hunchun Incident was not a second Nikolaevsk.54 
While this certainly would not justify the violence wrought on thousands 
of innocent Korean residents at the hands of the Japanese Army, it is 
nonetheless necessary to consider the state of mind of Japanese resident 
communities in Manchuria and the Russian Far East after Nikolaevsk. 
Indeed, the role played by local Japanese and Korean communities 
in providing support for the Jiandao Expedition was substantial. Com-
munity groups repeatedly sent petitions to the Foreign Ministry de-
manding a strong response to the recent attacks. In fact, local Korean 
resident associations were often more adamant in their demands for 
greater Japanese police actions than were the local Japanese communi-
ties. In addition, these groups sent many requests to delay the withdrawal 
of troops until a greater degree of stability had been restored. Pressure 
from local Chinese authorities and international criticism had pushed 
Japan toward the troop withdrawal, but the local Korean community 
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tried hard to prevent it. In their view, Japanese police power was the 
only force available to protect their livelihoods from the depredations of 
criminal gangs and radical Korean resistance groups.55
After the Japanese Army had withdrawn from the area in the spring 
of 1921, the Gaimushô responded to the recent crisis by bolstering its con-
sular police facilities in Jiandao. For example, a number of new branch 
police stations were set up in order to strengthen local-intelligence gather-
ing capabilities.56 In response to the various new police facilities that 
 Jiandao consular authorities were establishing in the region, local Chi-
nese officials lodged numerous petitions in opposition to the expansion. 
In fact, the Chinese side refused even to recognize the legal legitimacy of 
the new Japanese police outposts and furthermore demanded that the 
new stations be closed down and their officers withdrawn.57 The Chinese 
strongly objected to these fortifications of Japanese police power in Jian-
dao because in their view the withdrawal of army units was meaningless if 
Japan simply replaced them with larger numbers of quasi-colonial police 
officers. Despite Chinese protest, however, the expansion went on. Per-
haps the most significant step was the establishment of a keisatsubu, or 
“police headquarters,” at the main consulate in Longjincun in April 1921. 
The new office would serve as a central point of command and control for 
all Japanese police operations in the Jiandao region. The headquarters 
divided its duties into three subsections: normal police duties, police train-
ing, and special high police work, or tokubetsu kôtô keisatsu (tokkô). The cre-
ation of a tokkô department within the Jiandao police network was a 
significant step in the politicization of consular police functions in 
Manchuria.58
The summer of 1922 saw what appeared to many to be a replay of the 
Hunchun Incident two years earlier. On this occasion, a gang of several 
hundred mounted “bandits” attacked the town of Toudaogou. As before, 
they burned Japanese consular facilities and also attacked the police sta-
tion and its jail to release several imprisoned comrades. Furthermore, the 
attackers went out of their way to target the homes and businesses of local 
Koreans deemed to be “Japan-friendly.” This was especially true of Kore-
ans who worked in and with Japanese police networks.59 To many in the 
local consular police network, the violence at Toudaogou was proof that 
local Chinese police could not effectively counter the wanton destruction 
of bandit gangs and the subversive activities of more politically minded 
Korean radical organizations. In the wake of the Toudaogou incident, the 
Foreign Ministry thus initiated another wave of personnel increases and 
other police-force reinforcements that continued throughout 1923 and 
into the following year. By the middle of 1924, the expansion of Japanese 
consular police forces in Jiandao had stabilized. The consulate-general at 
Longjincun, including its keisatsubu and the regular police section, had 
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159 officers. Another 323 policemen were scattered between the four sub-
consulates and their smaller branch outposts, making a total of 482 con-
sular police officers in the Jiandao region as of May 1924. That nearly 20 
percent of those officers were Korean reflects the politically and ideologi-
cally divided nature of their community in Jiandao.60
It is also worth noting that the same pressures that led to the creation 
of a tokkô section in the Jiandao consular police office in 1924 were, of 
course, also at work in the homeland. The economic recession in Japan 
during the last year of the First World War sparked an increase in labor ac-
tivism and rural unrest, the most well-known episode of disorder being the 
Rice Riots of 1918. The Home Ministry responded to these events by re-
vamping its police surveillance system, while the Justice Ministry began 
pushing for new laws designed to preserve public order. The year 1922 then 
saw the official establishment of the Japanese Communist Party, and wide-
spread arrests of JCP members were carried out in 1923. Between 1923 and 
1924, the Metropolitan Police Bureau (Keishichô) also increased its num-
ber of tokkô officers by twice the amount of the previous year’s increase. 
New tokkô sections were also set up throughout 1923 in Hokkaido, Kana-
gawa, Nagano, Aichi, Kyoto, Hyogo, Yamaguchi, and Fukuoka.61 At home 
and abroad during the early 1920s, then, Japanese police networks re-
sponded to the challenge of left-wing radicalism, both Japanese and Ko-
rean, with vigor.
Finally, one should recognize that the early history of the Jiandao con-
sular police and its response to the evolution of overseas Korean resistance 
is markedly different from the manner in which consular police forces 
developed in Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin. In Jian-
dao, Gaimushô police faced more serious and immediate threats of vio-
Police staff of the Hunchun Consulate training on machine guns, early 1920s. (Photo 
courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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lence from radical Korean independence groups. They also had to face 
much stronger opposition to their activities from local Chinese authori-
ties. With superiors back in Tokyo who could not see local circumstances 
in the same light, the Jiandao consular police thus began to cultivate a 
spirit of unilateral adventurism very early on in the war against Korean 
resistance in exile.
Local Collaborators: The Manchuria People’s Protection Society
Nationalist movements in China and Korea during the spring and sum-
mer of 1919 created a two-tiered problem for Japanese police, especially 
in Manchuria. The political opposition and terrorist violence inspired 
by the Korean independence movement of March first meant that the 
necessity for effective police work was greater than ever before. Almost 
simultaneously, however, the Chinese nationalist movement of May 
fourth meant that smooth and reliable Sino-Japanese cooperation re-
garding police work would become more elusive than ever before. The 
solution to this difficult conundrum would then here seem quite impos-
sible: to find local non-Chinese collaborators in Manchuria who were 
amenable to the notion of suppressing Korean independence activists. 
The Japanese consular police in Fengtian, however, managed to stumble 
upon this very thing.
The position of the Foreign Ministry’s consular police forces in 
south Manchuria was quite different from that of forces in other parts of 
Manchuria. In Fengtian and regions immediately surrounding the 
South Manchuria Railway Company’s main line, the authority and juris-
diction of consular police had to compete with police forces of Japan’s 
Kwantung Government-General. Beyond that, the most influential re-
gional Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin, also made Fengtian his head-
quarters. Therefore, local Chinese authorities under Zhang’s control 
also competed for influence over the management of Chinese, Korean, 
and Japanese communities in the area. 62 As in other parts of Manchu-
ria, the Fengtian area played host to various anti-Japanese Korean orga-
nizations. However, unlike the course of action in Jiandao where Japan 
had ultimately relied on unilateral solutions to the security crisis, what 
had emerged by late 1920 was the need to formulate a strategy for sup-
pressing Korean independence activists in Manchuria that did not rely 
solely on Japanese military power in the region. Japanese authorities 
needed a subtler (yet still swift and uncompromising) approach that 
would solve their security problems while stirring up as little protest as 
possible from Chinese and Western voices. To those ends, a fascinating 
collaborative venture aimed at crushing local Korean radicalism took 
shape during the early 1920s. This Sino-Korean-Japanese security orga-
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nization was called the Manshû hominkai (hereafter MHK), a name 
translatable as the Manchuria People’s Protection Society.63
Early in 1920, Ch’oe Ch’anggyu and a Korean associate called on the 
offices of the Kwantung Government-General in Lushun and presented a 
plan for developing a local self-defense organization in South Manchuria. 
After later obtaining a letter of introduction from Saitô Makoto, the gov-
ernor-general of Korea, they approached the Japanese consulate in Feng-
tian to pitch their idea to police leadership there. By early June, the plan 
had been approved and the MHK was born.64 Significantly, a large major-
ity of the group’s leadership were former members of the Ilchinhoe, a col-
laborationist association that helped facilitate the Japanese annexation of 
Korea in 1910. Ilchinhoe ideology was rooted in late nineteenth-century 
Tonghak religious philosophy, the Tonghak movement being the violent 
and xenophobic peasant uprising behind civil disturbances on the Ko-
rean peninsular during the early 1890s. The process by which this Tong-
hak antiforeignism became Ilchinhoe collaborationism is best understood 
as a subtle shift from suspicion and fear of all foreigners to a more focused 
hostility aimed at the powers of Western Europe and North America. 
Thus, the Ilchinhoe saw cooperation with Japan as the best possible strat-
egy for combating the predatory inclinations of more powerful foreign 
foes.65 As Stewart Lone has further explained, the Ilchinhoe had operated 
with two aims in mind: “reform of an unequal and unstable society and 
the ejection of the corrupt ruling dynasty.”66 In other words, these “pro-
Japanese collaborators” were driven above all else by a desire for social 
and political reform within their own society. The Ilchinhoe judged coop-
eration with the Japanese to be the best way to achieve those goals. The 
ideological underpinnings of the MHK, based on a branch of Tonghak 
teachings called Chõngdogyo, were quite similar.67
According to the group’s founding manifesto, their aim was two-
fold.68 One goal was the promotion of the general welfare of the Korean 
community in Manchuria. This would be done through educational and 
employment assistance, as well as by way of proper moral guidance 
under their religious principles. The second general aim of the organi-
zation was to stand in opposition to both radical Korean independence 
associations in Manchuria and the Provisional Government in Shang-
hai. Manchurian rebels and urban independence intellectuals were 
equally guilty of corrupting traditional Korean morality in the eyes of 
the MHK. Funding for the organization came largely from the Japanese 
colonial Government-General in Korea, but the Foreign Ministry also 
provided a limited amount of budgetary assistance. However, money 
and other resources funneled into the group were often lost to the pil-
laging of radical Korean opposition groups or to extortion by local Chi-
nese authorities. Indeed, from the Chinese side the MHK appeared to 
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be a puppet organization designed to facilitate Japanese encroachment 
on Chinese territory and aid in undermining Chinese sovereignty in 
Manchuria. As such, MHK members were often the target of violent re-
crimination by local Chinese police.69
The early activities of the MHK included a wide variety of programs 
designed to improve the living conditions of local Koreans. They sup-
ported education and public health, and they also encouraged the devel-
opment of local Korean entrepreneurship and economic development. In 
addition to these rather benign ventures, the MHK also facilitated the 
surveillance and arrest of Korean radicals operating throughout southern 
Manchuria. They provided critical intelligence by infiltrating local anti-
Japanese organizations, and MHK members also participated in what 
amounted to political assassination squads led by Japanese kempeitai (mili-
tary police) or Kwantung Government-General police officers.
A closer look at the details of the first official MHK “research expedi-
tion” reveals a more complete sense of the group’s operations and ideol-
ogy. A Japanese report clearly indicates that a significant reason behind 
the establishment of the group was to deal with the problem of “disloyal 
Koreans” after the withdrawal of the Siberian expedition in 1922. The 
same report also claims that the participation of Zhang Zuolin was neces-
sary for MHK activities, as only Zhang could instruct his local officials to 
protect MHK members and facilitate the group’s missions.70 In the first 
budget outlay, specific amounts of money were earmarked for certain ac-
tivities. Almost half of the first budget went to costs of establishing the 
group, and another large chunk of funds went to supporting the research 
expeditions. Other expenses included construction costs for jeugyo (the 
sect of Ch’õngdogyo to which many members subscribed) churches, re-
ward money for arrests, and propaganda activities in local Korean com-
munities. Key among those activities was the publication of a group 
newsletter called the Manshû hominkai kaihô, or Minkaipô.71
The “research groups” mentioned above are perhaps the most intrigu-
ing aspect of MHK operations. Nine groups of police operatives partici-
pated in the first “research” expedition in January 1921. Each team was 
comprised of eighteen men (ten Japanese consular and military police, 
five MHK members, and three provincial Chinese police officers), ac-
counting for a total of 162 men who fanned out across southern Manchu-
ria that month in search of “rebellious” Koreans. Their operations were 
carried out in secret, members were well-armed and disguised, and Zhang 
Zuolin’s regime in Fengtian had provided the weapons.72 In their first trip, 
which lasted eight days from May 21 to May 29, a number of arrests were 
made and important documents seized. Curiously, the reports on this first 
expedition also reveal a rather provocative pattern of behavior. With 
alarming regularity, suspects arrested by MHK “research” squads are said 
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to have put up some kind of resistance after being taken into custody, and 
they were subsequently shot during the scuffle. The consistency of these 
reports suggests that, for all intents and purposes, these MHK research 
teams were paramilitary death squads.73
By the spring of 1921 the group had opened branches in numerous 
cities throughout southern Manchuria. Their early success inspired group 
leaders to petition for an expanded budget in March 1921.74 In their re-
quest, the MHK leadership cited the various dangers faced by the Korean 
community in Manchuria. At the root of most problems was the “danger-
ous thought” of extremist Russian Bolshevism. This ideology, the petition-
ers claimed, was having a profoundly negative effect on local Korean 
residents, since Korean radicals, inspired by these foreign evils, abused 
and pillaged Korean communities, and consequently popular anti-Japa-
nese inclinations grew ever more intense. The MHK described their own 
role as being the most effective tool for fighting the social destruction 
caused by the importation of Western communist ideology and for pre-
serving peace and stability among what they viewed as the brotherhood of 
East Asians. This petition was also clear in pointing out the corruptive in-
fluence of Western religious teachings, namely Christianity, suggesting 
that the MHK’s dual spiritual mission was helping the fight on that front 
as well. Signed by sixteen of the most influential leaders in the organiza-
tion, the petition was received well by Japanese authorities in Fengtian, 
who authorized budget increases for the coming year. Certainly, these pe-
titioners were to some extent telling Japanese officials what they wanted to 
hear in order to secure financial support for their activities. The group’s 
eager participation in violent assaults against fellow Korean residents, 
however, leaves little doubt that at least some of the ideological conflict 
and political rivalry within their community was quite genuine. 
Aiba Kiyoshi, a long-time Foreign Ministry police veteran, had been 
working as an interpreter in Fengtian when the MHK was founded.75 Many 
years later, in September 1940, Aiba wrote up a report based on his experi-
ences with the MHK to be included in the official Foreign Ministry police 
historical compendium, for which he was then serving as an editor. Al-
though composed some fifteen years after the group’s abolition, Aiba’s 
report provides a number of fascinating insights into the nature of the 
organization.76 On the matter of the group’s foundation and early activi-
ties, Aiba noted that the leadership of the group was indeed almost exclu-
sively made up of former Ilchinhoe officeholders, and he also drew a 
fascinating comparison between MHK ideology and the contemporary 
Japanese concept of Dai Ajia shugi or “Greater East Asianism,” a rhetorical 
pillar of Japanese conquest in China during the 1940s. Aiba further stated 
unequivocally that MHK research groups had indeed carried out the pur-
suit and assassination of rebellious Koreans, with the full knowledge and 
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consent of Zhang Zuolin. He also confirmed that MHK bands joined with 
Japanese army units during the Jiandao Expedition of 1920–1921, hunt-
ing down and shooting suspected Korean radicals.
In Aiba’s estimation, the activities of the MHK had ultimately pro-
duced numerous positive results. Both the number of “rebel gangs” 
(futei dan) and the scope of their disruptive activities were reduced dur-
ing the MHK years of operation. Travel by Japanese civilians in Korea-
Manchuria border regions had been made safer, Aiba claimed, and 
resistance groups faced greater difficulty in extorting money from local 
communities. The MHK had also served usefully, according to Aiba, as 
a conduit by which Japan-friendly ideas could be infused into local Ko-
rean communities, especially through their educational activities. Finally, 
border crossings from Manchuria into the Korean peninsula by “rebel 
gangs” decreased, and border incursions by Korean colonial police bu-
reau forces became less frequent, helping smooth out Sino-Japanese rela-
tions in the area.77
It would seem, then, that Japanese authorities had found an answer 
to their delicate diplomatic problem. Radical Korean independence 
fighters were being suppressed, and it was being done without stirring 
the anger of local Chinese officials. In fact, local Chinese authorities 
were making the work possible. The early success did not last, however, 
as this attempt at counterinsurgency through indigenous collaborators 
soon fell victim to many of the difficulties that plague similar strategies 
in other geopolitical environments.
Despite the operational success and budgetary enthusiasm of 1921, 
problems began to emerge in the organization by the end of 1922. In Sep-
tember of that year, Japanese authorities convened a general conference of 
regional MHK leadership in Fengtian. Japanese Consul-General Akatsuka 
Shôsuke identified a number of problematic issues in his opening remarks, 
in particular the matter of ideological divisions within the MHK. These 
differences needed to be addressed, but Akatsuka argued that the more 
pressing problem was the breakdown of cooperation between Japanese 
and Chinese security forces in efforts to suppress radical Korean resistance 
activity in Manchuria.78 By the spring of 1923, however, the problems iden-
tified by Akatsuka had not been resolved. In fact, internal dissension and 
factionalization within the MHK had intensified. A petition filed by a small 
group of regional MHK leaders in April is indicative of the suspicions and 
mutual distrust that was beginning to tear the organization apart from the 
inside. After reviewing the history and mission of the organization, the 
petitioners brought up the matter of 25,000 yen earmarked for its activities 
that had mysteriously disappeared. While the accusation was vague, Ch’oe 
was mentioned by name in the complaint, a clear hint that his enemies 
suspected him of embezzlement.79 By July, this same group of insiders was 
 Policing Resistance to the Imperial State | 83
openly accusing Ch’oe and other high-level MHK officials of appropriating 
funds for their own personal use. “Ch’oe speaks of serving the good of the 
people,” they stated, “but in his heart he serves only himself.”80 The peti-
tion went on to describe a list of twenty-one crimes perpetrated by Ch’oe 
against the group and the Korean community in Manchuria as a whole. In 
short, the document was more than just a statement of censure; it was a call 
for Ch’oe’s expulsion from the organization.
To some Japanese officials, particularly those in the Kwantung 
 Government-General, internal dissension such as this was proof that the 
MHK was a dismal failure. In fact, Japanese critics of the organization 
identified three main problems. First, radical Korean groups saw MHK 
members as running dogs of Japanese imperialism and thus targeted 
them and their families for violent intimidation and sometimes even as-
sassination. Second, local Chinese authorities were also growing increas-
ingly hostile to the MHK for reasons similar to those of radical Korean 
opposition forces, namely that the organization seemed to be a front for 
Japanese encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Finally, as evidenced by 
the claims against Ch’oe, the MHK itself was disintegrating from within 
due to ideological conflicts between its members. The solution was simple 
according to the critics. First, the MHK had to be completely shut down 
and then replaced with a more low-key Korean residents’ association like 
those already in operation throughout Manchuria. Finally, former leaders 
of the group would have to be paid off with a handsome severance pack-
age, with extra careful attention to Ch’oe because of his deep connections 
to the Fengtian consulate.81
In October 1923, fearful that his organization would soon be on the 
chopping block, Ch’oe wrote to Foreign Minister Ijûin in defense of the 
MHK. He argued that inflammatory propaganda of rival religious sects 
had exaggerated the degree of internal division within his group. Fur-
thermore, he suggested that competition between Japanese institutions 
was the driving force behind efforts to disband the MHK, by which he 
meant the jurisdictional rivalry between the Kwantung Government- 
General and the Foreign Ministry’s consular offices in South Manchuria.82 
The opponents of the MHK however, were, determined to put an end to its 
operations. So much so, in fact, that Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo 
had quickly resigned themselves to the inevitable dissolution of the group. 
In planning a strategy for dealing with local conditions after the MHK was 
no more, Gaimushô authorities in Tokyo instructed local Manchurian 
consuls to collect weapons from MHK members who had participated in 
armed “research trips” along with Japanese police and soldiers as well as to 
assemble and safely store documents related to MHK operations. Further-
more, because the MHK had been especially useful as an intelligence-
gathering tool, such operations were sure to suffer once the group was 
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disbanded, so consuls were instructed to compensate for that loss by going 
back to more traditional use of spies and paid informants.83
The group was finally disbanded in early 1924 despite the protests 
of Ch’oe and Fengtian Consul Akatsuka, who continued to defend its 
utility in the face of criticism from the Kwantung Government-General 
and the absence of support from high-level Foreign Ministry leadership. 
As Ch’oe and others had predicted, MHK members quickly became the 
targets of violent reprisals by radical Korean activists. Ch’oe himself fell 
victim to this vengeance when a band of radical Korean assassins in-
vaded his home in Fengtian in June 1924. They had intended to kill 
Ch’oe, but when they discovered him to be away from the house, they 
murdered his wife and mother-in-law instead. The Fengtian consular 
police gave chase that day, shooting and killing one of the nine assas-
sins. A second was shot the following day, and the remaining seven were 
arrested and taken into Japanese custody. In a chilling statement given 
to the Japanese police, one of the assailants sent a message directly to 
Ch’oe. “We may have failed the first time, but there will be a second and 
a third,” he proclaimed. “We will follow you all the way to Tokyo!”84 
In July, Ch’oe made a final desperate and impassioned plea for sup-
port from Japanese authorities. He began by arguing that the three great-
est threats to peace and stability in Manchuria were American missionaries 
with their Christian propaganda, Russian Bolsheviks with their Commu-
nist propaganda, and the violence of radical Korean resistance groups. 
The MHK had been established to combat all of these “evils,” and in 
Ch’oe’s view they had done just that. Since their inception, the group had 
protected “decent” Korean civilians from dangerous revolutionaries, bro-
ken up dozens of rebel groups, and seized mountains of secret and sensi-
tive documents. All of that work had made them targets of recriminatory 
violence from radical Koreans, Ch’oe explained, and the protection of 
Japanese authorities was all that kept them safe. By eliminating the group, 
Ch’oe continued, some two hundred families or roughly a thousand peo-
ple were sure to face severe poverty, hardship, and perhaps even worse. In 
fact, Ch’oe suggested that the order to shut down the MHK was in effect a 
death warrant for those two hundred families.85
Ch’oe’s pleas, however, fell on deaf ears, as the Foreign Ministry never 
revitalized his organization. To turn back to the recollections of Aiba 
 Kiyoshi, he commented in his 1940 report on the conditions that brought 
about the dissolution of the MHK. According to Aiba’s account, Consul 
Akatsuka had argued that Japan’s greatest priority then was to crush radi-
cal anti-Japanese groups in Manchuria, and the MHK was clearly the most 
effective Japan-friendly group around to help achieve that greater goal. 
Yamagata Isaburô, of the Kwantung Government-General, however, 
claimed that MHK activities were “immoral” and had brought great pain 
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and misery to many innocent civilians. The Japanese government, accord-
ing to Yamagata, could no longer provide assistance to such a group, re-
gardless of their utility in realizing other political goals.86
Despite Yamagata’s moralism, the likely reason for his attacks on the 
MHK was institutional jealousy. During the early 1920s, the Kwantung 
Government-General had been forced to recognize the jurisdiction of 
Foreign Ministry police in areas of South Manchuria where its leader-
ship believed their own police units should have greater authority.87 The 
MHK was a consular project, so destroying it was one way to undermine 
Foreign Ministry police authority in the area. This is indicative of the 
endemic jurisdictional rivalry that plagued Japan’s network of colonial 
offices throughout northeast Asia.
Stepping up the Pressure: 1925
As should be evident by this point, the Korean independence movement 
in exile presented the Gaimushô with a host of difficult problems on the 
informal frontiers of the empire, and these difficulties were compounded 
by anxiety over the activities of Japanese communists who posed an inter-
nal threat to the stability of the domestic political landscape. In Shanghai 
and other treaty port cities, where these two movements converged, the 
Japanese consular police were still quite small numerically and the scope 
of their budget and operations accordingly limited. In Manchuria, the 
Foreign Ministry had larger numbers of police officers attached to the 
consulate offices, but opposition from the Chinese side severely circum-
scribed their activities. By 1925, however, the evolution of the Japanese 
consular police had reached a critical stage. In Shanghai, they moved to 
diversify their personnel to include keen specialists in political surveil-
lance, the first such step to be taken by the Gaimushô in China proper. 
Simultaneously in Manchuria, a new collaborative relationship with the 
Chinese aimed at managing the problem of Korean resistance in exile was 
sealed in ink, if not always in practice.
The May 30 incident of 1925, in which British police gunned down 
a dozen Chinese students in Shanghai during a peaceful protest against 
foreign corporate exploitation of local Chinese workers, inspired a surge 
of Chinese nationalist sentiment that in turn provided critical momen-
tum to the drive for more political police in the Shanghai consulate. 
The original push for that expansion, however, had come several months 
earlier when, in March, Shanghai Consul Yada Shichitarô spelled out a 
plan to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijûrô for the reorganization of 
consular police forces in the port. Because the civilian Japanese popula-
tion in Shanghai had grown considerably in recent years, Yada pointed 
out, the ratio of police officers to residents in the concession area was 
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much lower than in the homeland (naichi). In addition, the growth of 
radical political movements and resident Korean independence activists 
demanded, according to Yada, that a new office devoted solely to politi-
cal surveillance be set up to combat such urban elements.88 
However, not just expansion, Yada contended, but also improvement 
of existing police facilities was necessary. One particular area targeted for 
reform was related to the origins of consular police personnel. Yada ar-
gued, for example, that police chiefs from the Home Ministry in Tokyo 
should not be appointed as consular police chiefs. Likewise, he continued, 
the practice of sending police staff from Taiwan and Korea to serve as 
Gaimushô police in China should also be abandoned. Why? Yada ex-
plained, echoing arguments made by consular officials in South Manchu-
ria, that having so many different institutions and bureaucracies involved 
in staffing and financing consular police operations was inefficient and 
confusing. In terms of general reforms, Yada also claimed that overall Gai-
mushô police numbers had to be increased, tokkô capabilities expanded, 
and police commissioners drawn from the Gaimushô whenever possible. 
Finally, he noted that his police department was in dire need of more of-
ficers with English, Russian, Korean, and Chinese language skills.89 
An official Foreign Ministry directive put Yada’s plan for expansion 
into effect in early 1926.90 Later that year, a more specific order related to 
an increase of intelligence-related personnel made clear the new direction 
that the Shanghai consular police were taking after 1925. The August cable 
from Yada elaborated on his logic, giving Kasumigaseki additional reasons 
for the targeted expansion of intelligence operations. Shanghai had be-
come a global center of communist activism, Yada reiterated, and the May 
25 incident and its related anti-Japanese boycotts heightened the degree of 
labor unrest in the city, leaving Japanese businesses in need of greater po-
lice protection. Finally, Yada argued, the activities of Korean independence 
radicals were still serious, and expanded powers of surveillance and arrest 
were necessary to suppress them.91 Cooperation with the French in advanc-
ing some of these aims began slowly to improve after 1925, but there were 
still impediments to the efficient exchange of intelligence between the two 
sides. Japanese homeland authorities did finally turn over information re-
garding the exiled independence activist Prince Cùºng Ðê to French au-
thorities, but the value of the intelligence was marginal at best, leaving the 
French side less than satisfied. Why were the Japanese still holding back? 
First, they lacked confidence in the value of what information on Koreans 
in Shanghai the French might be willing to share in return for their coop-
eration. They had heard French promises before, but did not trust them 
entirely. Second, many high-level figures in the Japanese government such 
as Inukai Tsuyoshi were still supportive of Prince Cùºng Ðê and his exiled 
Vietnamese compatriots.92
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Consular police leadership in Shanghai, then, was clearly moving to 
intensify and expand police operations against Korean radicalism dur-
ing 1925–1926, while simultaneously taking steps to consolidate their 
authority in the field and clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between 
themselves and Japan’s other colonial institutions. In Manchuria, too, 
the consular police entered a new era, but it was not entirely of their 
own making. Foremost among the many problems triggered by the Jian-
dao Expedition was sensitivity among Japanese authorities in Manchu-
ria to public opinion regarding Japan’s actions in the region. As such, 
collaborative arrangements with local Chinese security forces to deal 
with the Korean problem became the most sought-after solution, the ill-
fated MHK being one such project. In the summer of 1925, however, the 
police bureau chief of the Korea Government-General made a deal with 
the police chief of Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian regime that provided a new 
framework of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the management of Man-
churian Koreans.
Later dubbed the Mitsuya Agreement, its consequences have largely 
escaped the purview of Western scholars for decades. Inoue Manabu, 
however, pointed out the peculiar significance of this moment in north-
east Asian interregional politics over thirty years ago, suggesting that the 
1925 accord dramatically embodied the perplexing contradictions at work 
in relations among Japanese imperialists, Chinese landlord elites, regional 
warlords, and a socially fractured Korean diaspora community in Man-
churia.93 Specifically, the agreement reached between Mitsuya Miyamatsu 
and his Chinese counterpart in Fengtian, Yu Cheng, contained eight main 
articles that stated: (1) Chinese authorities would keep an accurate census 
of resident Koreans, and those Koreans would be responsible for monitor-
ing each other’s behavior; (2) Chinese authorities would order all resident 
Koreans to refrain from entering Korea with arms, offenders to be ar-
rested and handed over to Japanese officials; (3) Chinese would disband 
all societies of “disloyal Koreans” and confiscate their weapons; (4) local 
Chinese police would conduct periodic raids on suspected Korean organi-
zations; (5) Chinese authorities would immediately arrest all Koreans on a 
list provided by Japanese authorities in Korea; (6) Chinese and Japanese 
authorities would share intelligence regarding operations against disloyal 
Korean organizations; (7) Chinese and Japanese police would not tres-
pass into each other’s territory; (8) both sides would come to a resolution 
of previous incidents in a timely manner.94
Several factors can help to explain how and why the Mitsuya Agree-
ment was reached. For the Chinese, the activities of radical Korean inde-
pendence groups were potentially dangerous because they gave the 
Japanese an excuse to violate Chinese territorial sovereignty in their pur-
suit of those “rebellious” Koreans; collaboration with the Japanese against 
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the Koreans thus served the “nationalist” interests of the Chinese. For Japa-
nese authorities, interestingly, the Mitsuya Agreement represented a with-
drawal from the policy advocated since 1915. At that time, Japan asserted 
its exclusive right to supervise Koreans in Manchuria as imperial subjects. 
However, overly zealous pursuit of Korean radicals by Japanese police had 
caused numerous clashes with local Chinese authorities. Therefore, to im-
prove relations with China in the wake of rising anti-Japanese sentiment 
there, it was necessary to turn over responsibility for the suppression of 
Korean radicals to the Chinese side to as great a degree as possible.95
What did the agreement mean in terms of the relationship between 
the police forces of the Korean Government-General and the Japanese 
consular police in Manchuria? Colonial police bureau veteran Kamio 
Kazu haru provided some answers at a Kyoto University seminar in 1959.96 
Kamio explained that the Jiandao consular police were critical of the 
 Mitsuya Agreement because it seemed to undermine the position of Gai-
mushô police in the region. In principle, the agreement implied that the 
local consular police force was inadequate in terms of both strength and 
efficacy. In practice, the agreement sometimes even excluded the Jiandao 
consular police, in 1925 the largest body of Gaimushô police in northeast 
Asia, from meaningful participation in regional political security opera-
tions. Significantly, the Kwantung Army also criticized the agreement be-
cause it left sensitive and critical strategic concerns too much in the hands 
of local Chinese security forces. However, to the Korean Government-
General, only local Chinese police had the ability to effectively penetrate 
the deepest recesses of the Manchurian interior in order to locate the sus-
pected Korean radicals who were the colonial police’s greatest concern, 
and then turn them over to Japanese authorities.97 In short, then, the 
agreement represents a significant moment at which the shared concerns 
of the Jiandao consular police and the Kwantung Army seemed to put 
both at odds with colonial authorities in Korea.
Despite the controversy, the number of disturbances led by “recalci-
trant Koreans” in Manchuria decreased dramatically in 1925–1926, sug-
gesting that the Mitsuya Agreement had begun to yield valuable results. 
Chinese police were zealous in their pursuit of suspected Korean radi-
cals, motivated in no small part by the financial incentives often offered 
by Japanese officials in Korea for arrests, although entirely innocent Ko-
rean residents in Manchuria also often faced harassment by Chinese se-
curity forces. Nonetheless, with newly enthusiastic Chinese support, the 
police campaign against Korean communists in Manchuria scored a 
major victory in 1927. Police units from the Jiandao consulate raided a 
meeting of the East Manchurian branch of the Korean Communist 
Party (KCP) held in Longjincun, arresting several dozen leading mem-
bers of the party and seizing thousands of pages of sensitive party docu-
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ments. From these materials, Japanese police came to learn a tremendous 
number of details concerning the organization and membership of the 
Korean communist movement in Manchuria.98 Indeed, Dae-sook Suh 
has noted in his history of the Korean nationalist movement that, due to 
the more effective collaboration of Sino-Japanese police forces, “Man-
churia ceased to be a haven in which the Communists could strengthen 
their forces.”99 While the number of KCP members arrested and ulti-
mately sent back to Korea for incarceration was relatively small, Suh 
points out that “the Japanese consulate police had the names of the 
most important Communists . . . , which made future activities of the 
Communists extremely difficult.”100 
The conclusion of the Mitsuya Agreement in 1925 thus marked a 
clear turning point in several ways for the history of Japanese consular 
police operations in Jiandao. The year 1925 was, of course, also a key 
turning point in the evolution of metropolitan police work. In that year, 
the Japanese Diet passed the Peace Preservation Law, which enabled the 
state to arrest and prosecute anyone suspected of activities designed to 
alter the “national polity” (kokutai) or deny the system of private prop-
erty. While the 1925 law is often viewed as a signifier of the imperial 
state’s repressive nature, it is important to remember that the final law 
was the product of negotiation between the Justice and Home minis-
tries; Justice Ministry officials had sought harsher terms for the law, but 
these were tempered by Home Ministry bureaucrats.101 Even so, the law 
does mark the point at which the state authorities took a firmer stand 
against the rising tide of radical social movements at home, and this was 
more than just a matter of silencing domestic political opposition. In 
fact, a lengthy report from the metropolitan police department pro-
duced in June 1925 illuminates the interconnectivity of imperial resis-
tance and its suppression during that critical year. In tracing the long 
history of the socialist movement in Japan, the report highlighted the 
role of Korean socialists in facilitating the survival of the Japanese left 
by way of their position as a conduit with the Soviet Union—a role they 
were still playing in 1925.102 Thus, the Peace Preservation Law, the  Mitsuya 
Agreement, and the opening of a tokkô office in the Shanghai consulate-
general can all be viewed as steps toward the same goal: suppression of 
political dissent, Korean and Japanese alike.
Finally, just as the character of Japanese consular police work in China 
was changing dramatically by 1925, it is important to recognize that the 
rising tide of nationalist consciousness in China was also reaching new 
heights in that year and after. Chiang Kai-shek’s military campaigns to 
wrest provincial authority from the hands of regional warlords, as well as 
the broader rights recovery movement aimed at undoing the unequal 
treaty system and restoring Chinese sovereign rights, both contributed to 
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the emergence of a local political environment within which Japanese po-
lice forces would find it more and more difficult to secure Chinese collab-
oration with their security measures against Korean resistance groups. It 
is both ironic and unfortunate, then, that during the same year that saw 
the conclusion of the Mitsuya Agreement, the foundations upon which 
the efficacy of that concord rested simultaneously began to erode. To that 
topic the discussion will turn more directly in the next chapter.
Conclusions
The degree to which fear of a united front of Japanese and Korean social-
ists actually reflected the functioning relationship between the two groups 
is doubtful, of course, since many Japanese socialists, like most of Japa-
nese society at the time, often tended to view Koreans as inferior to them-
selves; moreover, the Japanese socialist movement as a whole lacked a truly 
dynamic internationalism.103 It is important to remember, even so, that 
the perception on the part of imperial government police forces that these 
groups were part and parcel of the same threat is in a way reminiscent of 
early U.S. Cold War geopolitical rhetoric that conflated Soviet and Chi-
nese communism as two prongs of the same “red menace.” In both cases, 
the most threatening ideological dimensions of the enemy were over-
emphasized while clear differences of culture, tradition, ethnicity, and 
national identity were downplayed or outright ignored. Whether U.S. 
ideologues, for examples, genuinely believed during the early 1950s that 
Mao was a proxy stooge of the Kremlin, or simply used such rhetoric to 
justify their policies, does not change the fact that it was an effective moti-
vational force. Likewise, even if the Foreign Ministry, Home Ministry, and 
Korean Government-General deliberately overstated the likelihood that 
socialist ideology could unite Japanese, Korean, and Chinese dissenters 
into a potent force of resistance to the imperial Japanese state, that the 
case was made in those terms at all is what matters most in the present 
evaluation of Gaimushô police activity. The Foreign Ministry justified the 
expansion of its police networks in Shanghai and elsewhere as a measure 
to counter this transnational threat. Real or imagined, the threat none-
theless served its purpose.
To be sure, all of the foreign powers in Shanghai sought to suppress 
leftist movements there, since “the Shanghai Municipal Police and the 
French Concession Police were both part of global colonial networks of 
imperial control systems.”104 In this sense, the British, French, and Japanese 
all shared a common political security concern regarding the presence in 
Shanghai of Indian, Vietnamese, and Korean nationalists and communists. 
For the Japanese, however, this concern was especially acute. Compared to 
Paris or London, Shanghai was a mere stone’s throw from the metropoli-
 Policing Resistance to the Imperial State | 91
tan center of the imperial Japanese state in Tokyo. This being so, commu-
nist activism there posed a far more immediate threat to the stability of 
domestic society in the eyes of Japanese authorities. The vigor with which 
metropolitan police pursued the left at home leaves little doubt that the 
conservative imperial bureaucracy believed the threat was quite real. Like-
wise, the fact that the Foreign Ministry devoted so much time and resources 
to policing radical resistance throughout the informal empire strongly sug-
gests that their professed mission to protect and control overseas Japanese, 
too, was more than shallow spin meant merely to screen the brute violence 
of imperial expansionism. Recognizing this factor certainly does not jus-
tify Japanese violations of Chinese sovereignty in the pursuit of political 
security imperatives, but rather reminds one of the complex regional dy-
namics at work in Japanese police operations in Shanghai.
In the broadest sense, the character of Japanese consular police activ-
ity and ideology clearly began to change after 1919. No longer functioning 
simply as a local public health and security force, the Gaimushô began 
using its police networks on the ground in China and Manchuria to exe-
cute the surveillance and suppression of radical Korean independence 
activism as well as Japanese socialism, and it is significant that this trans-
formation began to take shape during the early 1920s. The operations of 
Korean independence activists in China, and the response of the Japanese 
consular police to their perceived threat, need to be recognized as a pow-
erful factor in the evolution of Foreign Ministry perceptions and policy. 
Similarly, while it is certainly true that “anticommunism served as a colo-
nial discourse of exclusion” by which Japanese authorities could justify 
their suppression of nationalist independence movements, this is an in-
complete and ultimately unsatisfactory explanation of Japanese policy 
when one considers the political significance of connections between Ko-
rean nationalists and Japanese socialists.105 Anticommunism had as much 
to do with securing the ideological conformity of the home islands as with 
crushing anticolonial resistance movements, and the Japanese consular 
police occupied a key position at the intersection of both concerns. In 
doing so, they functioned as a branch of the Foreign Ministry that shared 
many of the same concerns, attitudes, and prerogatives as other arms of 
Japan’s conservative imperial bureaucracy.
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Opposition, Escalation,  
and Integration
On May 8, 2002, a small group of tired and desperate North 
Korean refugees rushed the gates of Japanese Consulate-General office 
in Shenyang, China, seeking political asylum. An armed contingent of 
local Chinese police quickly stormed after them and dragged the ragged 
travelers kicking and screaming from the consulate grounds. In the af-
termath of this relatively insignificant local fracas, as dramatic video-
tape of the incident appeared on news broadcasts in Japan for weeks on 
end, many Japanese politicians and media outlets used the episode to 
criticize the Chinese government for its blatant disregard for Japanese 
jurisdictional authority within the confines of its own consular com-
pound.1 Obviously, the early twenty-first century geopolitical context of 
this clash was vastly different from the local environment of the 1920s 
within which Chinese and Japanese authorities fought doggedly with 
much more at stake over the contentious issue of which side possessed 
legitimate jurisdictional prerogatives over the Korean resident popula-
tion in China’s northeastern provinces. Even so, the 2002 incident was 
nonetheless a dramatic reminder of an earlier era characterized by con-
siderable ambiguity in the geographical, cultural, and political borders 
of northeast Asian society. Perhaps it is no small irony either that She-
nyang, known in the 1930s as Mukden, was also the site of the opening 
salvo of Japan’s campaign to conquer Manchuria in September 1931—a 
conquest often justified at the time as necessary to protect the rights of 
Korean subjects of the Japanese empire.
It is the nature of that conquest to which the discussion must now 
turn. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the year 1925 marked a significant 
point in the evolution of consular police strategy regarding the problem 
of Korean resistance in exile in two major ways. In Manchuria, a mutu-
ally satisfactory Sino-Japanese collaborative relationship had been 
achieved for the moment through the Mitsuya Agreement. In Shanghai, 
while truly effective cooperation with French concession authorities had 
still not been realized, the Japanese consular police there escalated the 
intensity of their commitment to deal with the Korean problem by creat-
ing a distinct tokkô section within their office. It thus seemed as if an ef-
fective framework for dealing with the problem of Korean resistance in 
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exile, and its equally important relationship to the Japanese socialist un-
derground, had finally been achieved.
However, a combination of circumstances in 1927–1928 led Foreign 
Minister Shidehara to initiate a series of initiatives aimed at lowering 
the public profile of Japan’s consular police in China and Manchuria. In 
short, Chinese nationalism was making Sino-Japanese police collabora-
tion increasingly difficult in urban areas and the mere presence of Japa-
nese consular police increasingly controversial. Shidehara’s attempts to 
appease Chinese sentiment, however, proved to be in vain. Political se-
curity conditions in Manchuria took a turn for the worse in 1930, and 
the consular police responded to those developments with vigor. While 
Shidehara tried to contain the situation and stay on course with plans to 
relinquish more security duties to Chinese police authorities, his efforts 
were undermined by the Foreign Ministry’s own police leadership in the 
field. When the Kwantung Army made its move on Fengtian in Septem-
ber 1931 the crisis escalated, and by the spring of 1932 consular police 
forces were fighting side by side with Kwantung Army units in local cam-
paigns to suppress resistance to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. By 
also linking this story to related “terrorist” attacks and police operations 
in Shanghai and Tokyo in 1929 and 1932, this chapter will reveal a por-
trait of the Gaimushô’s role in the invasion of Manchuria that differs 
remarkably from most orthodox interpretations. Far from standing in 
stark opposition to the expansionist impulses of the Kwantung Army, 
the Foreign Ministry’s commitment to policing radical politics beyond 
the boundaries of the formal empire placed it at the forefront of Japa-
nese encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty.2 
The Collapse of Sino-Japanese Cooperation
As noted earlier, the consequences of the Mitsuya Agreement were imme-
diate and impressive. Despite the early successes, however, Suematsu 
Kichiji, the police chief at the Jiandao consulate, had some serious reser-
vations about both the utility and the propriety of the Mitsuya Agreement. 
As such, he made a number of suggestions regarding the best course for 
Japanese action in dealing with the Korean problem in mid-1926. As early 
as 1921, Suematsu had warned the Foreign Ministry about the dangers of 
Communist infiltration among Manchurian Korean communities, and 
this concern grew only greater over the years. First among his recommen-
dations was an expanded budget for intelligence-gathering operations 
focused specifically on communist activities. He also argued that Japan 
should maintain close links with local schools and media outlets to guide 
Korean residents away from “harmful thought,” as well as set up private 
schools run by the Japanese to accomplish the same goals. More police 
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personnel with skills in translating local communist propaganda were 
also crucial according to Suematsu, and while he agreed that cooperation 
with local Chinese security forces was desirable to the greatest extent pos-
sible, he had little faith in the efficacy of that strategy. In his view, Japan 
needed to develop a deeper understanding of the local conditions faced 
by Koreans in order to deal effectively with their problems.3
Gaimushô police in Jiandao thus expressed serious doubts regarding 
the framework of Sino-Japanese cooperation based on the Mitsuya Agree-
ment. But the Korea Government-General’s position came under attack 
from another direction in September 1927, when the Chinese government 
initiated a systematic policy of persecuting Manchurian Koreans. Chinese 
actions included preventing the sale of land to Koreans, blocking Korean 
settlement farther into the Manchurian interior, closing Korean schools, 
and harassing pro-Japanese organizations of local Korean residents. This 
hostility can be explained by several factors, each with deep roots. First, 
since the annexation of Korea and the beginnings of Japanese extraterrito-
riality extending over Koreans, Korean residents seemed, to the Chinese 
side, to represent a local vanguard of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and 
Mongolia. Second, the presence of radical Korean resistance groups, espe-
cially Communists, was both a disruptive social force and a source of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic friction, which in turn gave Japanese authorities 
excuses to violate Chinese sovereignty and to pressure domestic Chinese 
political figures. Third, by not allowing Koreans to naturalize as Chinese 
and then pressing for the right of these “Japanese” Koreans to buy and own 
land, Japan was blatantly violating Chinese law.4 In short, many of the con-
cerns related to resident Koreans that had often facilitated Chinese col-
laboration with Japanese authorities during the early 1920s were now 
making that collaboration more and more unsustainable.5
While Chinese nationalism was beginning to chip away at the frame-
work of collaboration between Japanese colonial police in Korea and 
Zhang Zuolin’s regime in Fengtian, the Foreign Ministry itself also grew 
increasingly more concerned with the potential threat posed by the ris-
ing tide of Chinese nationalism to its own position in the Jiandao re-
gion. Demonstrations in Shanghai following the May 30 incident of 1925 
had already awakened Gaimushô leaders to the power of popular anti-
Japanese demonstrations in China. But when the Foreign Ministry at-
tempted to set up a sub-office of the Andong consulate in 1927, they met 
face to face with an intensity of Chinese resistance they had not previ-
ously confronted in the northeastern provinces.6
Much like the situation faced by Gaimushô police in Jiandao, con-
sular leaders in Andong were consumed with problems associated with 
their local Korean populations. However, unlike Jiandao, which had pos-
sessed a sizeable police force since 1909, the Japanese consulate at An-
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dong was understaffed. As such, the Andong consul had asked as early as 
1923 for a new subconsulate to be opened in Maoershan. The Korea 
 Government-General, which also had an interest in strengthening the ap-
paratus of control over Koreans near Andong, had also pressured the Gai-
mushô in 1924 to open a new facility in Maoershan; so in June 1924 
Shidehara instructed minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi in Beijing to ask the 
Chinese for official permission to do so. The Chinese, however, refused 
on the grounds that Maoershan was not an “open settlement” (kaihôchi). 
The Foreign Ministry raised the issue again in 1926, asking the Korea 
Government-General for assistance in persuading the Chinese to acqui-
esce. After 1925, however, colonial authorities in Korea were of a different 
opinion on the matter. The Mitsuya Agreement, of course, was by that 
time acting as the framework for security cooperation between colonial 
authorities in Korea and local Chinese officials. Therefore, the Government-
General would have been in violation of the agreement had it helped the 
Gaimushô set up new offices along the Sino-Korean border.7
Undaunted, the Foreign Ministry continued its drive to expand the 
jurisdictional grip of the Andong consulate by opening a subconsulate 
at Maoershan.8 In early 1927, a police chief from the Hunchun consul-
ate was assigned to be the new chief at the Maoershan office, and four 
patrolmen accompanied him in March on his first visit to the future site 
of the office to survey the area and make preparations for construction. 
Rumors soon spread through the local Chinese community that the of-
fice was meant to be a new step toward the Japanese invasion of sover-
eign Chinese territory, and by April anti-Japanese pamphlets began to 
circulate in greater volume. Local Chinese residents even formed pro-
test associations that filed formal petitions of opposition to the new sub-
consulate, taking their case to Chinese and Japanese officials in 
Fengtian. By May, the protest movement had spread beyond Andong to 
other parts of South Manchuria, with petitions being filed with greater 
regularity and formal opposition groups continuing to build support.9
Throughout the spring and summer of 1927, the colonial regime in 
Korea refused to aid the Gaimushô in pressing its case for the necessity 
and legitimacy of a subconsulate office in Maoershan. The Foreign Minis-
try was thus left to push the issue with Chinese authorities on its own. In 
March 1927, Shidehara told Yoshizawa in Beijing to give the Chinese two 
main reasons for setting up the new office. First, because the volume of 
trade had increased so much in the area during recent years, additional 
consular staff and offices were necessary to manage the local economy. 
Second, the jurisdictional authority of the Andong consulate was simply 
stretched too thin. Significantly, Shidehara stressed the economic impera-
tives that were driving the expansion, not concerns about matters of politi-
cal security. The Chinese side, however, continued to resist, as the pressure 
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from local opposition groups often headed by community leaders in busi-
ness and education proved to be an influential force.10
The Foreign Ministry did eventually open the subconsulate at Maoer-
shan despite the vociferous opposition to it. That opposition, however, did 
not subside; in fact, it intensified. Consequently, the Maoershan subcon-
sulate was compelled to close its doors for good in the summer of 1929, 
and its staff returned to the main office at Andong.11 The protests at Mao-
ershan, however, are significant for a number of reasons, most of which 
are related to the Mitsuya Agreement of 1925. To the Chinese, the agree-
ment provided a clear framework for Sino-Japanese cooperation in the 
management of local Koreans. The Foreign Ministry’s insistence on open-
ing a new office along the Chinese side of the Korean border could thus 
only be interpreted as a move of aggression by the Japanese. However, the 
episode may be more important for what it reveals about the relations be-
tween different appendages of the Japanese colonial presence in north-
east Asia. Why did the Foreign Ministry insist on pressing its case in the 
face of ardent Chinese opposition and without the support of the Korea 
Government-General? It must be remembered that the Mitsuya Agree-
ment was struck between Korea Government-General police and Chinese 
security forces in Fengtian. With the agreement, the Korea Government-
General had in a sense sacrificed Gaimushô claims of Japanese authority 
over resident Koreans in Manchuria. Therefore, Foreign Ministry persis-
tence about opening the Maoershan office can be viewed as a struggle to 
exercise the power it had been stripped of by the 1925 accord and thereby 
protect the integrity of its jurisdictional authority in Manchuria.12 
Years after Japan’s surrender, former Government-General official 
Kamio Kazuharu made an insightful, if a bit snide and condescending, 
remark on this matter of consular police determination to defend their 
position in the northeastern provinces. Whenever Government-General 
police crossed the border into Jiandao, Kamio noted, the consular police 
would demand that they pull out, citing the fact that only the Gaimushô 
held authority there. However, as soon as some kind of large disturbance 
broke out, something that was beyond consular police capacity to quell, 
Kamio claimed, they were quick to beg for help from the Korean Govern-
ment-General police.13 Putting aside his contemptuous tone, Kamio’s 
comments nonetheless reveal a great deal about the institutional rivalry 
that surely fueled Foreign Ministry persistence in this case.
By 1928, then, the collaborative strategy embodied by the Mitsuya 
Agreement was being significantly undermined by two forces. First, the 
rising tide of Chinese national consciousness made cooperation with 
the Japanese increasingly difficult. Even though Chinese officials saw 
Korean radicalism as a disruptive force that needed to be extinguished, 
the Japanese presence in Manchuria was also viewed as more and more 
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onerous. Second, jurisdictional rivalry among Japan’s own colonial insti-
tutions weakened the potential efficacy of the Mitsuya accord. Signifi-
cantly, the Jiandao consular police and the Kwantung Army shared the 
belief that the agreement had gone too far in relinquishing Japanese 
jurisdictional prerogatives to the Chinese, and such shared views be-
tween the consular police and the army would come to facilitate greater 
cooperation between them during the early 1930s.
Upon his return to the position of Foreign Minister in 1929, Shidehara 
quickly recognized the need to address the first of those problems by mov-
ing to appease rising anti-Japanese sentiments in China. One step in par-
ticular, closely linked with plans eventually to abrogate extraterritoriality 
in China, was to scale back the physical presence of Japanese consular po-
lice forces. To achieve this goal, the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry is-
sued a plan for the “improvement” of Japan’s consular police forces in 
China and Manchuria in August 1929. The plan focused first on the matter 
of nomenclature. Citing the fact that Chinese authorities had never offi-
cially recognized the legitimacy of police forces attached to Japanese con-
sular facilities, the 1929 directive declared that such police stations would 
no longer be referred to as “police” stations. Instead, all signs, stationery, 
name cards, and so on. would simply identify the occupants as consular 
employees. Similarly, the custom of having consular police wear distinctive 
military-like uniforms, making them largely indistinguishable from Kwan-
tung Army police, was also a source of conflict with the Chinese. So, con-
sular police in many offices were directed to perform their duties in civilian 
attire.14 Aside from lowering the visual profile of the consular police, steps 
were also taken to improve the professionalism of the police officers them-
selves and further hone their skills in local languages.15 
While Chinese resentment and suspicion of Japan’s consular police in 
urban centers like Tianjin, Shanghai, and Canton had certainly motivated 
Shidehara’s reform mission, it was Chinese opposition to Japanese police 
in Manchuria that continued to dominate the concerns of Kasumigaseki. 
In September 1929, Shidehara expressed to Jiandao Consul Okada 
Kanekazu his hope that a further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations 
because of the police problem could be avoided. Citing the recent prolif-
eration of Chinese petitions, especially in Jiandao, Shidehara pointed out 
that not only did the Chinese want to put an end to the opening of addi-
tional Japanese police stations, they wanted currently operating facilities 
shut down. Violent clashes between Chinese and Japanese police in Man-
churia, which were becoming increasingly common, only added more fuel 
to the fire. Thus, Shidehara suggested, Japanese consular police should 
allow local Chinese security forces to handle daily criminal affairs as much 
as possible.16
More formally, the Foreign Ministry issued a general directive to all 
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consular police in Jiandao in May 1930. The report began by describing a 
string of recent violent incidents rooted in anti-Japanese orientation of 
many Chinese officials and the rising tide of the rights recovery movement. 
While the security crisis might lead one to argue that more Japanese police 
were needed, personnel increases only further stoked the fires of Chinese 
hostility. Improving cooperation and communication with local Chinese 
police was the only alternative. To achieve that goal, four issues were of 
critical importance: (1) Japanese police must be sure they had sufficient 
evidence when making an arrest; (2) better cooperation was needed to 
prevent unnecessary harassment of Korean civilians by Chinese military 
police; (3) intelligence needed to be shared with the Chinese side; (4) intel-
ligence gathering and analysis had to be improved. In short, better intelli-
gence could prevent altercations with the Chinese before they occurred.17
While Shidehara pursued an agenda based on appeasing the rising 
tide of anti-Japanese nationalism in China by lowering the profile of 
Japanese consular police forces there, other elements within the Gai-
mushô were pushing for an expansion of consular police numbers and 
facilities in Manchuria. In his correspondences with Fengtian Consul 
Hayashi Kyûjirô in August 1928, for example, Arita Hachirô of the For-
eign Ministry’s Asia Bureau detailed plans for the aggrandizement of 
consular police forces in Manchuria to “protect” Japanese resident com-
munities there. His plan was to expand consular police power at the ex-
pense of the Kwantung Leased Territory Government by cutting the 
budget for their police forces operating within South Manchurian con-
sulates. The Kantô-chô, not surprisingly, opposed the plan, and this dis-
pute was placed at the center of negotiations then under way with the 
Home Ministry over police budgets for the coming year.18
By April of 1929, the Asia Bureau had a more detailed plan for the 
expansion of consular police forces in Manchuria. The report focused on 
four main topics: (1) the enrichment of consular police to protect resi-
dents and “increase profits” in Manchuria; (2) the integration of Japanese 
police forces in Manchuria, largely under the direction of Gaimushô po-
lice forces; (3) the investigation and control of the communist movement 
in China, including Chinese, Korean, Soviet, and Japanese activists; and 
(4) the reform of consular prisons in Manchuria.19 The Asia Bureau, how-
ever, was not unaware of the problems that Shidehara was trying to solve 
with his plans to reform the consular police and hopefully make them a 
less onerous presence in the eyes of local Chinese. In fact, the Asia Bureau 
had its own plan for reforming the consular police in August 1929. It was 
based on recognition that the rising tide of the Chinese rights recovery 
movement often targeted the injustices of extraterritoriality. Chinese at-
tacks on the consular police as an infringement on Chinese national sov-
ereignty were thus becoming more and more common. To counter this 
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problem and to avoid direct clashes with Chinese security forces in Man-
churia, the Japanese consular police needed to be a well-trained and well-
disciplined institution.20 While this was still just a proposal, local 
circumstances would soon provide those advocating escalation with an 
effective impetus to execute those plans.
The May 30 Jiandao Uprising
Despite Shidehara’s attempts to reverse the course of consular police ex-
pansion, circumstances that developed in the field during 1929 and 1930 
made such a backward move difficult, if not impossible. More significant, 
however, is the fact that consular police leadership on the ground in Man-
churia, especially in Jiandao, took conscious steps to undermine Shide-
hara’s policy of accommodation. Nowhere was this more evident than 
during the policy discussions and deal making that followed a large Com-
munist disturbance in late May 1930 near the Jiandao consulate-general 
at Longjincun. In fact, the May 30 uprising was in many ways a more cru-
cial turning point for the consular police in Jiandao and elsewhere than 
the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931.21
Before describing the events of May 30, however, it is important to 
note several developments in the relations between the Comintern, the 
Chinese Communist Party, and the Korean Communist movement in 
Manchuria. Factionalism had plagued the Korean Communists for 
years, and Japanese consular police action against them in Manchuria, 
resulting in mass arrests and forfeited intelligence, had severely weak-
ened the movement as a whole. In an effort to reinvigorate the Korean 
Communists and put an end to their internal strife, the Comintern or-
dered in late 1929 that the Korean Communist movement in Manchuria 
be placed under the immediate supervision of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Thus it was under the influence of more aggressively anti-
Japanese leaders in the CCP, namely Li Li-san, that the plan for the Ji-
andao uprising took shape in early 1930.22 
That plan materialized on May 30, when a mounted band of Chinese 
and Korean Communist guerrillas, numbering between six and seven 
hundred strong, attacked the concession areas of Hunchun, Longjincun, 
and Toudaogou. They cut telephone lines, tossed grenades and Molotov 
cocktails into homes and administrative offices, and stole weapons and 
other property. During the course of the attack, “the Japanese Consulate 
was invaded and the Japanese consulate police massacred: the Commu-
nists set fire to various Japanese clubs and houses of wealthy Chinese and 
Korean collaborators, killing any and all Japanese they encountered.”23 
Indeed, those targeted in the attacks were not randomly selected. In fact, 
the Communist rioters went out of their way to burn the houses of either 
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well-known or merely suspected Korean collaborators, and even those 
residents simply thought to be friendly with Japanese authorities.24 
Shidehara’s initial response to the uprising was to urge caution and 
restraint on the part of local residents and consular police forces. Aware 
of Chinese sensitivity to Japanese police action on Chinese territory, he 
ordered local consuls to discuss matters with local authorities and leave 
retaliatory security measures to Chinese police. Nonetheless, Shidehara 
was not entirely ignorant of the need for more manpower on the ground. 
He thus agreed to arrange for an additional twenty officers to be sta-
tioned at the Longjincun consulate-general.25 However, the Jiandao 
consul-general, Okada Kanekazu, held a much different view. Okada 
argued that an immediate increase in police personnel was necessary to 
meet the threat of Communist “bandit” activity, and he thus requested 
that at least two hundred additional police officers be dispatched to the 
Jiandao region as soon as possible.26 Shidehara refused Okada’s request 
on the grounds that such a dramatic increase in personnel would surely 
be unacceptable to the Chinese. Unwilling to risk delicate negotiations 
over the abolition of extraterritoriality in China then under way, Shide-
hara reiterated his instruction that Japanese consular police forces 
should cooperate with local Chinese police and do everything possible 
to avoid arousing greater anti-Japanese sentiment in the area.
While Okada’s opposition to Shidehara’s plan posed a major obstacle 
to its success, it was the consular police chief in Jiandao, Aiba Kiyoshi, who 
took even greater steps to undermine Shidehara’s control over the Foreign 
Ministry’s response to the May 30 crisis. Frustrated by Shidehara’s timidity, 
Aiba contacted the Korean colonial governor-general, Saitô Makoto, and 
asked him about the possibility of support for the Jiandao consular police 
in the form of a dispatch of several hundred police officers from northern 
Korea across the border into Jiandao.27 Recognizing an opportunity to ex-
tend the direct influence of the Korea Government-General over the Ko-
rean problem in Jiandao, Saitô immediately contacted Shidehara with a 
detailed plan involving the dispatch of several hundred support police 
from the Government-General police force.28 However, Shidehara declined 
Saitô’s offer, thus countering Aiba’s scheme, arguing that such an expedi-
tion was not necessary and would likely only cause more problems.29
A second outbreak of local Communist-led violence erupted, however, 
in Jilin on August 1, and this gave additional evidence in support of those 
who had recommended an immediate increase in Japanese police person-
nel.30 In early September, Shidehara sought once again to put an end to 
the debate by issuing an official Foreign Ministry statement on the status 
and function of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao. However, just 
as Shidehara took his stand on the issue, Saitô Makoto issued a plan of his 
own to the minister of colonial affairs, Matsuda Genji. Saitô’s plan called 
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for the eventual incorporation of all Gaimushô police in Jiandao into the 
police bureau of the Korea Government-General. To Saitô, the manage-
ment of the Korean problem in Jiandao was far too important to be left to 
the Chinese side, and the actions of Gaimushô police were too circum-
scribed to be effective. Only by making Jiandao a formal part of colonial 
Korea could the crisis be resolved.31 The feasibility of Shidehara’s plan to 
keep police authority in Chinese hands was further complicated in Sep-
tember by numerous reports of Chinese police summarily executing Ko-
rean suspects rounded up in the anti-bandit campaign. However, in 
October, the murder of several Japanese consular police officers by Chi-
nese soldiers dealt an even more severe blow to Shidehara’s plans. In fact, 
these deaths provided the cause for a long desired expedition of extra 
police officers from the colonial regime in Korea into Jiandao. In the 
weeks that followed, Shidehara pressed for a quick withdrawal of these 
police, but Saitô and Okada both warned against it.32
While Shidehara continually pressed for greater unity between Chi-
nese and Japanese police forces, the prospect of improving cooperation 
with Japanese police authorities in Jiandao put the Manchurian warlord 
Zhang Xueliang in a difficult position. On the one hand, it was clearly in 
his best interests to eliminate the problem of banditry, communist or 
otherwise. Public peace and security would help in stabilizing his rule in 
Manchuria as a whole. Furthermore, all Chinese authorities, including 
Zhang, knew quite well what had happened in 1920 when “bandit” at-
tacks in Hunchun prompted a severe response by the Japanese military 
during the Jiandao Expedition. No one wanted a repeat of that disaster, 
which was a real possibility in summer of 1930. However, Zhang was also 
more committed to the cause of Chinese nationalism than his father, 
Zhang Zuolin, had been. As a result, cooperating with Japanese police 
on any level was politically unpopular. In addition, coordinating Chi-
nese security campaigns with those of the Japanese consular police 
would implicitly suggest recognition of the legitimacy of the consular 
police in Jiandao.33 This, of course, was something that Chinese authori-
ties had been rejecting for almost twenty years.
In early November, Shidehara was finally successful in negotiating the 
withdrawal of the Government-General police expeditionary forces, but 
he also recognized that total reliance on the Chinese side was problematic 
to say the least. Despite his reluctance to approve an official police person-
nel increase in Jiandao, Shidehara was not a fool. He fully understood the 
magnitude of the security crisis, but he also desired stable relations with 
the Chinese. What options, then, did the foreign minister have? Shide-
hara and Jiandao consul Okada explored one possibility in late 1930 and 
early 1931. Their strategy was to secretly recruit “police employees” (kei-
satsu yônin), who for forty yen per month would provide intelligence on 
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local communist guerrilla activity as well as provide proper guidance and 
protection for local Korean communities. Those who performed excep-
tionally well could even be hired on eventually as consular patrolmen.34 
The obvious purpose of this program was to circumvent Chinese opposi-
tion to official police personnel increases by secretly bolstering local po-
lice offices with these “adjunct” security forces.
Despite these efforts, by the spring of 1931 it was cooperation between 
Jiandao consular police forces and the Korea Government-General, not 
improved relations with the Chinese, that brought about a severe decline 
in communist guerrilla activity in the region. While the 1925 Mitsuya 
Agreement had driven a wedge of sorts between police forces of the Jian-
dao consulates and those of the colonial regime in Korea, the May 30 riots 
had brought them back together, as demonstrated by the scheming of 
Aiba, Okada, and Saitô. In the meantime, however, the voices of those 
Chinese who saw Japanese police on the continent as blatant violations of 
Chinese sovereignty continued to grow louder and more vociferous in 
early 1931. This was the case not only in Jiandao but across China as a 
whole, from Xiamen to Qingdao to Harbin.35 
In response to the Chinese outcry, by late March the Foreign Minis-
try had begun complicated negotiations with the Chinese government 
over the question of when and how to abolish Japanese extraterritorial-
ity. Because the Japanese side still had grave concerns over the ability of 
Chinese police forces to provide for adequate public security in Jiandao, 
however, the idea of relinquishing Japan’s extraterritorial rights there 
did not sit well even with Shidehara himself. Therefore, the foreign min-
ister directed Japan’s representatives in the negotiations to treat Jiandao 
as a special area, not to be included in general discussions of the aboli-
tion issue. This exception was to be based on the 1909 Jiandao treaty, 
which indicated that Koreans living in Jiandao were legally distinct from 
Koreans living in other areas of China. Furthermore, because the Jian-
dao region had been developed by Koreans under Japanese direction, 
Shidehara argued, Japan had special concerns there that deserved sepa-
rate consideration. The underlying reason for this equivocation was, of 
course, that Japan would have no legal ability to respond to security 
threats in the region if extraterritoriality was abolished there.36
In the summer of 1931, Foreign Ministry leadership in Tokyo made 
a more direct move to reestablish their authority over the direction of 
police action in Jiandao. Aiba and Okada had been disregarding Shide-
hara’s instructions for over a year, giving the Korea Government- General 
and the Colonial Ministry a stronger hand in the region while weaken-
ing the influence of Kasumigaseki. To put a stop to these trends, Aiba 
Kiyoshi was replaced by Suematsu Kichiji as the Jiandao consular police 
chief in June 1931.37 Initially, Suematsu was sent to the Jiandao consul-
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ate merely to advise Aiba and Okada on police matters. Aiba and Sue-
matsu, however, had very different notions of what the most effective 
security policy would be. In Aiba’s view, Chinese police forces were en-
tirely incapable or unwilling to crack down on anti-Japanese guerrilla 
movements and common bandit gangs, and this conviction had led to 
his direct clash with Foreign Minister Shidehara. Suematsu, on the other 
hand, brought an entirely different set of ideas to the table. With more 
field experience in the Jiandao region than anyone else involved in the 
debate, Suematsu had a deeper understanding of the root causes be-
hind social instability in the area. He argued that resident Koreans 
should be allowed to live as naturalized Chinese and that Japanese au-
thorities had been too overbearing in their efforts to control every as-
pect of local Korean life. He further suggested that more support should 
be given to local Korean community organizations and that the educa-
tion of Korean residents beyond legally recognized settlement areas 
should be left to Chinese educational institutions. Finally, Suematsu ar-
gued that Japanese should be prohibited from forcefully seizing land 
from local Chinese and Korean residents.38 To Suematsu, the problem 
was much deeper than the issue of legitimate police authority. Political 
unrest in Jiandao was the result of the poor social conditions of the local 
Korean resident community. Only by improving those conditions could 
the threat of Communist rebellion be eliminated.
So, in the months immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident, 
three competing sets of ideas were jockeying for position over the question 
of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao. Foreign Minister Shidehara 
maintained that local Chinese police forces should be left in charge of se-
curity matters in the region because any increase in Japanese police per-
sonnel would risk upsetting the delicate negotiations then under way 
concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality in China. In contrast, Con-
sul Okada, Aiba Kiyoshi, and Saitô Makoto advanced the view that Chinese 
police were useless, and that the only way to effectively crush the commu-
nist insurgency was to increase drastically the number of Japanese police in 
the area and give them a free hand to carry out operations aimed at sup-
pressing political subversives. Suematsu’s view was an alternative to both 
positions. He rejected the strong-arm methods of Aiba, Okada, and Saitô, 
because harsh retaliation by Japanese authorities only fueled the fire of 
anti-Japanese sentiment. However, Suematsu also feared that if a social so-
lution to the crisis could not be found, the prerogative of public security 
might eventually demand the colonial conquest of the region along the 
lines of what had brought about the annexation of Korea in 1910. 
Unfortunately, a series of events in the summer and fall of 1931 
turned Suematsu’s fear into reality when Ishiwara Kanji and his cocon-
spirators in the Kwantung Army sensed the time was ripe to take Japan’s 
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China policy into their own hands. It should be clear, however, that the 
Japanese consular police in Jiandao had already “retaliated with vigor” 
to the May 30 riots, arresting over thirteen thousand people by the late 
spring of 1931.39 The manner in which local Gaimushô police reacted to 
the Kwantung Army’s invasion of Manchuria in September must be con-
sidered with that fact in mind.
The Impact of the Manchurian Incident
In the immediate aftermath of the Kwantung Army’s invasion of Septem-
ber 18, 1931, Okada and Shidehara exchanged numerous messages detail-
ing the course of events in Manchuria and the response of the local 
Japanese and Korean communities there. Their primary concern at first 
was to keep a lid on the loud cries for military intervention coming from 
local residents’ associations. To that end, Suematsu Kichiji met with sev-
eral local Chinese police officials on September 19 and the group decided 
on several measures aimed at containing the crisis. No public meetings or 
assemblies would be allowed, for example, and steps would be taken to 
control inflammatory rhetoric of local residents. An 11:00 p.m. blackout 
order was also given in order to keep people in their homes during the 
Police personnel from a sub-station of the Jiandao consulate at Longjincun on a “ban-
dit suppression” mission, 1930s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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late evening and early morning hours. Finally, both sides agreed that in 
the event some kind of disturbance should erupt, Sino-Japanese police 
cooperation was of the utmost importance in quelling public disorder.40
Despite these efforts, the foreign minister was concerned about the 
spread of violence in the area, so less than a week after the Kwantung Army 
launched their operations near Fengtian, Shidehara made a stark reversal 
in the policies he had pursued after the May 30 crisis of 1930. At that time, 
he had fiercely refused to accommodate demands from Okada, Aiba, and 
the Korea Government-General to dispatch several hundred additional 
police officers to supplement Jiandao consular forces. This time, however, 
Shidehara initiated an offer of additional police on September 23. In a 
cable to Okada, the foreign minister explained that, should the consul de-
sire additional police forces in order to contain the emerging crisis, such 
forces could and would be provided immediately. His concern was that the 
local chaos caused by the Kwantung Army’s movements might ignite a 
much larger breakdown of public order. In addition to the offer made to 
Okada in Jiandao, Shidehara also sent a preparatory communication to 
the Japanese police authorities in Korea to be sure that those emergency 
forces would be ready to move if and when called upon.41
Okada’s reaction to Shidehara’s offer is equally intriguing. Okada 
explained that, despite the complaints of local residents, there was no 
immediate need for reinforcements. However, he took Shidehara’s offer 
of additional police officers as a chance to remind the foreign minister 
of their conflict over the question of personnel increases in the summer 
and fall of 1930. Okada explained that, although the present situation 
was under control, the Jiandao consular police force was still drastically 
understaffed, just as it had been a year earlier. Therefore, an increase 
was necessary, not because of present circumstances, according to the 
Jiandao consul, but rather because Shidehara had failed to take the ap-
propriate measures after the May 30 uprising. Nonetheless, Okada was 
not about to let an opportunity for expansion pass by, so he told Shide-
hara that an increase of fifty officers would suffice for the moment.42 
Throughout October, Shidehara and Okada further discussed the 
specific steps to be taken in escalating the consular police presence in 
Jian dao. Based largely on the demands made in petitions by local Korean 
residents’ associations, Okada developed a plan including the opening of 
two new police substations. The initial plan was for fifteen officers to be 
stationed at each new station. Okada and Shidehara spent most of Novem-
ber working out the details of staffing the new facilities and coming up 
with a satisfactory budget for their operation. As was often the case, the 
foreign minister’s major concern was finding the money to fund new po-
lice facilities. The two new offices opened in early December, and the over-
all personnel increase in Jiandao turned out to be close to ninety officers 
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in total. By the end of 1931, then, the Jiandao consular police force had 
expanded to just over five hundred men.43 These forces went to work 
against the “bandits” and Communists of Jiandao in early 1932, and 
throughout the year they engaged in paramilitary operations alongside 
elements of the Kwantung Army and its military police units.
By the beginning of 1932, Shidehara had lost his job and the Foreign 
Ministry in Tokyo was beginning to take on a new character. However, 
consular police leadership in the field had remained constant throughout 
the early months of the Manchurian crisis, as Jiandao consul Okada was 
still at his post when Yoshizawa Kenkichi became the new foreign minis-
ter. The two men soon began developing plans to expand consular police 
activity in Jiandao and Manchuria as a whole. The first step was to bolster 
consular police forces in northern Manchuria, an area that had been 
lightly staffed before 1931, so in February Yoshizawa instructed Okada to 
transfer a large number of Jiandao consular police officers to Harbin and 
Jilin. Later on, those who had been transferred would be replaced, in most 
cases by recently recruited and trained Korean patrolmen. The immedi-
ate need was to increase the consular police presence beyond Jiandao, 
where it was already strong.44 More concrete plans for expansion then 
emerged in March. In a report on the conditions of the local Communist 
insurgency in Jiandao, Okada claimed that significant progress had been 
made in suppressing communist activity during late 1930 and throughout 
1931, but, ironically enough, the Manchurian Incident had actually dis-
rupted those trends. Chinese anger over the Kwantung Army’s invasion of 
Manchuria had made effective cooperation with local Chinese police in-
stitutions close to impossible, and the lack of effective police action on the 
Chinese side had given the local communist movement a chance to re-
group and mobilize. Therefore, according to Okada, Japanese police 
forces needed to engage the communist insurgency with a more direct 
and vigorous campaign.45
After several periodic personnel increases throughout the summer of 
1932, the consular police force in the Jiandao region reached a total of 
665 men by the end of September. A summary of consular police actions 
during the year indicated that the police engaged in 332 distinct encoun-
ters with communist and rebel forces throughout the year. Total casualties 
on the police side were nine killed and twelve wounded, while the rebels 
sustained over twenty-seven hundred killed and wounded.46 How reliable 
these statistics are is certainly debatable. Nonetheless, they do clearly indi-
cate that the consular police in Jiandao participated fully in military ef-
forts to crush resistance to the conquest of Manchuria. Data concerning 
arrests of Korean suspects and confiscation of politically sensitive docu-
ments also illustrate well the impact of the May 30 uprisings on the milita-
rization of consular police forces in Jiandao before the Manchurian 
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Incident. The number of arrests of “rebellious Koreans,” for example, 
jumped from 39 in 1929 to 1,274 in 1930. That figure then reached 2,485 
in 1932, but the greatest increase percentage-wise clearly took place in the 
wake of the May 30 riots.47 Furthermore, it must be stressed that those ar-
rests were made possible by closer ties between Foreign Ministry police in 
Jiandao and colonial police authorities in Korea.
Not by coincidence, the number of police officers added to Jiandao 
forces after September 1931 corresponds almost exactly to the two hun-
dred-man increase that Okada and Aiba had requested in June 1930. 
Looked at in this light, the expansion of consular police numbers and 
activities in the wake of the Manchurian Incident seem more like a logi-
cal outcome of pressure initiated in the summer of 1930 rather than an 
unprecedented response to the crisis conditions forced upon Japan’s 
consular offices by the unilateral actions of the military in Manchuria 
during the late summer of 1931. Certainly one could argue that “re-
straints on consular police forces in all of China ceased in the wake of 
the Manchurian Incident,” but this gives the impression that Kwantung 
Army action made it possible for Gaimushô police to operate more 
freely.48 It is clear, however, that the Jiandao consular police applied 
equal pressure to abandon a path of conciliation; the Kwantung Army’s 
invasion simply gave more muscle to their demands.49 As Gaimushô vet-
eran Aiba Kiyoshi himself put it when describing the Jiandao consular 
Officers from the Erdaogou sub-station of the Jiandao consulate at Longjincun cele-
brating with weapons captured in counterinsurgency operations, early 1930s. (Photo 
courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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police in 1930, “They were altogether much more like soldiers than they 
were police [keisatsu to iu yori mo, mattaku guntai desu ne].”50 What opposi-
tion they may have had toward the Kwantung Army adventurism was not 
rooted in a fundamental rejection of unilateral action. Rather, they de-
sired consular leadership over that unilateralism.
That the problem of resistance in exile to Japan’s colonial rule of 
Korea is inextricably bound to the Manchurian Incident of September 
1931 is not an entirely new idea.51 However, previous scholarship has em-
phasized plans by militant leaders in the Korean Government- General to 
stage a “Jiandao incident” of sorts in the summer of 1931. Their aim was 
to provide a pretext for a border incursion by the Japanese Army in 
Korea that would solve the problem of Korean resistance in Jiandao 
once and for all. Once they had occupied the region, the plan was to 
abolish the consular police and make Jiandao a part of formal Korean 
colonial territory.52 It is clearly necessary, however, to insert the Foreign 
Ministry into the equation by recognizing the agency of the Jiandao 
consular police in energizing their own escalation of hostilities without 
the initiative of Japanese armies in Korea or Manchuria.
Metropolitan Connections
With the initial wave of resistance to the Japanese conquest of Manchu-
ria for the most part snuffed out by the middle of 1932, the Gaimushô 
quickly moved to reorganize the administrative framework of its con-
sular police network in the region. Two significant changes stand out in 
particular: a sizeable and region-wide personnel increase and the aban-
donment of the Mitsuya protocol of 1925. On the first point, consular 
police in northern Manchuria lagged far behind in overall numbers 
when compared to those in Jiandao, or even in South Manchuria. To 
correct this discrepancy, a new police station (keisatsubu) was established 
in Harbin in August 1932. On the second point, whereas the conclusion 
of the Mitsuya Agreement in 1925 had marked a new stage in Sino-Japanese 
collaboration to crush radical Korean resistance in Manchuria, by late 
1932 such collaboration had become impossible. Fengtian was by that 
time, of course, completely under Japanese control. Thus, the Mitsuya 
Agreement was formally abrogated on December 12, 1932.53
It is critical to remember, however, that events in Manchuria during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s did not play out in a vacuum. In fact, while 
Shidehara was busily trying to lower the profile of Japanese consular po-
lice in treaty port China to make their presence less odious to the Chinese 
government and ordinary residents, police officers in the field, especially 
in Shanghai, continued with their business as usual. Two high-profile ar-
rests, in particular, illustrate well the continuity in consular police opera-
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tions regardless of high-level Kasumigaseki diplomacy. And this continuity 
suggests that events in Manchuria, Shanghai, and Tokyo during 1932 were 
all interrelated when examined through the lens of political police work.
As noted earlier, many Japanese leftists in Shanghai had a keen in-
terest in the development of the Chinese communist movement, which 
made them targets of consular police surveillance.54 During the late 
1920s, for example, Japanese Communist Party member Nishizato  Tatsuo 
was writing for the Japanese-language newspaper Shanghai Nippô. In his 
memoirs he describes feeling inspired by the heroic struggles of workers 
and farmers in the Jiangxi Soviet and writing detailed reports about the 
movement in his paper. Finding his reports to be “sympathetic to com-
munist revolution,” however, the Shanghai consular police censored 
Nishizato’s articles. Nishizato also translated numerous works of leftist 
Chinese intellectuals and published them in the Shanghai Nippô, for 
which he was constantly harangued by the consular police. “I often went 
back and forth with those guys,” Nishizato later recalled.55
Similarly, just as consular police forces targeted leftist Japanese writ-
ers in China as potential subversives, so those writers in turn often tar-
geted the consular police as prime examples of the insidious injustice 
that characterized Japan’s imperial presence in China. Proletarian au-
thor Kuroshima Denji’s Militarized Streets, a devastating semifictional cri-
tique of Japanese actions in North China around 1930, for example, 
highlights the shameless corruption of consular police officers routinely 
shaking down local Chinese residents for bribes and “protection” money. 
Especially powerful, however, is Kuroshima’s harrowing indictment of 
consular jurisdiction through a depiction of three Chinese arms smug-
glers being publicly executed for their crimes. “When people deal tim-
idly in small quantities of guns or drugs, they atone for it with their 
blood,” Kuroshima wrote. Referring then to the ease with which Japa-
nese citizens involved in illicit trade could avoid punishment by way of 
their extraterritorial privilege, he continued: “But those who operate on 
a truly grand scale grab up all they can and make their underlings pay 
the price. . . . This was why the Chinese people cried out for the aboli-
tion of consular trials and immunity from local law.”56
In their pursuit of such sympathetic Japanese voices, the Shanghai 
consular police made a major arrest in 1929—that of Sano Manabu. Sano 
had come to Shanghai to participate in meetings organized to coordinate 
cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese Communist parties and 
the Comintern, and the circumstances of his arrest are worth describing 
in detail.57 While the Shanghai consular police took great pride in their 
role in capturing Sano, it was a local Chinese police officer and a paid 
Chinese informant who actually apprehended the Japanese Communist 
leader on the afternoon of June 16. After lengthy discussions between 
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local Japanese consular authorities and the Chinese police over how and 
when to turn Sano over to the Japanese police, he came under Japanese 
custody on June 21. That Chinese police had made this important arrest 
without direct involvement of Japanese officers had a larger public rela-
tions value that was not lost on Japanese consul Kamimura. He was quick 
to tout the success of this operation as clear evidence that Sino-Japanese 
security cooperation could indeed work smoothly even within an environ-
ment of high anti-Japanese sentiment throughout Chinese treaty ports 
and strong demands by many Chinese for the removal of Japanese police 
forces from sovereign Chinese territory.58
The Shanghai consular police had targeted Sano, of course, because 
he was the most internationally recognizable representative of the Japa-
nese Communist Party in Shanghai. His close ties with members of the 
CCP and the KCP made his capture a high priority, as the anticipated 
intelligence yield from his interrogation would be quite high. While 
 Sano’s highly publicized tenkô (“conversion”) in which he denounced his 
affiliation with the Communist movement did not come until 1933, he 
almost immediately turned over a significant amount of information 
about the inner workings of the CCP and its relationship with the Com-
intern. Among the many topics covered in his lengthy handwritten re-
port on the current state of the CCP, Sano acknowledged that he was 
not aware of any specific Comintern documents that spoke directly to 
the relationship between the CCP and the JCP. He did, however, offer 
his own view on that matter to his Japanese interrogators.
The Chinese revolution, Sano explained, was destined to have a tre-
mendous impact on the global socialist fight against imperialism. Japa-
nese imperialism, however, was clearly the CCP’s greatest mortal enemy. 
If the Japanese empire could be brought down, the Chinese revolution 
would rapidly gain strength, Sano went on, and its success would inspire 
socialist movements worldwide. The socialist movement in Japan would 
in turn thus be aided by the success of the CCP’s struggle on the main-
land.59 This logic reveals in a dramatic way just why the Japanese con-
sular police were so intent on crushing Korean, Chinese, and Japanese 
communism on the frontiers of the empire. In effect, the consular po-
lice understood themselves as the first line of defense against the com-
munist revolutionary tide that was perceived as a threat not just to the 
colonial empire but to the metropolitan homeland itself.
Indeed, Sano’s arrest in Shanghai was directly linked to contempo-
rary developments in the police war on communism on the home is-
lands. The Justice Ministry had organized a massive sweep of suspected 
JCP members in the spring of 1928, and on the morning of March 15, 
the nationwide crackdown began, ultimately netting roughly 1,600 sus-
pects and thousands of pages of party documents. Prime Minister 
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Tanaka Giichi responded to the arrests by urging revisions to the 1925 
Peace Preservation Law that would enhance the state’s ability to sup-
press leftist radicalism by broadening the definition of threats to the ko-
kutai and adopting the death penalty for convicted offenders.60 The 
mass arrests of March 1928 had netted almost every major leader in the 
Japanese Communist Party; only those who had been abroad at the time, 
such as Sano, escaped the dragnet.61 It was the responsibility of the 
Shanghai consular police, then, to complete the metropolitan-centered 
security operation that had begun in the spring of 1928.62 Another na-
tionwide dragnet on the home islands in April 1929 “represented the 
severest blow yet suffered by the [Japanese] communists.”63 Thus, the 
capture of Sano in the summer of 1929 was the final stage in a series of 
arrests including those of Nabeyama Sadachika, Ichikawa Shôichi, Mita-
mura Shirô, and Watanabe Masanosuke.64 Japanese Communists, how-
ever, were not the only targets of these transnational police operations.
As noted earlier, the Shanghai consular police had been following the 
career and movements of Yõ Un-hyõng since 1919. Less than a month after 
Sano’s arrest, but more than ten years since they began keeping tabs on 
him, the Shanghai consular police scored a second major victory in their 
battle against the Korea independence movement with the arrest of Yõ, a 
well-known Korean communist and former Provisional Government min-
ister. Japanese officers apprehended Yõ at an athletic field in the interna-
tional settlement while the unsuspecting man was watching a baseball 
game there on July 10, and he was subsequently detained under the charge 
of violating the Peace Preservation Law.65 By the end of the month, Yõ had 
been sent to Seoul to be held and interrogated. Yõ had been a key person-
ality in the movement since its earliest formative days, so the intelligence 
coffers of the Japanese police benefited greatly from the depth of his revo-
lutionary experience.66 Indeed, Yõ’s incarceration was clearly a significant 
victory for the Japanese police network in China. Dae-sook Suh has noted 
that the arrest of Yõ and other key leaders among the Korean Communists 
in Shanghai between 1928 and 1932 all but brought the Communist move-
ment in Shanghai to a halt.67 This was the case, too, of course, in Manchu-
ria, where the escalation of Jiandao consular police operations after the 
May 30 riots and joint actions with the Kwantung Army after the Manchu-
rian Incident had succeeded in crushing most organized resistance by the 
end of 1932.
The near simultaneity of the arrests of Yõ Un-hyõng and Sano 
Manabu by the Shanghai consular police in mid-1929 is especially sig-
nificant in two distinct ways. First, it demonstrates the centrality of anti-
communism in Gaimushô police strategy, a characteristic that can be 
traced back to at least the early 1920s. Korean or Japanese, what made 
one a target of consular police surveillance and suspicion was “danger-
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ous thought,” namely left-wing radicalism of any type. Furthermore, 
these two arrests reflect continuity in political police operations in the 
homeland and on the imperial periphery, as socialism posed a terrify-
ing threat to social stability in both locales, and as such it had to be 
crushed. The second significant meaning of the dual arrests is in the 
fact that the Shanghai police were clearly still focused upon and com-
mitted to their duties in the field, despite the attempts by high-level Gai-
mushô leadership in Tokyo to lower their profile and appease Chinese 
nationalist demands. The consular police in Shanghai had a mission to 
suppress international communism and the Korean independence 
movement, and they were determined to carry it out, even unilaterally if 
and when that was necessary.68 
To further explain the interrelatedness of metropolitan police work 
at home and consular police work in China during the late 1920s, one 
must examine the link between Japanese socialist organizations and Chi-
nese popular nationalism. The case of the Shandong expeditions of 
1927–1928, when Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi authorized the deploy-
ment of military forces to “protect” Japanese residents in north China 
from Chiang Kai-shek’s National Revolutionary Army, is a useful case in 
point. The popular Chinese reaction to these incursions is well known, 
but left-wing Japanese groups were also quite critical of what they saw as 
blatant imperial aggression. Not only that, they often explicitly linked 
military aggression in China with political oppression at home. A 1928 
leftist pamphlet, for example, argued that opposition to the Shandong 
expedition and resistance to the Peace Preservation Law were part of the 
same struggle.69 A similar, but more elaborate, case was made by the Japan 
Communist Party in 1929 in a pamphlet arguing that the Shandong in-
cursion and the struggles of the Japanese proletariat were two parts of the 
same process, the logic being that the same industrial bourgeoisie that 
was bankrolling Japanese militarism overseas was exploiting workers at 
home. After making reference to their revolutionary comrades in the 
CCP, the pamphlet concluded with a rousing call for opposition to the 
Peace Preservation Law.70
The evolution of tokkô activities among the consular police during the 
1920s, then, should be examined in light of similar trends in domestic se-
curity networks. The first half of the decade was characterized by tension 
and rivalry between the Home Ministry and the Justice Ministry, with 
Home Ministry positions usually emerging as official policy. However, as 
Richard Mitchell has argued, the gradual strengthening of the Peace Pres-
ervation Law after 1925 had the dual effect of enhancing the influence of 
Justice Ministry procurators and deflating the power of Home Ministry 
bureaucrats.71 The mass arrests of JCP suspects in March 1928 then 
sparked more draconian revisions to the Peace Preservation Law. Ulti-
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mately, the various domestic and foreign crises of the early 1930s brought 
on a new wave of reforms to metropolitan police networks providing for 
even more comprehensive tools of social control. A similar process is evi-
dent in the development of Foreign Ministry police overseas. Between 
1919 and 1925, political surveillance came to the forefront of consular 
police operations, but the trend both in treaty ports like Shanghai and 
on the Manchurian frontier was to develop multilateral strategies. The 
Mitsuya Agreement of 1925 and the concomitant establishment of tokkô 
sections in the Shanghai consular police station facilitated a more effec-
tive campaign against leftist suspects. The numerous raids on Jiandao 
area Korean Communist Party offices in 1927–1928, as well as the arrests 
of Yõ Un-hyõng and Sano Manabu in Shanghai in 1929, were the result of 
this stronger police presence. Because the response of the Japanese con-
sular police to the May 30 riots in Jiandao and the Manchurian Incident 
made Sino-Japanese police cooperation virtually impossible, the door to 
unilateral escalation and more severe measures against Korean, Chinese, 
and Japanese leftists alike opened wide during the 1930s.
Transnational “Terrorist” Bombings 
The arrests of Sano and Yõ clearly indicate that the Japanese consular 
police were escalating their program of suppressing leftist activists (Ko-
rean and Japanese alike) long before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. 
The expansion of Shanghai consular police power during the spring of 
1932, then, should not be viewed as an isolated response to new condi-
tions created by the army’s invasion of the northeast. Rather, it must be 
understood as a logical next step in the pattern of intensification of po-
lice actions against communists that began in 1919. 
To understand events in Shanghai, however, one must turn first to 
Tokyo. On January 8, 1932, a young Korean revolutionary named Yi 
Pong-ch’ang tossed a live grenade at the passing motorcade of the em-
peror outside the palace gates.72 Later dubbed the Sakuradamon Inci-
dent by the Japanese, interrogations of Yi revealed that the plot had 
been masterminded by the well-known Korean independence activist 
Kim Ku from his base of operations in the French Concession of Shang-
hai. Additional police reports reveal that Yi had received the bombs 
used in the attack from representatives of the Korean Provisional Gov-
ernment in Shanghai and that Kim Ku then wired additional funds to 
him via bank transfer after he arrived in Tokyo to carry out the plot.73 
While damage from the attack was minimal, the fact that the struggle of 
Korean resistance fighters in treaty port China had been unleashed 
within the very core of the empire’s metropolitan center was a deeply 
disturbing turn of events in the eyes of Japanese police authorities.74 In-
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deed, the incident inspired the government to order the Home Ministry 
to begin planning for significant reforms of domestic police aimed at 
rooting out such “abominable incidents.”75 The Shanghai consular po-
lice were determined to find those responsible for the Tokyo bombing, 
with some sources even suggesting the use of torture on local Koreans 
to extort information regarding the whereabouts of Kim Ku.76
The full import of what happened in Tokyo in January became 
clearer when a more effective terrorist attack was carried out in Shang-
hai several months later. On the afternoon of April 29, about a dozen 
high-ranking Japanese civil and military officials were presiding over a 
Japanese community celebration of the emperor’s birthday. Shanghai’s 
Japanese residents had been encouraged to bring bentô boxes to the fes-
tivities, but the twenty-five-year-old Korean Yun Pong-gil’s lunchbox was 
a cleverly disguised explosive device. Just as the national anthem Kimi-
gayo reached its final few notes, Yun hurled the bomb onto the stage, 
where it exploded, maiming several Japanese, including Japanese minis-
ter plenipotentiary to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the Japanese 
commander of forces in Shanghai, General Shirakawa Yoshinori. 
Shigemitsu lost his leg in the attack and Shirakawa later died from inju-
ries sustained that day. Interviews with Yun after his arrest also revealed 
that Kim Ku was the main planner behind the attack; Yun himself was 
executed for his role in the bombing on December 19, 1932.77 
The significance of these two interrelated bombings was made clear 
by the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau in June 1932. A report drafted by 
Section Two identified these two attacks as unmistakable signs that the 
threat posed by the Korean resistance movement in Shanghai had reached 
an unacceptably dangerous level. Acknowledging that the lack of French 
cooperation in policing Koreans in the concessions area had prevented 
the Japanese from solving this problem much earlier, the Asia Bureau rec-
ognized that now such cooperation was absolutely vital. To obtain it, then, 
the Japanese government had to be willing to provide French authorities 
with intelligence regarding Vietnamese political refugees in Tokyo, some-
thing they had been reluctant to do throughout the 1920s. In addition, 
the Shanghai consular police needed to prepare for a rapid expansion of 
their resources and information-gathering networks.78
On the matter of French cooperation, it had already begun to im-
prove in the immediate wake of the April 29 bombings. The Shanghai 
consular police executed a raid of the Korean Provisional Government 
headquarters in the French Concession of the city the very next day. 
This was an extraordinary victory for the intelligence-gathering ele-
ments of the Shanghai police force. In fact, with the documents seized 
in April 1932, they were able to write a complete history of the overseas 
Korean independence movement, so rich in detail that contemporary 
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scholars should consider it one of the most valuable primary sources 
available today.79 Why did the French finally agree to aid the Shanghai 
consular police in their war against Korean radicalism? On the one 
hand, French authorities were troubled by the violence brought to their 
concession by the resident Korean revolutionaries, many of whom had 
become more militant by the early 1930s. On the other, as the Asia Bu-
reau report suggests, the Japanese came to realize that improving secu-
rity in Shanghai was more important than protecting their Vietnamese 
friends in Tokyo. That being the case, Japanese police at home finally 
provided intelligence to France regarding Vietnamese exiles in Tokyo, 
such as Prince Cùºng Ðê. In short, the French and the Japanese came to 
an understanding on issues of independence activists in exile. In ex-
change for information on Vietnamese in Tokyo, the French would help 
bring down the hammer on Koreans in Shanghai.80
Reflecting back upon the events of 1932, a report from the Shanghai 
consular police department in late 1937 explicitly linked the January 
Sakuradamon Incident in Tokyo and the March Shanghai park bombing. 
These events, according to the report, stood out as pivotal moments in the 
explosion of anti-Japanese “terrorism” after the Manchurian Incident.81 
The physical distance between Tokyo and Shanghai and the status of one 
as a metropolitan center, the other as a hub of the colonial periphery, were 
both transcended by the danger of political crime evident at both sites. 
The cities were linked by police priorities, metropolitan and colonial, 
Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry. The arrests of Sano Manabu and Yõ 
Un-hyõng in 1929, the escalation of consular police action in Jiandao after 
1930, and the achievement of Japanese–French security cooperation in 
1932 all illustrate how the imperial Japanese state’s commitment to crush-
ing subversive left-wing movements in any and all forms extended to its 
sphere of influence in treaty port China and Manchuria; and the Japanese 
consular police played a central role in facilitating that objective. 
Conclusions
Japan’s political elites scrambled throughout 1932 to manufacture stra-
tegic, economic, and legal justifications in defense of the nation’s thor-
ough conquest of China’s northeastern provinces and the “liberation” of 
Manzhouguo. Because postwar historians know, of course, that the mili-
tary occupation of Manchuria ultimately led to the full-scale invasion of 
China and finally to a cataclysmic war with the United States and Great 
Britain, attempts by the civilian Japanese government to explain its mili-
tary actions in 1932 have been largely written off as rhetorical spin de-
signed only to veil the civilian sector’s helplessness in the face of the 
Kwantung Army’s fait accompli. What the history of consular police ac-
116 | Crossing Empire’s Edge
tions before 1932 make clear, however, is that Japan’s civilian govern-
ment had itself been locked in an often violent struggle against the 
forces of subversive political thought on the frontiers of the empire. This 
struggle played a significant role in the escalation of Japan’s colonial 
presence on the continent that is still often exclusively ascribed to the 
unilateralism of right-wing extremists in the military.
A lengthy report issued by the Foreign Ministry in 1932 entitled Rela-
tions of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia sheds further light on this inter-
pretive dilemma. In describing the position of Japan during the 1920s 
within the turbulent political context of East Asia after the end of the First 
World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Chinese and Korean Na-
tionalist movements, the report explains, “It goes without saying that the 
safety of a State is imperiled not only by the invasion of its territory by a 
strong armed force, but also by any disturbance of the stability of its politi-
cal ideas, social organization, and the like.”82 The most potentially danger-
ous “disturbance” in official Japanese eyes was, of course, communism, a 
perceived menace to which Japan was especially vulnerable because of its 
geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and China. Because “a cer-
tain number of Japanese have recently become adherents of communism 
and have occasionally attempted to cause social unrest by unlawful means,” 
the report continued, “the Japanese people cannot relax their vigilance 
against the nefarious activities of these black sheep.”83 Japanese imperial 
subjects in Manchuria and Mongolia were of special concern, because 
“among them there are not a few Japanese and Koreans who are engaged, 
in remote places beyond the control of Japanese authorities, in the con-
coction of nefarious anti-Japanese plots. This is a matter of grave concern 
to Japan.” The problem of suppressing these political criminals had been 
at the center of Sino-Japanese conflict throughout the 1920s, because “to 
leave their control in the hands of the Chinese authorities is anything but 
satisfactory, consequently the duty of controlling Japanese conspirators in 
China falls on the shoulders of Japanese authorities.”84 
This problem, however, was much larger than the simple matter of a 
handful of troublemakers on the empire’s periphery. The report went on: 
“the Japanese communists in Manchuria, who are mostly of Korean ori-
gin, are plotting to undermine the existing political institution of Japan 
by working in concert with their partizans [sic] in Japan Proper and Korea. 
It goes without saying that these dangerous elements must be placed under 
thorough and strict restraint.”85 Regional Japanese authorities had been 
reasonably successful in keeping the communist movement in check 
throughout Manchuria since the early 1920s. The end of the decade had, 
however, seen a series of troubling trends, namely the unification of the 
Korean Communist Party in Manchuria with the Chinese Communist 
Party, thus giving the KCP a direct link with the Comintern. Reinvigo-
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rated after 1929, the Korean communists turned to more violent tactics of 
resistance. “Finally on May 30, 1930, they started a riot in Chientao and 
continued their agitation incessantly for several months,” and while that 
movement was put down by consular police action, “their agitation, how-
ever, is still continued in secret and there is little doubt that if opportunity 
presents itself they will seize it and come again to the front.”86
Speaking of the more moderate adherents of the “so-called ‘Korean 
Nationalism’ ” the Gaimushô report paid them little attention: “These 
organizations are not powerful enough to be formidable, because be-
sides lacking a central organ to unite them, they have frequently been 
taught a severe lesson by the Japanese authorities.”87 In fact, despite the 
recognition that Korean Communists and Nationalists “resemble each 
other in constituting a menace to the safety of Japan, the one scheming 
to undermine our state foundations, and the other to overthrow our 
rule in Korea,” the Nationalists “need not at present be taken too seri-
ously, because they have no powerful support behind them. . . . As for 
the Communists, it is a different matter altogether.”88
Communism in Manchuria posed a much more serious threat in 
the eyes of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Korean Communists, “by 
maintaining close connections with their friends both in China and 
Japan . . . are maturing a sinister design against the state foundations of 
Japan.” The Japanese government was thus compelled to take action 
against such elements, “because such measures will at the same time 
serve as a restraint upon their friends in Japan Proper and cannot but 
furnish a means of safeguarding the security of our country.”89
The most important theme to emerge here is the clear connection 
being drawn by the Foreign Ministry between the activities of communists 
abroad and communists in Japan. The report continued, “Japan is exercis-
ing very strict control over communist movements at home, but . . . she can-
not regard with equanimity the ‘bolshevization’ of China, because her 
policy against communism must necessarily be shaped in accordance with 
the situation in that country.” The potential “bolshevization” of Manchuria 
was an especially serious concern, because should that occur, “it would im-
mediately disturb the peace and order of Korea, which in turn would affect 
the peace and order of Japan Proper. So far as the question of ‘bolsheviza-
tion’ is concerned, therefore, the purgation of the two regions [Manchuria 
and Mongolia] from communistic elements is the key to the preservation 
of peace and order in Japan.”90 Not insignificantly, the Foreign Ministry 
was quick to point out that its security forces, the consular police, had been 
instrumental in preventing this dreaded “bolshevization” so far. “Fortu-
nately, up to the present,” the report claims, “the activities of the Third In-
ternational and the Chinese Communist Party in the two regions has not 
borne much fruit. This is accounted for partly by the strong, though invisi-
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ble, pressure exercised by Japan in the two regions, which has induced the 
communist agitators to deem it advisable to turn their attention to other 
parts of China which would offer less resistance.”91
Certainly, it is easy to dismiss this reasoning as cynical and self-serving 
hyperbole intended solely to provide justification for the Kwantung Ar-
my’s invasion of Manchuria, which the Foreign Ministry had done so little 
to prevent. The evidence in this chapter demonstrates, however, that this 
1932 Foreign Ministry statement is much more than insincere propa-
ganda. It reflects clearly the depth to which the Foreign Ministry was com-
mitted to its mission of combating the spread of communism from East 
Asia into the Japanese homeland. And, most important, this commitment 
began as early as 1919; it was not a reaction to immediate events of the 
early 1930s. And, of course, it was through its consular police forces that 
the Gaimushô was able to participate in this mission. Thus, while it is un-
derstandable why one might argue, from the postwar vantage point, that 
“the steady rise of Japanese militarism . . . replaced the consulate police 
with the thought police, high police, military police, gendarmes, and 
other regulatory agencies,” the problem with this explanation lies in how 
it relegates the Foreign Ministry police to a role as passive participants in a 
story line driven by the Japanese military.92 Close examination of the long 
history of consular police activism in the fight against overseas Korean in-
dependence activism and Japanese socialism reveals clearly that the Japa-
nese consular police in Manchuria were not necessarily “replaced” by 
more militant elements. In fact, their activities in many cases cultivated 
and encouraged the emergence of that militarism. 
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5
The Struggle for Security  
in Occupied China
Without a doubt the Manchurian crisis of 1930–1932 had a pow-
erful effect on the evolution of consular police ideology, activity, and 
organization. However, as illustrated in Chapter 4, these changes did 
not necessarily mark a radical shift in direction, but rather brought to 
fuller fruition trends with roots in the 1920s. This chapter will examine 
the further expansion of Gaimushô police facilities and operations in 
Manzhouguo and China proper during the mid-1930s and throughout 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. During these years, Japan’s con-
sular police forces continued to play an active role in prosecuting the 
war on Korean resistance in exile, but combating Chinese communism 
and Soviet intrigue took a more significant position at the forefront of 
consular police goals and strategy. The scope of political police work at 
home and abroad also changed in important ways during the 1930s as, 
with communist organizations all but eliminated in Japan proper by 
1933, tokkô police forces began to turn their attention as well to right-
wing extremists and virtually any social group whose ideology could be 
viewed as a threat to the state and its interests. In occupied China, too, 
the consular police not only had to continue their war against commu-
nism and anticolonial resistance, but they also broadened the scope of 
their surveillance in the same manner as did the metropolitan police. 
As many consular police officers would comment, tokkô work in wartime 
northeast Asia thus became far more complicated than was “special po-
licing” at home.
The discussion begins with the five-year span between 1932 and 1937 
during which the Gaimushô moved to both expand and centralize its po-
lice operations in China by establishing new “command and control” fa-
cilities in Shanghai and Tianjin. Similarly, the consular police in 
Manchuria after 1932 fought to maintain their role in the complicated 
security apparatus of the new Manzhouguo state. The focus then turns to 
the continued growth of Gaimushô police operations in occupied China 
during the Sino-Japanese War, again exploring key developments in 
Shanghai and the Tianjin/Beijing area; and here, too, it will be clear that 
military security in China was linked to political stability at home, and 
that the consular police played a vital role in pursuing both. While there 
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is little doubt that the Foreign Ministry incrementally “lost control” of 
China affairs after the Manchurian Incident, relying on this passive expla-
nation for the transformation of the its consular system into an apparatus 
of wartime colonial control largely absolves the ministry of responsibility.1 
The history of the consular police in China and Manchuria reveals a far 
more proactive struggle on the part of the Gaimushô to shape continental 
policy, and the ministry used its consular police forces as a tool to that 
end. To be sure, Japan’s diplomatic corps was ultimately overpowered by 
the military’s war machine, but not because its policies stood in stark op-
position to those of the Imperial Army. Rather, the two sides most often 
clashed on matters of means, not ends.
Expansion in Shanghai 
Since at least as early as 1925, the consular police force in Shanghai had 
included a small number of officers dedicated solely to the task of political 
surveillance over individuals and groups committed to resistance against 
the imperial state, whether it was Korean, Chinese, or Japanese. These ac-
tivities took on a new urgency, however, after the Shanghai Incident of 
1932, when Japanese aerial bombardment of the city only served to harden 
the Chinese will to resist Japanese aggression. In response to the drastic 
worsening of Sino-Japanese relations in the city, the Gaimushô took steps 
to bolster its police facilities there, especially in terms of tokkô police work.2 
In June 1932, the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau spelled out its reasons for 
expanding the size and scope of consular police operations in Shanghai 
through the establishment of a new police department within the Shang-
hai Consulate-General. Shanghai was a dangerous place, according to this 
report, filled with a dizzying variety of criminal plots. To make matters 
worse, the report continued, the numerous foreign countries with inter-
ests and investments in the city had police forces of their own, and because 
the concerns and priorities of each nation were different, effective coop-
eration between them was rather difficult to achieve.3 Shanghai was also 
the center of three destabilizing anti-Japanese movements, in the Asia Bu-
reau’s view. The port, of course, had long been a hotbed of Korean resis-
tance in exile. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party was recovering 
from its decimation in 1927, and Shanghai was once again emerging as a 
center of their organizational activity and underground agitation.4 Finally, 
the USSR and the Comintern continued to make Shanghai a focal point 
of international communist intrigue in East Asia. The combination of 
these three forces, the report argued, posed a serious threat to Japan’s 
colonial rule in Korea and its larger strategic position on the mainland.5
The establishment of a new “police headquarters” (keisatsubu) in the 
Shanghai office, the report concluded, was the immediate answer to these 
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problems.6 The early efficacy of the new consular police office, however, 
was aided by two additional factors. First, cooperation with French conces-
sion police had improved greatly since the spring of 1932, as French and 
Japanese police had found a common threat in Korean “terrorism” around 
which they could assist each other through intelligence sharing and ar-
rests of suspects on foreign soil. In fact, it seems that closer cooperation 
with Japanese security forces might have made the French themselves 
more likely targets of Korean violence. One municipal police report, for 
example, suggests that a group of Korean “terrorists” were plotting to as-
sassinate the French consul and police chief in order to throw a bit of cold 
water on French willingness to assist the Japanese.7 The second factor en-
hancing the efficiency of new police department operations was related to 
the staffing of the new office. Experienced tokkô police officers from the 
home islands assumed a large number of the new positions in the police 
department, and officers from the colonial police bureaus of the Korea 
and Taiwan Governments-General also filled several new posts in the 
Shanghai keisatsubu.8 It is also important to remember that this integra-
tion of Gaimushô police into other administrative organs of the imperial 
Japanese state is consistent with earlier patterns. While the Foreign Minis-
try sometimes resented such movements as infringements upon its juris-
dictional prerogatives, circumstances could also dictate a more amenable 
stance on the matter.
The new Shanghai consular police department was subdivided into 
three sections: Section One handled business related to the general man-
agement of the police department, such as accounting, training, and 
equipment; Section Three was charged with duties related to everyday 
concession policing such as drugs, prostitution, traffic, and petty crimes; 
Section Two, then, was designated as the office of “special police work.” 
Put briefly, the duties of Section Two included gathering intelligence on 
movements of “dangerous thought” like socialism, communism, and anar-
chism, and it also held authority over the surveillance of any activity re-
lated to Japanese rule in Korea or Taiwan. Finally, it was charged with 
responsibility for any other area related to tokkô police work, a broad li-
cense to investigate almost anything at will.9 Despite the fact that Section 
Two was only one of three official sections in the Shanghai keisatsubu, Gai-
mushô police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu has noted that, in practice, “the 
police department was the special high police section (keisatsubu ikôru 
tokubetsu keisatsuka de atta).”10 The most important duty of Section Two 
was undoubtedly the surveillance and arrest of Japanese, Korean, and Tai-
wanese leftists in Shanghai. Much of what Japanese authorities came to 
know, for example, about the role of Uchiyama Kanzô’s bookstore as a 
meeting place for Japanese and Chinese communists, as well as the con-
nections that many Japanese socialists in Shanghai had with prominent 
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Chinese such as Lu Xun, came as a result of Section Two police investiga-
tions of resident Japanese leftists such as Kaji Wataru in 1932.11 By 1933 the 
work of Section Two had expanded sufficiently that the section itself was 
divided into several areas of subspecialty. Some officers were assigned to 
general affairs, research, investigation, foreign contacts, and the like; the 
rest were designated as specialists in affairs involving Chinese, Russians, 
Japanese, Koreans, or Taiwanese.12 
The priorities of the new Shanghai consular police department were 
also clearly reflected in a substantial year-end report on tokkô-related work 
in the city in 1932. The five chapters of the report are titled for the five 
main targets of police surveillance: conditions of resident Japanese; mat-
ters relating to Koreans; matters relating to Taiwanese; conditions of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the labor movement; conditions of the Rus-
sians. The information contained therein about Korean, Taiwanese, and 
Chinese political movements is to be expected, but the section on Japanese 
residents is especially revealing. In recalling the history of Shanghai as a 
center of the Chinese communist movement and a site of interaction be-
tween Japanese communists and their Chinese, Korean, and Soviet com-
rades, the report specifically mentioned the 1929 arrest of Sano Manabu as 
the point at which the early expansion of Japanese communism was 
checked, reinforcing the long-standing links between domestic and colo-
nial police work. After 1931, of course, new circumstances had given rise to 
escalations of both communist resistance and police repression, and the 
new police department was meant to meet those challenges.13
Indeed, the activities of the new department in Shanghai also 
strongly reflected not just their local security imperatives but the ideo-
logical agenda of metropolitan forces back home. Controlling the Japa-
nese left in Shanghai was of crucial importance, a 1935 Justice Ministry 
report argued, because Shanghai had been the original furnace in 
which the JCP was initially forged. As such, ideological movements in 
domestic society could not be controlled without successful political po-
lice work in Shanghai.14 One can see this logic at work, for example, in 
the attention paid to a letter from a Japanese Communist Party member 
in Kobe to the Chinese communist youth league in Shanghai in 1934. 
After beginning the note “My Dear Chinese comrades,” the author went 
on to expound upon his hopes that Japan’s imperialist invasion of Man-
churia would soon be defeated.15 In the eyes of metropolitan and colo-
nial police, maintaining public peace, gathering intelligence on Chinese 
communists, and suppressing Japanese leftists were all a part of the im-
perial state’s program to solve the same problem: dissent and resistance. 
The military campaign raging against the armies of China was a part of 
the same larger struggle that included the ideological campaign against 
rebellious Japanese citizens themselves.
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Japanese leftists committed to resisting the militarism of their own 
society found in Shanghai an especially important arena for waging 
their ideological campaign.16 The case of several dozen former and cur-
rent students of the TôA Dôbun Shoin in March 1933, for example, sug-
gests that one critical target was the Japanese military itself. The story 
began to unfold when a local restaurateur turned in a case of match-
boxes to the Shanghai consular police when he discovered that hidden 
within several individual boxes were folded antiwar leaflets. Clearly, 
whoever placed them there knew that Japanese sailors frequented this 
particular café and thus it was a prime location to surreptitiously distrib-
ute their propaganda materials. Municipal police soon arrested a Japa-
nese man named Sakamaki Takashi under authority of a search warrant 
issued by the Japanese Consulate-General on charges of violating the 
Peace Preservation Law. A Chinese named Wang Nai-an was with Saka-
maki when he was arrested, and Sakamaki later fingered him as his liai-
son with the Chinese Communist Party. Apparently, Sakamaki was a 
former student of the academy, and his arrest led to the further arrest of 
a ring of current students, some twenty or so in number, for their in-
volvement in this plot. The Shanghai consular police later identified 
Sakamaki as the chief of the Japanese section of the Foreign Soldiers of 
the Chinese Communist Party, which he had joined in May 1932.17
A quick look at the translations of the leaflets that were discovered 
reveals the political and ideological strategy employed by these left-wing 
antiwar activists:
Let us oppose the massacre of Chinese labourers and farmers. The Japa-
nese government of capitalists and landowners which occupied Shan-
haikwan [sic] is attempting to make you kill Chinese farmers and 
labourers in the Shanghai area. The emergency call which started three 
days ago is nothing but preparation for the massacre. . . . Do not kill the 
Chinese brethren. Oppose the war of the capitalists and landowners.
Another stated:
Dear sailors, do not be deceived by such words as “for the sake of our 
homeland” and “for our nationals.” In our country our aged parents 
are suffering from cold by being robbed of their supporters. For whose 
sake are we staying in Shanghai? Do not the landowners and capitalists 
squeeze our comrades, labourers and tenant-farmers? We still continue 
to live a life of slavery even in Shanghai. Our work is worse than that of 
miners. If we make a slight mistake punishment will be freely imposed 
on us in such a cruel manner as if dealt to animals. . . . Oppose dis-
criminating treatment between officers and men. Our brethren in 
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Japan have already commenced a movement to oppose the capitalists 
and landowners. We must therefore unite ourselves firmly . . . in order 
to oppose officers.18
These activists clearly saw the struggles of the rural poor in Japan as in-
extricably linked to the hardships faced by Chinese farmers under Japa-
nese military occupation. The war being waged upon the Chinese, in 
their view, was sponsored by the same elite class of big business bureau-
crats and landlords that exploited the Japanese underclass on the home 
islands.19 Quite naturally, then, Japanese police both at home and in 
China targeted such voices for suppression. The place of the East Asian 
Common Culture Academy in this episode is also especially and illustra-
tively ironic. The academy had, of course, once been a site for promot-
ing Pan-Asian unity that the Japanese government itself greatly 
supported, as evidenced by the reluctance of Japanese officials to coop-
erate with French police on the matter of Vietnamese revolutionaries. 
Now, while the government still promoted a rather cynical ideal of Asian 
unity within its rhetoric of territorial conquest, revolutionary Pan-Asian 
socialism had become a target of Japanese police suppression.
Escalation in Tianjin
Conditions in North China also changed dramatically after the Manchu-
rian Incident and the urban violence of 1932 in cites such as Shanghai. 
While the Gaimushô did not take steps in Tianjin as immediate as those 
taken in Shanghai to bolster its consular police forces, the Tianjin con-
sular police nonetheless continued to evolve in response to local condi-
tions.20 Back on the home islands, domestic tokkô activities expanded 
dramatically during the early 1930s in response to a perceived threat of 
social disorder on the part of state authorities, and a report from the Tian-
jin consular police office in late 1933 suggests that similar concerns were 
on the mind of Gaimushô police leadership. The report identified two 
particular “ideological problems” (shisô mondai) that consular police felt 
could prove destabilizing to the resident Japanese community in Tianjin. 
First, there had been a general rise in the number of residents placed 
under surveillance throughout the year, and of special concern among 
those being watched were the children of local residents who had returned 
to Japan to study and while there had been exposed to left-wing ideology. 
In a reversal of usual trends, here it seemed that the police feared danger-
ous “domestic elements” (naichi bunshi) from the home islands might 
spread subversive ideas to the Japanese community in China! The second 
main concern had to do with a striking rise in the number of so-called 
Shina rônin, or “China adventurers,” and other right-wing elements in the 
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treaty ports since the stabilization of conditions in Manzhouguo.21 The 
influence of these suspicious characters, too, could have unwanted conse-
quences, consular authorities warned. Of prime significance here is that 
those targeted by police as dangerous to public security were of both the 
left and right ideologically, just as was the case in metropolitan Japan.
From 1933 until 1936, the Tianjin consular police maintained a steady 
level of staffing, but conditions on the ground were also creating a sense of 
urgency for official expansion of police facilities there. During those four 
years, the number of Gaimushô police in Tianjin fluctuated between 
roughly seventy-five and ninety officers. This manpower, however, was bol-
stered by a large number of Chinese assistant patrolmen, or junho. In fact, 
in each of these years the number of Chinese junho hovered at around 
three hundred and fifty. As for local conditions, consular officials cited 
increases in banditry committed by defeated Chinese soldiers from Man-
churia, who began infiltrating the suburbs of Tianjin during 1932. The 
number and nature of anti-Japanese activities in and around Tianjin were 
also on the rise, and numerous assassination plots involving both Korean 
and Chinese suspects were uncovered by the consular police throughout 
1932–1933. A potentially more serious threat, by 1934 Tianjin consular 
police had also come to believe that Kim Wõn-bong and his infamous Üi-
yõldan, which had terrorized Shanghai and other Chinese cities with 
waves of bombings and assassinations during the 1920s, were beginning 
to regroup in Tianjin in 1934.22 As early as March 1936, then, the Tianjin 
consulate had begun to request that its police forces be expanded to deal 
with volatile local conditions. In response, sixty-five Gaimushô police of-
ficers from the Manzhouguo Embassy police were transferred to Tianjin 
in August to bolster the consular police presence there.23
Ultimately, in September 1936, the Gaimushô approved funding for 
the establishment of a new North China keisatsubu at the Tianjin consul-
ate-general, following the pattern set by the Shanghai office in 1932.24 
The general threat of international communism in northeast Asia was 
an overarching concern, but reports also cited increasing disorder being 
stirred up by “gangs of adventurers” (rônin gun) from both Manzhouguo 
and even the home islands. In short, surveillance of “rebellious” (futei) 
elements of all kinds needed to be stepped up. As a part of that process, 
the necessity of providing support to local pro-Japanese ruling associa-
tions was also cited as a reason for expanding consular police numbers 
and activities in and around Tianjin.25 Another significant motivating 
factor surely was that the army’s Tianjin garrison, too, had ambitious 
plans for strengthening its position in 1936, something that civilian 
leadership in Tokyo surely hoped to avoid. In this light, “Tokyo’s attempt 
in expanding the consular police force in North China at this time was 
obviously a move towards restraining the newly reinforced Tientsin Gar-
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rison.”26 The two sides were engaged in a race of sorts to see which insti-
tution could first establish its jurisdictional authority in provincial 
localities within this volatile climate.
A report produced by the new police headquarters itself in December 
1936 also provides numerous significant details concerning the reasons 
behind creating the new facility and the problems associated with carry-
ing out the expansion. According to this report, the need for expanding 
consular police tokkô capabilities in North China had been clear enough 
since the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, but several factors con-
tinued to complicate the situation even after the Tanggu Truce of May 
1933. Not only was the political scene in North China unstable and unpre-
dictable, there had also been a rapid increase in the Japanese civilian pop-
ulation in the region since late 1931. Beyond that, a new vitality in the 
Chinese Red Army, the report pointed out, coupled with the fact that pup-
pet regimes amenable to Japanese interests in North China were not yet 
sufficiently strong or stable to be relied upon by the Japanese authorities, 
made for a doubly dangerous environment.27 It was in the light of all these 
concerns that tokkô police operations had been boosted in March 1936 by 
way of personnel increases drawn from metropolitan police in Tokyo and 
transfers from the Manzhouguo Embassy in Xinjing. In September 1936, 
the new keisatsubu officially opened and various upgrades to existing sub-
stations also carried out, with the three main offices under Tianjin juris-
diction being Shanhaiguan, Beijing, and Zhangjiakou.28 
The expansion was not accomplished without some difficulty, how-
ever, as opposition from the Chinese continued to be a serious concern. 
The official report includes, for example, a translation from a local Chi-
nese newspaper editorial in Tianjin describing operations of Japanese 
police on Chinese soil (beyond mutually recognized settlement areas) 
as violations of national sovereignty, a claim with a very long history, of 
course. Furthermore, various phases of incomplete preparations in Jap-
anese police facilities and the as yet unfulfilled pacification of Inner 
Mongolia both slowed things down, according to this report. Problems 
were not only to be found in the field, however, as fiscal disputes also 
erupted between the relevant bureaucracies back home in Tokyo. From 
the Gaimushô perspective, the need for expansion was clear, but people 
like Aiba Kiyoshi (by this time working in the Asia Bureau) and others 
had to fight it out with the Finance Ministry to secure budget funds.29 
What these budget fights also reflect, Lincoln Li suggests, is that the 
consular police network based in Tianjin hoped to take advantage of 
the strength of the North China Army by “wresting the political func-
tions from it.” This goal was blocked, however, both by the Foreign Min-
istry’s failure to secure budgetary resources for it and by the army’s 
expansion of its own political branch, the Special Service.30
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Perhaps the most revealing security-related concept to emerge from 
the expansion process in Tianjin was expressed by the new police chief 
at the Tianjin office in late 1936, Ôe Hikaru. In his inaugural address to 
the Tianjin staff, Ôe elaborated upon what he termed shisô gaikô (thought 
diplomacy), by which he meant diplomatic machinery devoted to achiev-
ing an all-important ideological victory. Ôe claimed that “thought diplo-
macy” had to be recognized as a vitally crucial pillar of Japan’s overall 
continental policy, and this was especially true regarding affairs in 
China. Japanese authorities needed to revamp their methods of combat-
ing communism, Ôe argued, by putting greater focus on winning the 
hearts and minds of ordinary people, and the new keisatsubu provided 
the foundation for that mission.31 Such an approach, of course, was not 
unique to the Foreign Ministry, but rather reflected a widespread atti-
tude among civilian Japanese agencies involved in China affairs.32
In another speech a few days later, Ôe expanded on this vision, 
speaking at great length about relations between new staff and preexist-
ing officers. The new arrivals, most of whom had been freshly trans-
ferred from Manzhouguo, Ôe urged not to assume that the knowledge 
gained through their experience there could be directly applied to their 
duties in North China. Circumstances in Manchuria were quite differ-
ent, Ôe explained, and he then encouraged the North China police vet-
erans to help new arrivals learn about local conditions as quickly as 
possible.33 Ôe had seen firsthand the militarization of Japanese control 
in Manchuria and was apparently convinced that a different course 
should be followed in China. It was not the legitimacy of Japanese au-
thority there that he questioned, but rather the dubious long-term effi-
cacy of relying solely on brute force to pacify the region.
There is one additional dimension to consular police activity in 
North China during the mid-1930s that merits at least brief attention 
here. Despite their obsession with political security in occupied China, 
the consular police were also engaged in the facilitation of Japanese 
economic interests in the Beijing-Tianjin region. This itself is, of course, 
nothing new, as the consular police had played a part in advancing the 
commercial interests of Japanese resident communities since the 1880s 
in Korea. The commerce they protected in North China, however, was 
described by contemporary observer Itô Takeo in this way: “Bands of 
armed ships and trucks of adventuristic merchants, ignoring customs 
checkpoints of the Nationalist government, unloaded in China large 
quantities of such items as narcotics, cotton thread, and cloth.”34 In 
other words, it is quite clear that Japanese Foreign Ministry police facili-
tated an immense smuggling network during the mid-1930s. Another 
commentator had this to say about the illegal trade: “The goods left 
Dairen in fleets of 10 to 30 motor vessels, they sailed across the Gulf of 
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Peichihli [Beizhili], which had been cleared of preventative vessels by 
the Japanese Navy, and were landed on the sandy beaches of East Hopei 
[Hebei] with the passive assent or active assistance of the Japanese con-
sular police.”35 The actual trade in smuggled goods such as silk and cot-
ton cloth, sugar, and gasoline was carried out in most cases by resident 
Korean and Japanese civilians, and their aim was to avoid Chinese cus-
toms duties, generating profits for Japanese manufacturers. In the 
course of this illegal trade, Chinese customs officials were often abused 
and their offices damaged by Korean and Japanese smugglers while the 
Japanese consular police did nothing to stop it. In fact, at the peak of 
the smuggling era during the early summer of 1936, the consular police 
often demanded that Chinese officials return contraband they had 
rightfully seized. By July 1936, official consular protection of smugglers 
was withdrawn, but the trade nonetheless continued.36
The Japanese consular police in China just before the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 have been described as “bands of armed 
Japanese scattered inside Chinese territory, performing espionage work, 
organizing Japanese residents into volunteer corps, and putting political 
pressure on local authorities to allow the advance of Japanese interests.”37 
Undoubtedly, Gaimushô police activity during the mid-1930s does indeed 
reveal how “the Japanese Foreign Ministry thus saw to it that direct action 
in China was no longer the monopoly of the military overseas.”38 But this 
Foreign Ministry activism on the continent was certainly not something 
new to the post-1931 era of Japanese expansionism. The basic tasks of both 
protecting and advancing Japanese state and citizen interests while simul-
taneously controlling the limits of acceptable political discourse had their 
roots in earlier decades. This continuity in forms of “direct action” by the 
consular police since at least 1925, if not earlier, should place events after 
1937 in a much different light. But, before turning to that matter, the final 
act in the story of the consular police in Manchuria must be told.
Foreign Ministry Police in Manzhuoguo
By early 1933, the most persistent elements of resistance to the new order 
in Manchuria had been more or less crushed, at least in some part 
through the cooperation of provincial Gaimushô police forces and the 
Kwantung Army. As the army sought to consolidate both its strategic 
position and its authority over all Japanese continental policy, a desire to 
unify the numerous police institutions at work in Manchuria also began 
to take shape.39 The preeminent position of the consular police in this 
process of integration was significant because it suggests that Gaimushô 
police in the field and the Kwantung Army were not necessarily driven 
apart by the colonial conquest of Manchuria in 1931–1932. Rather, in 
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many ways that turn of events brought them closer together in terms of 
overall goals, strategy, and even tactics.
As of March 1933, there were still three main police institutions func-
tioning within the territory of Manzhouguo: police forces of the Kwantung 
Government-General, the army’s own kenpeitai or military police, and the 
Gaimushô’s consular police.40 Significantly, the most important rivalry to 
first take shape was not between army police and Foreign Ministry police, 
but rather between Kwantung government police and Manchurian con-
sular police. Tension between these two forces was nothing new; since its 
inception in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, the Kantô-chô had been 
a rival to Foreign Ministry authority in Manchuria on both police and other 
matters of local jurisdiction. A key question therefore is how did these three 
police institutions become one unified security network by 1937?41
In terms of overall numbers, by March 1933 there were 1,390 Gai-
mushô police in all three regions of Manzhouguo (North, South, and 
Jiandao). Among the subsections of a Xinjing embassy report describing 
consular police operations were the following categories: protection of 
resident Japanese, protection of Korean farmers, support of army opera-
tions, battles with bandits, protection of new railroad construction sites, 
control of the Communist movement, investigation of political plots and 
foreigners, cooperating with the Manzhouguo police apparatus, and as-
sisting with research on local Japanese business and industry.42 Clearly, 
Gaimushô police still had a far-reaching presence in Manchuria that 
could serve army interests well. The plan for unifying police power 
within Manzhouguo that ultimately took shape thus placed Gaimushô 
police on a higher level than their Kwantung regime counterparts. In 
fact, the plan was to incorporate all Kantô-chô police into the consular 
police system, which itself would then be subordinate to the Kwantung 
Army and its military police, a plan the Kantô-chô was sure to resist 
fiercely.43 To facilitate the construction of a unified command and con-
trol network over all Japanese police in Manchuria, the Gaimushô and 
the army agreed on the establishment of a Manchuria Embassy Police 
Bureau in Xinjing in the autumn of 1933.44 The new office was respon-
sible for coordinating all consular police activity in Manchuria, and its 
top official posts were filled by Kenpeitai officers.45 Both the Kantô-chô 
and the Colonial Ministry (Takumushô) opposed the budget for setting 
up this new bureau, but their resistance had little practical effect.46 
Nonetheless, the protests launched by Kwantung government police 
leaders during these discussions reveal the logic behind the decision to 
incorporate those forces into the Gaimushô police system. In an effort 
to establish public peace and gain recognition of Manzhouguo as a le-
gitimate state, the army needed to provide for the appearance of genu-
ine independence and sovereignty. The Kantô-chô was, of course, a 
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formal colonial institution set up to administer the Kwantung Leased 
Territory. If its police forces were allowed to continue operating, the fic-
tion of Manzhouguo’s independence would be jeopardized. By subsum-
ing Kantô-chô police units into the Gaimushô police system, the level of 
manpower could be maintained under cover of the entirely legal frame-
work of extraterritoriality that assured the legitimacy of Foreign Minis-
try police.47 It was an ingenious logic indeed. Furthermore, this reasoning 
clearly indicates the close affinity between Kwantung Army goals and 
the long-standing legacy of consular police activities in Manchuria. Sig-
nificantly, it also reflects a deliberate manipulation of consular “legiti-
macy” previously put to use on the Korean peninsula as early as 1905.
Once the new police bureau was up and running in Xinjing, the po-
lice department (keisatsubu) at Harbin, which had been established not 
even two years earlier, became obsolete and was thus closed on January 1, 
1934. Several weeks later, all police personnel under the command of the 
Kantô-chô were officially placed under the jurisdiction of the Manchu-
rian Embassy police bureau. In a move meant to appease high-level Kwan-
tung government leaders who remained opposed to the reorganization, 
the Kantô-chô police bureau chief was appointed as a “police adviser” 
(keimu komon) in the embassy.48 While the Harbin office was closed, the 
police department in Jiandao remained in operation. The Jiandao police 
office, of course, was the oldest, and throughout the 1920s the largest, 
Gaimushô police facility in all of northeast Asia. Even within Manzhou-
guo, the Jiandao area still posed a special problem, so the extra police 
presence there was deemed necessary.
Gaimushô police in Manzhouguo had numerous other concerns in 
addition to the basic tasks of securing the public peace and integrating 
themselves into the army-dominated administrative framework of state. 
Significantly, Chinese Communists and Korean resistance fighters were 
not the only dangerous elements that became targets of consular police 
operations in Manzhouguo. Gaimushô police were also committed to 
combating the problem of controlling Japanese civilians engaged in un-
lawful (furyô) activities, which could include behavior such as inciting 
political subversion; violence against “Manchurians”; business fraud; 
smuggling contraband (weapons, opium, and the like); defaulting on 
debts; and subverting national policy and Japanese–Manchurian friend-
ship and goodwill.49 Even so, perhaps still highest among consular pri-
orities were the problems related to the control of international 
socialism.50 At a meeting of thought police leadership convened in April 
1935, for example, Embassy Police Bureau Chief Iwasa spoke in his open-
ing remarks of the responsibility that consular police officers carried in 
promoting correct ideologies. To do this effectively, Iwasa exhorted his 
officers to study and understand sociology and politics, and he further-
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more stressed the importance of close cooperation between Gaimushô 
police in Manzhouguo and the army’s military police.51 
Indeed, the relationship between Gaimushô police within Man-
zhouguo and the Kwantung Army seems to have been more productive 
than in other regions of occupied China. Statistics culled from the re-
cords of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau are particularly illustrative 
of the close cooperation between the Kwantung Army and the Jiandao 
consular police. During the nearly six-year period between the estab-
lishment of Manzhouguo in March 1932 and the abolition of extrater-
ritoriality in December 1937, roughly 1,700 joint expeditions between 
the two forces were carried out against guerrilla resistance and insur-
gency, involving just over ten thousand men. The peak of activity came 
in 1933 when there were 586 missions executed by nearly four thousand 
officers and soldiers.52 Another example of their close links were the 
activities of “public security enforcement squads” (chian kôsaku han/chian 
shukusei han). At the request of army officials, these teams of Manchu-
rian consular police would arrive on the scene after the army had com-
pleted the military pacification of a particular region and take up the 
tasks of local intelligence gathering and analysis, public relations with 
the community, and censorship.53 These public security activities, how-
ever, were not merely ad hoc responses to local conditions; there was a 
much larger process at work. In fact, the embassy police bureau had a 
complicated and long-range plan for the involvement of consular police 
units in the pacification of Manzhouguo from April 1936 until March 
1939.54 Gaimushô police most certainly saw a future for their institution 
in the construction of a “New Order in East Asia.”55 
The last significant conference of Gaimushô police in Manzhouguo 
convened in May 1937. By that time, preparations were well under way to 
abolish extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo. The privilege of extraterrito-
riality, of course, had served as the pretext for Japanese consular police 
legitimacy throughout northeast Asia since 1880.56 Once removed, the 
consular police would be illegal, and thus the tone of this meeting was 
both reflective concerning the long and distinguished history of the 
consular police in Manchuria, and forward-thinking on matters of the 
empire’s future.57 Finally, it was on December 1, 1937, that all Gaimushô 
police in Manchuria were absorbed into the police bureau of the Man-
zhouguo government.58 At that time, the total number of Japanese con-
sular police in Manchuria could be placed at roughly 1,900 men. 
If cooperation between the two sides was often quite successful, one 
must wonder why it was that Kwantung Army officials ultimately decided to 
abolish extraterritoriality. While the army clearly saw the utility of the con-
sular police in fabricating an illusion of sovereignty in Manzhouguo, at-
tempts by the Foreign Ministry to strengthen its police forces in North 
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China in 1936 had begun to change that view. Indeed, as Lincoln Li has 
noted, “The rapid buildup of the consular police alarmed the Kwantung 
Army and it took steps to forestall any similar development in Manchu-
ria.”59 The abolition of extraterritoriality in 1937, then, in Li’s view was “a 
measure designed not to strengthen the hands of the puppet government 
there, but to deprive the Foreign Ministry of a potential instrument in Man-
churia.”60 Ironically, however, while the abolition of extraterritoriality in 
Manzhouguo in 1937 did indeed weaken the Foreign Ministry position 
there, it also contributed to strengthening consular police forces in North 
China, since former Manchurian officers could be transferred to Tianjin.61
Contrary to the notion that the creation of Manzhouguo was a deci-
sive blow to the position of the Gaimushô in shaping Japan’s Manchuria 
policy, the story of the consular police suggests a far more complicated 
process. The security interests of Gaimushô police in Manchuria melded 
quite smoothly with those of the Kwantung Army at first. The army gave 
the consular police the strength they had never before possessed, and 
the consular police gave the army the cover of legal legitimacy that they 
desperately needed. Put simply, policemen and soldiers have much more 
in common than do policemen and diplomats. In spite or perhaps be-
cause of that fact, however, both sides consistently jockeyed for posi-
tion—sometimes over jurisdictional turf and at other times over distinct 
policy directions—within the official bureaucracy of Japanese expan-
sionism. Though the Gaimushô lost that struggle in Manzhouguo, the 
contest continued after 1937 within the borders of occupied China.
 Wartime Growth in Occupied China
The “China Incident” of July 1937 had an immediate impact on consular 
police operations in North China. Within one week of the clash between 
Chinese and Japanese soldiers near the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Bei-
jing, Tianjin consular police chief Ôe instructed the forces under his com-
mand on how to respond to the new conditions. He began by pointing out 
what he saw as the two broadest and most immediate priorities: protection 
of resident Japanese communities and close cooperation with the army to 
carry out the “sacred work” of “civilizing East Asia” (Tô-A kaimei no seigyô). 
He then went on to outline several more specific measures to be taken by 
the Tianjin consular police force, which included expanding intelligence-
gathering networks and transmitting fresh information to the military 
without delay, disrupting enemy intelligence networks, disseminating pro-
paganda against the CCP and the Nanjing government, keeping a close 
watch on “bad elements” (furyô bunshi) within the Japanese resident com-
munity, and controlling rumor mongering among the people in order to 
maintain public order.62 In this one speech Chief Ôe conveniently sum-
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marized all of the characteristic activities of the consular police during 
the wartime era. A more detailed exploration of those activities, however, 
must follow a brief survey of the physical expansion of Foreign Ministry 
police facilities throughout occupied China.
One of the most illuminating documents related to the expansion 
of Gaimushô police facilities in North China during the early stages of 
the Sino-Japanese War was produced by the Tianjin police department 
in December 1937. The introduction explained that Gaimushô police 
forces in North China were too shorthanded to deal adequately with the 
rapid pace of change in local conditions after July 1937. Of special im-
portance among those changes were an influx of unlawful (furyô) Japa-
nese and the increasing radicalization of Chinese resistance forces. A 
greater Gaimushô police presence would thus facilitate the control of 
these troublesome newcomers to the local Japanese community as well 
as the intensification of political surveillance concerning Chinese Com-
munists.63 Principally, the dramatic increase in the overall local Japa-
nese civilian population seems to have been at the heart of Gaimushô 
desires to bolster its local police forces. Among many concerns, the ille-
gal drug trade was a high police priority, with the Japanese community 
of Tianjin being a locale of special concern. In June 1937, for example, 
the Tianjin consular police under the direction of Consul Horiuchi 
Tateki executed a large-scale raid of illicit narcotic dealers in the city, 
netting over two dozen suspects. To the embarrassment of consular au-
thorities, however, the arrests and interrogations also implicated a num-
ber of officers on the Tianjin police force itself.64
By November 1937, discussions were under way regarding the ex-
pansion of Gaimushô police operations in North China, centered at that 
time in the police department of Tianjin Consulate-General. In Febru-
ary 1938, twenty-two new police officers arrived in Tianjin from Gai-
mushô headquarters in Tokyo, followed by an additional one hundred 
men in March, and these increases were supplemented by the transfer of 
one hundred police officers from the colonial Korea police bureau in 
March and eight more from a special security force in Tianjin. In total, 
Gaimushô police numbers in the greater Tianjin area thus increased by 
329 officers, and with these increases came the official closing of the 
keisatsubu in Tianjin in favor of a new office, the North China keimubu 
(department of police affairs).65 
Opened in early June 1938, the North China Department of Police 
Affairs supervised thirty-five facilities in all under its jurisdiction total-
ing some 773 officers, but that official total does not include the hun-
dreds of Chinese assistant patrolmen who also participated in the 
execution of Gaimushô police operations. At the time the keimubu was 
established, these nearly eight hundred Gaimushô police “protected” a 
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civilian population of 92,000 Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese in the 
North China jurisdiction of the Tianjin police headquarters.66 The of-
fice continued to expand throughout the following year, with the num-
ber of consular police employed by the North China Department of 
Police Affairs reaching 957 by December 1938.67 Those numbers grew to 
1,032 officers stationed in sixty-three facilities by the end of 1939, and 
then 1,267 men in sixty-seven stations by the end of 1940.68
Less than one year after operations began at the North China 
keimubu in Tianjin, Gaimushô police officials in Shanghai initiated dis-
cussions regarding the establishment of a similar department in central 
China.69 In the course of a two-day conference at the Astor House Hotel 
in Shanghai in mid-June 1939, a plan finally emerged for a Central 
China Department of Police Affairs. While structurally modeled largely 
upon the Tianjin bureau, which was later moved to Peking, the Shang-
hai office had a significantly smaller initial outlay of personnel, includ-
ing only thirty-four men.70 The regular consular police department in 
Shanghai was already quite large by the late 1930s, however, with several 
hundred Japanese officers and numerous additional Chinese assistants, 
so the overall numbers were not far behind those in Tianjin.
An official Foreign Ministry press release on September 30, 1939, out-
lined in more detail the motivation for establishing the new police bureau 
in Shanghai. After noting the glorious accomplishments of the Imperial 
Army in fighting bravely since 1937, the statement added that Japan’s con-
sular police had played an integral part in fostering local Sino-Japanese 
cooperation since the outbreak of war. Although numerous new police 
substations had been established in a piecemeal way to deal with immedi-
ate conditions since 1937, now a central office of command and control 
was deemed necessary, and this was the primary reason behind opening 
the Central China Department of Police Affairs on October 1.71 In a more 
dramatic statement, the new department chief, in a speech to mark the 
opening of the new office, explained that the history of the Foreign Minis-
try police in northeast Asia was at the dawn of a new age, and the duties of 
the consular police were now more important than ever before. Together 
with the Imperial Army and Japan’s other administrative institutions on 
the continent, Gaimushô police would also take part in the grand project 
of “constructing the New Order in East Asia.”72 
As of October 1939, there were a total of 557 Japanese consular po-
lice officers under the jurisdiction of the Central China Department of 
Police Affairs, and these numbers continued to climb. That number was 
590 by the end of 1939, and it reached 730 in 1940, with those officers 
distributed throughout a network of twenty-six stations, substations, and 
field offices.73 The new police bureau in Shanghai, however, aimed to 
increase the quality not just the quantity of its personnel to execute their 
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mission more effectively, so police officers received extensive training 
there. A note on the seminars provided during a training session for 
twenty-five new recruits in February 1940 reveals the qualifications most 
valued in a consular police officer. During a total of fifty-two hours of 
instruction, discussion topics included thirteen hours of Chinese lan-
guage; thirteen hours of training in martial arts and weapons; two hours 
on current affairs in China; two hours on international law; three hours 
on consular jurisdiction regulations; three hours on “higher police” du-
ties; four hours on consular police law; and three hours on public secu-
rity management.74 Additional training sessions were provided for the 
all-important business of political intelligence, as a seminar in April 
1940 included lectures by senior officers on such topics as “Police Offi-
cers under Today’s Conditions”; “The Meaning of the Sino-Japanese 
War in the Context of Contemporary International Affairs”; “The Con-
cept of Special Higher Police Work”; “Observing and Controlling Social 
and Intellectual Movements”; “Observing and Controlling Right-Wing 
Movements”; “Total War and the Duty of the Police Officer”; “Military 
Intelligence and Security Methods”; “Points on Intelligence Gathering 
regarding China”; and “Observing and Controlling Foreigners.”75
What were the long-term aims of this new police bureau? At a March 
1941 conference of consular tokkô section chiefs, the Shanghai police bu-
reau chief explained that when the military operations ended, the war it-
self was not over. Echoing the comments of Ôe Hikaru in 1936, he said 
that the real fight continued in the realms of economy and thought, and 
in these struggles Gaimushô police would play a critical role. Working day 
and night to gather intelligence and keep watch over suspicious ideologi-
cal movements, according to this police chief, was the core of consular 
police duty.76 At the same meeting, a representative of the Foreign Minis-
try’s Asia Bureau also talked at great length on the organization, ideology, 
and activities of the Chinese Communist Party, touching on matters of 
party structure, relations with the Comintern, political goals of the CCP, 
and even the role of “disloyal” Japanese (futei Hôjin) in the war of resis-
tance against Japan.77 A researcher from the Asia Development Board 
(Kô-A in) then tackled the complex issues linked to what he termed 
“thought problems” (shisô mondai).78 In fact, he took a truly global ap-
proach to the topic, viewing it in terms of world historical development. 
Human civilization was characterized, he argued, by three momentous 
intellectual revolutions. The rise of Christianity had been the first, and 
the second took place during the Renaissance; global society was now in 
the midst of the third revolution: the emergence of socialism and commu-
nism. The battle being waged by the consular police against this ideologi-
cal enemy thus took on enormous significance, in his view, a significance 
that extended well beyond the immediate objective of pacifying occupied 
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China. Those who stood in the way of that mission quickly found them-
selves under the watchful eye of both newly enhanced Foreign Ministry 
police bureaus.
Targets of Wartime Surveillance
To be sure, Japanese consular police in North China were still very much 
engaged in the surveillance of resident Koreans during the war. A 1939 
report from the North China consular police bureau in Beijing provided 
a list of over one hundred suspected Korean “subversives” targeted for 
arrest, which included the suspects’ names, last known addresses, occu-
pational information, and details of their political activities.79 The list 
was also prefaced by a short description of the three top concerns of 
consular police in Beijing. First, they were deeply alarmed at the rapid 
increase in the Korean resident population after 1937, which had grown 
at a rate even greater than the increase in Japanese residents. The sec-
ond concern pointed out that recent Korean social movements and Chi-
nese resistance movements were becoming more likely to join forces in 
all out anti-Japanese war. The final point then suggested that such a war 
was already under way in the homeland (naichi), Korea, and Manchuria, 
Police staff from a sub-station of Tianjin Consulate-General police force, early 1940s. 
(Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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as evidence of which the author specifically cited a bombing incident in 
Osaka that had been linked to “terror” groups on the continent.80 
Significantly, however, the consular police in North China were also 
deeply involved in the political surveillance of resident Japanese. One de-
partment report from Tianjin described the social pressures facing local 
Japanese communities caused by the recent influx of new residents from 
Manchuria and colonial Korea. Interaction and tension between new and 
old residents brought about factionalism within the community and a gen-
eral mood of disorder and chaos, and such conflict created an environ-
ment ripe for the agitation of both left-wing and right-wing extremists, as 
well as the flourishing of secret societies among residents.81 Interestingly, 
the policing of resident Japanese also seems to have included policing the 
police themselves. At a meeting of North China police chiefs, Tianjin sec-
tion chief Ôe made explicit mention of recent corruption scandals among 
consular police officers, and he urged his colleagues to work diligently to 
purge the consular police of illicit activities.82 This problem was appar-
ently a difficult one to solve, however, since almost one year later the Bei-
jing embassy police chief was still discussing at some length the matter of 
“bad and dishonest police officers (furyô fusei keisatsukan).”83
Turning more specifically to the matter of “dangerous thought” 
within the Japanese resident community, an especially revealing docu-
ment is a detailed chart illustrating the networks of right-wing and left-
wing associations under surveillance in North China produced by the 
Beijing Embassy Police Bureau in May 1939.84 The chart identified doz-
ens of socialist groups and ultranationalist societies, and their border-
crossing affiliations that connected homeland cities like Tokyo, Osaka, 
and Niigata to northern Chinese cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Qingdao. By depicting these relationships, the chart is a dramatic re-
minder of two critically important issues. First, in the eyes of the impe-
rial Japanese state bureaucracy, right-wing groups were often just as 
great a security concern by the late 1930s as those of the left. Second, 
political police work was truly borderless, as the threats to the kokutai 
were ideological as much as they were national.
Similar to the lists of suspicious Koreans drawn up by the Beijing em-
bassy police staff, the Central China Police Bureau in Shanghai produced 
a report of its own in October 1939. However, theirs was not a list of “recal-
citrant Koreans”; these lists contained the names of Japanese citizens.85 
While not as detailed as the other lists of Korean suspects, the informa-
tion provided is nonetheless sufficient to draw some preliminary conclu-
sions. First of all, the wide variety of occupations identified among the 
suspects suggests that few residents could escape the watchful police eye. 
People on the list included several journalists, a cosmetic wholesaler, 
 import/export brokers, a dance-hall manager, bankers, landlords, mer-
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chants, an auto mechanic, a theater owner, and a handful of local research 
institute staffers. It is also worth noting that most of those on the list were 
recent arrivals to the Shanghai area, corroborating statements in other 
sources about general suspicion surrounding the motives of new Japanese 
residents after 1937. Perhaps most revealing, however, is the large number 
of military intelligence operatives on the various lists. Perhaps these mili-
tary intelligence and local propaganda agents had grown too sympathetic 
with the Chinese and Korean social movements they were assigned to in-
filtrate, and thereby became suspects of their own thought police. Of 
course, the opposite, that these were soldiers connected to right-wing ex-
tremism, could also have been the case.
In any event, it is clear that the consular police in central China were 
also deeply concerned about the troublesome behavior of “unlawful Japa-
nese” (furyô Hôjin).86 As was true in North China, the category of unlawful 
Japanese could include the police themselves, as the case of a Shanghai 
resident, Russian native and British subject Elizaveta Mihailovna Newton, 
suggests. Ms. Newton was the proprietor of the “De Luxe Tea Room,” and 
on June 1, 1939, two Japanese consular police officers removed from her 
shop two illegal slot machines. According to Ms. Newton, this seizure 
came on the heels of a visit by two Japanese (one in plain clothes, one in 
uniform) a week earlier, at which time the two men, both probably con-
sular police officers, said if she paid them a hundred dollars per week, 
they would allow her to run Bingo games and operate slot machines in her 
café. Following her complaints about the seizure of her property, a lone 
Japanese man in plain clothes came to her café on June 2 and told her to 
keep her mouth shut or the store would be closed and she might be hurt 
herself.87 One cannot help but wonder how common this sort of gangster-
style extortion was among local consular police officers.88
Most important, however, the surveillance of so-called furyô Japa-
nese in China is inseparable from how Japanese authorities viewed the 
impact of the new war on political movements back on the home islands. 
As a Home Ministry police official explained in 1938, for those on the 
political left, the war was further evidence of the militaristic aggression 
of the imperial state, and opposing the war, or even working toward a 
Japanese defeat, would assist in the social revolution they sought at 
home. For right-wing ultranationalist societies, too, the war represented 
an opportunity of sorts for the construction of a new society. In deliver-
ing a final decisive blow against the expansion of communism, which is 
how such groups understood the meaning of the war, the imperial state 
could be revitalized in an even stronger embodiment of the kokutai. 
State security officials, of course, sought to curb both of these extremes.89 
Since both groups were active in the cities of wartime China, the respon-
sibility for their surveillance and suppression fell on the local consular 
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police because they were vital extensions of the home government’s 
“thought police” apparatus.
Still, while the failed military coup of February 26, 1936, in Tokyo had 
shown that the extreme right had to be kept on a leash, it was quite natu-
rally those on the political left who bore the brunt of greater police pres-
sure during the war. The right wing after all supported the state’s war 
effort, whereas the left vehemently opposed it. Popular antiwar sentiments 
during the final stages of the Pacific War have been examined insightfully 
by John Dower, but such feelings were made public through graffiti and 
leaflets within months of the war’s outbreak in 1937.90 In taking note of 
stock such socialist phrases from “Overthrow the bourgeois government” 
and “Land to the farmers” to more explicitly anticolonial and China-
friendly ideas such as “Absolutely oppose imperialist war for the sake of 
capitalists!” metropolitan police recognized the ideological dissent that 
threatened to undermine public support for the war effort.91
An especially dramatic example of the clear connection between left-
ist opposition to the war and, by extension, the Japanese imperial state can 
be found in the activities and writings of Hasegawa Teru, who was an active 
member of the Japanese People’s Anti-War League (Nihonjinmin hansen 
dômei) in China after 1937.92 In a letter to her comrades back in Tokyo 
penned shortly after the war broke out, Hasegawa passionately argued that 
in China’s victory, and Japan’s defeat, one had to see a more hopeful future 
of all of Asia. She wore the label of “traitor” as a badge of courage and in-
stead lamented her cultural connections to a society that “simply invades 
the lands of others, and calmly brings down hell upon a completely inno-
cent and powerless people.”93 One of Hasegawa’s best-known compatriots 
in the league, Kaji Wataru, echoed these sentiments when he expressed his 
agreement with the wartime logic of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao 
Zedong, who suggested that only after Japan was defeated in China and 
then more broadly defeated in the world war could genuine social revolu-
tion liberate the Japanese people themselves.94 That Japanese citizens such 
as Hasegawa and Kaji were advocating these views within occupied China 
itself is a matter of a crucial importance, as it illuminates their conviction 
that the front lines of military battle on the Asian continent were also the 
front lines of an ideological struggle on the home front. It also further re-
flects the problematic function of Sino-Japanese Pan-Asianism during the 
1930s, which could be employed alternatively as a sincere language of resis-
tance by Chinese nationalists and Japanese socialists, or as a cynical lan-
guage of conquest by the Japanese imperial army.95
Within this wartime environment, Foreign Ministry police obviously 
played a key role in facilitating the imperial state’s war on internal dissent-
ers, but neither is this something new to the post-1937 era. Sano Manabu 
had made similar arguments about China’s victory being crucial for the 
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future socialist revolution in Japan during his police interrogation in 
1929. And, of course, it was the Shanghai consular police who had played 
the critical role in facilitating Sano’s arrest. What must be recognized 
here, then, is the continuity in anticommunist Japanese police actions in 
China from the 1920s on, as well as the special function of Gaimushô po-
lice in that pattern. An equally important dimension of that continuity is 
the often conflict-prone relationship between the police forces of the army 
and the Foreign Ministry.
Wartime Relations with the Army
Gaimushô police adjusted to the new conditions created by the army’s in-
vasion of North China by crafting a role for themselves in the pacification 
of occupied territories. For example, the consular police under the juris-
diction of both Tianjin and Shanghai police departments participated in 
what was termed senbu operations. Defined at the time as “communicating 
the will of the government and pacifying the people,” senbu activity came 
to be an important element of consular police duty in China under war-
time conditions.96 Documents from the Shanghai police department in 
December 1937 give some sense of what those operations included. One 
objective was to facilitate the return of refugees displaced by battles be-
Police staff of the Shanghai Consulate-General, early 1940s. (Photo courtesy of the 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)
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tween the Japanese Army and Chinese resistance forces, while also posting 
army proclamations, orders, and restrictions in public and tearing down 
anti-Japanese posters, pamphlets, and graffiti. Senbu activity could also 
refer to such tasks as organizing civilian security militias, reopening hospi-
tals and other public health facilities, and disposing of corpses. Even mun-
dane duties like preparing nationality registers for returning refugees and 
conducting spot checks of local food-service businesses were often a part 
of senbu operations.97 Documents from Tianjin in late 1937 reveal similar 
patterns of consular police participation in senbu activities there.98
As Gaimushô police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu put it, the primary 
objective of battle was military victory, but the real fight did not end 
when the gun barrels cooled. After the smoke cleared, the hearts and 
minds of the local population had to be won over if the military victory 
was to hold its ground. The consular police mission through senbu op-
erations was thus also to convince local Chinese that Japanese Army en-
gagements were not designed to take over China, but to restore peace 
and stability to East Asia as a whole.99 To achieve this goal, Kajikawa ex-
plained, Foreign Ministry police would distribute free food and medi-
cine to local communities, facilitate the reopening of local schools and 
other public service institutions, and generally assist in restoring the 
everyday exchange of goods and services in the localities. According to 
Kajikawa, the first and perhaps most important requirement for partici-
pation in senbu work was that one possess strong Chinese-language 
skills. Long experience living in China, along with knowledge of local 
geography, culture, and customs, were also indispensable. Long-resident 
Japanese merchants as well employees of the Mantetsu and the Man-
zhouguo administrative network often met these requirements, but 
local Japanese consular police, who often prided themselves on their 
language training and detailed familiarity with local conditions, made 
especially effective senbu unit participants.100 These pacification pro-
grams, however, could be quite dangerous for any local Chinese that 
cooperated. Assassinations of “Japan-friendly” Chinese informers dur-
ing the autumn of 1937, for example, became quite common, and Gai-
mushô police in Shanghai, calling them “antiterrorist” operations, 
expended considerable time and resources in apprehending the killers 
and interrogating them for usable intelligence.101
While local consular police regularly participated in these “pacifica-
tion” programs alongside their military counterparts, conflict between 
the two groups was equally if not more common during the first few years 
of the war. Gaimushô police had to compete with their rivals in the mili-
tary for primacy in directing the policy that would facilitate both the prac-
tical and ideological goals of the military occupation. Even in the heat of 
full-scale war with China after 1937, Gaimushô police continued to de-
142 | Crossing Empire’s Edge
fend their position and authority in the face of the army’s militarization of 
Japan’s presence in North China. A consular report on the proposed ex-
pansion of police facilities in Tianjin argued, for example, that intensified 
Kenpeitai activity in the region created the appearance that Japan was try-
ing to turn North China into another Manzhouguo. By strengthening 
Gaimushô police forces instead, according to the Tianjin consular police, 
Japan’s ultimate security aims could be achieved eliciting the least possible 
Chinese resentment and resistance.102 The irony in this logic is difficult to 
miss. The legal illegitimacy of Foreign Ministry police in China had been 
the source of decades of Chinese hostility, and here with the Gaimushô 
officials trying to suggest that their police forces were now the least likely 
to provoke anger from the Chinese side; although, when one considers the 
ferocious brutality of the Japanese Army in China, perhaps the reasoning 
was not so unsound after all.
Regardless, the kusho mondai, as the “ jurisdictional dispute” was 
known at the time, went on to become a heated topic in meetings of se-
nior consular police officials in many parts of occupied China.103 At a 
police chief’s conference in Shanghai in January 1940, Shanghai chief 
Miura explained that the problem was really one of improving close co-
operation between the consular police and the army’s Kenpeitai, not 
merely bold attempts by the military police to take over consular police 
operations.104 Tianjin police chief Ueda then used the experience of his 
region to offer a suggestion for the Shanghai area, explaining that, in 
Tianjin, because of Gaimushô police protest, the Kenpeitai stopped 
making direct jurisdictional demands regarding tokkô affairs and in-
stead began making requests to the local consular police, which they 
complied with or refused of their own will.105 Despite Chief Ueda’s opti-
mism, however, jurisdictional rivalries with the military were “for the 
consular police, a serious problem,” as some sources even reveal discus-
sions between police chiefs regarding the proper role of Gaimushô se-
curity forces in the management of the army’s prostitution centers, 
euphemistically referred to as “comfort stations.”106 
Surely cooperation between the two groups was difficult because Gai-
mushô police were far outnumbered by military police, but the turf wars 
were also attributable to the fact that consular police leadership often ad-
vocated fundamentally different approaches to solving local security prob-
lems. At a 1940 meeting in Beijing, for example, Section Two police chief 
Mitsumura pressed for a broad strategy to replace conquest by brute mili-
tary force with a more comprehensive approach. His argument was that an 
expansion of the war on economic and ideological fronts would ultimately 
be more successful in bringing Japanese goals to fruition. But Mitsumura 
also believed that Gaimushô police needed to move beyond piecemeal re-
sponses to security crises and instead develop a more comprehensive and 
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thorough program of higher police work that could effectively address the 
serious threats posed by international communism.107 So, the goal of Mi-
tusmura’s vision was not that different from that of the army; he just envi-
sioned a different path toward reaching it. To some degree, of course, the 
tension between the two forces was also due simply to the raw personal re-
sentment felt by some local consular police toward the army’s military secu-
rity forces. Some officers were embittered at being reduced to handmaidens 
of the military. “If we are to be beard trimmers for those guys, I’ll quit the 
consular police,” quipped one officer. “The source of the security crisis in 
occupied areas is the poor methods of the Kenpeitai, and they are to be in 
charge?” exclaimed another.108 Many consular police officers no doubt be-
lieved that they were far more qualified than the military police to manage 
local security affairs efficiently and effectively. 
In an ironic twist, it would also seem that sometimes Japanese con-
sular police could count on more effective collaboration with foreign po-
lice in Shanghai than on the military police of their own Imperial Army. 
On March 15, 1939, for example, the municipal police aided in the arrest 
of three Chinese suspected of arms trafficking in support of Chinese guer-
rilla fighters. The suspects were first turned over to the Japanese consular 
police for three days, “to allow them to continue inquiries” (which likely 
meant torture), and then five additional days beyond that. Documents 
seized during the arrest were also provided to the consular police.109 Simi-
larly, on May 30, 1939, the Japanese consular police received an anony-
mous tip that nine “terrorists” were occupying two rooms at a Shanghai 
hotel to work out their plans for bombing attacks on several targets, in-
cluding the Kempeitai headquarters on the “Floating Restaurant” near 
the Bund. Assistance was provided by the municipal police, but the raid 
revealed nothing to suggest that the tipster’s letter was authentic.110
It was not always matters of political security that were at the center 
of these disputes, as numerous disputes between consular police in 
North China and the Imperial Army’s military police were also related 
to the “management” of the drug trade there. Control of illegal narcot-
ics had been a duty of Foreign Ministry police since their earliest days on 
the Korean peninsula. In wartime China, however, the illicit sale of 
opium, heroin, and morphine was a lucrative trade in which the Japa-
nese military was deeply involved, using the profits to fund its numerous 
local Chinese puppet political regimes within occupied territories. Army 
officials regularly gave pharmaceutical licenses to resident Japanese in-
volved in narcotics dealing in exchange for kickback payments and 
sometimes even kept for themselves narcotic evidence that was to be 
used in trials, no doubt with an eye to selling it later on.111 Consular po-
lice efforts to thwart the drug trade, then, were likely motivated both by 
their obligations to the local law-abiding Japanese community and by a 
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desire to throw a monkey wrench into the machinery of army domina-
tion in North China after 1937.
Postscript
Regrettably, the evolution of Gaimushô police after 1942 is difficult to 
trace.112 One can perhaps begin with the establishment of the Asia Devel-
opment Board in 1938, which was a key step in the process by which Gai-
mushô institutional autonomy was undermined by more militaristic 
bureaucracies at home. That process was completed in 1942 with the cre-
ation of the Greater East Asia Ministry, or Dai Tô-A shô, which replaced 
the numerous departments of diplomatic affairs with one centralized bu-
reau.113 Despite the change in nomenclature, however, the organization 
and activities of the consular police on the ground in China seem to have 
remained largely unaltered.114 At the time of the Greater East Asia Minis-
try’s founding, there were roughly two thousand consular police in China, 
and according to Gaimushô police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu, when the 
Foreign Ministry police became the Greater East Asia Ministry police, the 
everyday lives of those officers did not change at all. In fact, it meant little 
more to them, Kajikawa claims, than changing the titles on the police de-
partment stationery.115
The postwar recollections of a Shanghai consul named Nakagawa 
Yû illustrate well that continuity. Thinking back upon the summer of 
1942, Nakagawa reminisced:
This was after the Pacific War had begun, so things in Shanghai were 
already pretty bad. Every morning when I got to work, on my desk I’d 
find a report from the Shanghai consular police department about all 
the incidents that had occurred in the Shanghai area. In one day we’d 
have all sorts of problems, from dance-hall fights involving Japanese 
residents, terrorist elements from Chengde destroying a movie theater 
with bombs, to the movements of Communist party members from the 
homeland (naichi) who had infiltrated the area. The consular police 
were the important eyes, ears, and hands above the regular work of the 
consulate-general.116
Nakagawa’s description sounds remarkably familiar indeed. In fact, his 
observations could aptly portray consular police work in any part of occu-
pied China.
There are, however, at least a few important dimensions of consular 
police activity specific to the remaining years of the war after 1941. Num-
bers of personnel, for example, experienced another great increase linked 
to a rapid influx of new residents from the Japanese home islands. In terms 
 The Struggle for Security in Occupied China | 145
of police operations, it also seems clear that westerners in China, espe-
cially British and Americans, came to be viewed as subjects of “enemy 
countries,” making them more likely to fall under suspicion and surveil-
lance. Finally, some research suggests that consular police actually worked 
as guards in prison camps housing detained civilians of the Allied nations 
in Shanghai and other coastal cities.117 While surviving documentary evi-
dence is scarce, one source indicates that, upon Japan’s defeat in August 
1945, the Greater East Asia Ministry was disbanded and the Foreign Min-
istry reinstated as the primary office of Japanese diplomatic business. 
Consular police in China at that time numbered roughly 3,470 officers.118 
Furthermore, even in defeat it appears that these forces continued on with 
their duties of protecting Japanese civilians overseas by facilitating the re-
patriation of residents in China back to Japan.119
Conclusions
Although the final few years of Foreign Ministry police history may be 
hazy, the overall story of consular police evolution during the decade from 
the establishment of Manzhouguo and the Shanghai Incident of 1932 
until the end of the Second World War in 1945 makes the resiliency of 
three long-established patterns abundantly clear. First, the Foreign Minis-
try continued to use its consular police forces to protect the physical secu-
rity and advance the economic interests of the Japanese civilian community 
in China. Second, the consular police also continued to play a key role in 
crushing subversive political movements seen as threats to both imperial 
control and domestic stability. Third, the Gaimushô continued to employ 
its consular police resources as a means of competing with other Japanese 
governmental and military institutions in a proactive way over who would 
exert more influence on the course of Japan’s China policy. In particular, 
local Foreign Ministry police prerogatives on the ground in China and 
Manchuria were not necessarily undermined by a more aggressive and 
unilateral Japanese Army during the 1930s and early 1940s. On the con-
trary, the two forces had largely identical aims; they simply disagreed on 
how best to execute them.
A final reflection upon the matter of consular police ideology and 
“culture” can help to explain how and why this was the case. The official 
Foreign Ministry police song adopted in 1933, for example, is a mixture of 
themes and imagery familiar to anyone who has studied the rhetoric of 
Japanese imperialism. “We serve in Manchuria. . . . In an intense cold of 
34 degrees below zero,” it begins, and “Our countrymen are troubled by 
bandits such as. . . . The duty of protection is heavy.” What provided their 
inspiration in the face of such challenges? “Look up and see the flag of 
imperial might shine brilliantly,” the first stanza closes, and “protect the 
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first wave of our countrymen.” Later verses then continue: “In the universe 
of East Asia’s common culture and common race. . . . Our obligation is a 
mission of peace. . . . Look up and see the light of Amida’s purple clouds 
shine brilliantly. . . . Protect East Asia’s way to peace.”120 A second wartime 
song composed in 1939 offers even more clues to the character of what is 
obviously an increasingly militarized Foreign Ministry police corps. It be-
gins: “The ideals of the one hundred million of the Yamato race. . . . Will 
rise up and spread out . . . ,” and then continues: “Supporting strength in 
all eight corners of the world. . . . One must protect fellow countrymen. . . . 
One must rise to the duty of higher police work,” and finishes, like the 
1933 version, with a call for sacrifice: “Offer yourself to die as a martyr for 
justice. . . . Protect Asia’s way to peace.”121
Comparing these expressions to the ideological zealotry of the Japa-
nese Army during the 1930s confirms that police often went to extremes 
of violence and intimidation during the wartime era, because, “like the 
military, the police represented the imperial mandate, and they justi-
fied each action accordingly.”122 Gaimushô police certainly viewed their 
role in the suppression of radical political resistance as inspired by im-
perial prerogatives. Indeed, the police operations of the Japanese For-
eign Ministry in treaty port China and throughout Manchuria during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s solidly place that institution within the 
circle of responsibility for the violent conquest of China during the early 
1940s that was inspired by those prerogatives.
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Conclusion
Anyone who has spent time in East Asia during the summer 
months knows that it is a time of both oppressive heat and even more 
oppressive memories. Every August the citizens of China, Korea, and 
Japan are reminded of the fateful day in 1945 that signaled hard-fought 
victory for one society, long-desired freedom for another, and grim 
apocalyptic defeat for the third. Although the number of people with 
personal memories of the colonial and wartime eras grows ever smaller 
each summer, the power that public memories of violence and victimiza-
tion wield seems to grow ever stronger. As vehement Chinese and Ko-
rean protests over both Japanese visits to their war memorial at Yasukuni 
shrine and the content of Japanese public school textbooks reflect, for 
the people of East Asia today the meanings of this past are as passion-
ately and politically important as they have ever been.
In Japan, this problem of public memory is particularly complicated 
because of that society’s past as both an inarguably brutal colonizer of its 
Asian neighbors and as an undeniably pitiable victim of nuclear annihila-
tion. Whether an individual feels a stronger pull toward one identity or 
the other depends largely on how that person comes to terms in their own 
heart and mind with the matter of responsibility. The self-absolving victim 
places all blame on a devious cabal of right-wing fascists that enslaved 
common society using ultranationalist jingoism and authoritarian disci-
pline. The guilt-ridden colonizer sees complicity in every facet of the cul-
ture and politics of the society that pursued such selfish aims with such 
ruthless vigor. Of course, most people probably locate themselves at any 
one of a thousand points in between those two extremes. 
 The history of Japan’s Foreign Ministry police forces in northeast 
Asia can help us to negotiate these delicate problems of postwar mem-
ory and postcolonial politics by deepening our appreciation of the com-
plexity at work in Japanese foreign policy during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. However, this history also shows that the 
line between foreign and domestic policy itself was not always as clear as 
historians today commonly represent it. Indeed, this book has illumi-
nated how it was that activities of the Japanese consular police were able 
to transcend borders of geography, politics, nation, ideology, and com-
munity in Japan and throughout northeast Asia during this era. Thus, 
by way of conclusion, there are several themes through which this no-
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tion of crossing the boundaries between Japan and its colonial empire 
can be summarized.
First, a central contention of this book has been that the jurisdic-
tional boundaries both professional historians and popular historical 
consciousness commonly draw between institutional actors within the 
structure of the imperial Japanese state are often analytically problem-
atic. Of particular concern here is the boundary between the Japanese 
Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much scholarship still con-
tends that a friction existed between the army and the Foreign Ministry 
that derived from their inherently unilateral versus multilateral ideo-
logical, political, and strategic orientations. The activities of the con-
sular police reveal in striking ways the severe limitations embedded 
within this conceptual binary. At some level, of course, the Foreign Min-
istry did have a vested interest in promoting “internationalism” and 
peaceful coexistence between nations under the Washington System of 
the 1920s because this system is what provided the Gaimushô itself with 
its raison d’être. After all, if Japan was to pursue a unilateral course of 
action in East Asia with no regard for the position and policy of other 
powers, the Foreign Ministry would have no reason to exist. That being 
the case, the Foreign Ministry, in order to preserve its jurisdictional pre-
rogatives, often did “insist that it could not be transformed into a colo-
nial agency.”1 If what one means, however, by a “colonial agent” is a 
group or institution that facilitates the efficient execution of the regula-
tory powers of a strong, centralized authority over a weaker and rela-
tively disorganized polity, what the history of the consular police suggests 
is that the Foreign Ministry’s consular apparatus in Korea, China, and 
Manchuria constituted a colonial agency from its very inception.
Furthermore, for at least as long as a decade before the Kwantung 
Army launched its “unilateral” drive to conquer Manchuria in 1931, the 
consular police had been engaged in an often unilateral war of their own 
against Korean resistance fighters. When the army did finally take action 
to secure its military objectives, those moves were not always met with pro-
test, but sometimes actually with encouragement and cooperation from 
the local consular police. It was a broadly defined and mutually held fear 
of threats to the kokutai that crossed the border between civilian and mili-
tary prerogatives. This is especially important when reflecting on the topic 
of Japan’s surrender in August 1945. Academic and political debates over 
the motivations for Japanese surrender have raged for decades, and the 
body of scholarly literature on the topic is enormous. While its relative 
weight in influencing the final decision can be debated, one clearly signifi-
cant factor in the thinking of Emperor Hirohito and his circle of advisers 
was their fear of a social revolution in Japan that would destroy the em-
peror system itself. Indeed, recent studies have powerfully argued that in 
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making his “sacred decision” to accept the terms of the Potsdam Procla-
mation, Hirohito’s “primary concern was above all the preservation of the 
imperial house.”2 In short, what the ruling elite of Japan feared as much 
as, or perhaps even more than, nuclear annihilation was a popular upris-
ing against the imperial system
Prince Konoe Fumimaro, of course, made a similar argument in his 
February 1945 plea to the throne pressing for an immediate end to the 
war. While Konoe contended erroneously that leftists within the military 
had been scheming since 1931 to carry out “internal reform”3 and destroy 
the emperor system, the “interpretation that this was merely a calculated 
evocation of the apocalypse . . . best relegated to history’s curiosity shop, 
must be weighed against a number of considerations.”4 The history of the 
Japanese consular police is one such consideration, because it significantly 
substantiates the notion that many within the imperial state bureaucracy 
understood domestic social and political stability to be inextricably con-
nected to colonial security. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 especially, it became 
clear that the struggle against Chinese and Korean communist national-
ism on the front lines of battle was inseparable from the fight to crush 
leftist social movements in the homeland. In this light, the notion that the 
Japanese decision to accept defeat by the Allied Powers was in many ways a 
matter of domestic policy begins to appear more reasonable. 
A related theme concerns the popular conception among historians 
of Japanese colonialism that the empire in northeast Asia was clearly 
divided into formal and informal spheres. Orthodox narratives describe 
the early 1920s as the end of formal empire building in the wake of the 
First World War, with the decade to follow taking shape as an era of 
Japanese participation in the multilateral informal imperialism of the 
treaty port system. The events of September 1931 then come to stand 
out as a “shift in direction to a new military imperialism” and a new era 
of formal empire building.5 This boundary between formal and infor-
mal empire is in many ways an analytical construct manufactured anach-
ronistically by historians, and furthermore it is a conceptual framework 
derived largely from the British colonial experience.
For both of these reasons, the formal-informal paradigm is often an 
inadequate and simplistic formula for understanding the Japanese ex-
perience in northeast Asia. The history of the consular police demon-
strates especially well why that is so. They were, in everything but name, 
colonial police that operated beyond the geographical confines of the 
formal colonies. More so, the consular police also illustrate that the 
1920s cannot simply be described as a decade of multilateral economic 
exploitation in the treaty ports without colonial expansion. To be sure, 
Japan did not acquire any new territories during this decade, but when 
viewed in terms of state-led efforts to police subversive thought and 
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thereby protect “national interests,” these years can nonetheless be seen 
as an era of continuity between the two recognized periods of formal 
colonial conquest in 1895–1922 and 1931–1945. 
Third, colonial history almost by definition relies upon a clear de-
lineation between the metropolitan core of a Great Power state and the 
peripheral regions of its colonial territories. Scholars of European em-
pire, largely in response to the work of Edward Said, have been breaking 
down this boundary for several decades now. Historians of East Asia, 
however, have been slow to follow suit. One brilliant exception is the 
work of Komagome Takeshi. In terms of the cultural dynamics of Japa-
nese imperialism, Komagome argues insightfully that Japanese colonial 
policies of cultural assimilation must be understood in the context of 
simultaneous early twentieth-century Japanese efforts to define their 
own “modern” culture.6 Only by exploring that complexity can one 
come close to resolving the inconsistencies and contradictions of a cul-
tural policy that on one hand celebrated the common culture (dôbun) 
shared by colonizer and colonized while on the other often enforced 
with violence the “nationalization” (kôminka) of subject peoples. 
Similarly, the activities of Japanese Foreign Ministry police reflect 
the larger process through which the ruling elites of East Asia began to 
build modern national identities during the late nineteenth century. 
Part of that process included the identification and control of “national” 
citizens both at home and overseas, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
invented the consular police in order to facilitate that mission.7 Those 
who threatened the state’s vision of this new national polity were tar-
geted for suppression, and just as the Home Ministry’s metropolitan po-
lice served that function on the home islands, so the Foreign Ministry 
police carried it out overseas. The Foreign Ministry was not simply a 
diplomatic corps; it was one of many Meiji imperial bureaucracies estab-
lished as a tool to facilitate state control over its citizen/subjects. Viewed 
in this way, the problem of Japanese colonial expansion becomes more 
complex and multifaceted. What investigation of the Foreign Ministry 
police enables one to understand is that forces driving colonial expan-
sion could transcend the boundaries between the home islands and the 
continent. It is possible, and perhaps even necessary, to describe Japa-
nese police work at home and abroad as two branches of the same state-
driven process of authoritarian consolidation. From such a vantage 
point, the borders between colonial and metropolitan become less clear, 
as political crime and the state’s efforts to control it in the empire and 
the metropole fueled developments on both fronts.
The fourth theme concerns the problem of agency. While the official 
organs of Japanese state power in continental northeast Asia changed dra-
matically over the decades through a process of creation, conflict, and 
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consolidation, the one constant representative face of Japan in Korea and 
China was that of the local Japanese resident community. In fact, when we 
think of the initial wave of merchants, traders, and prostitutes who arrived 
in Pusan in the late 1870s and the thousands of exhausted repatriates list-
ing across the ocean back to their “homeland” in the autumn of 1945, one 
could describe this group as both the first to arrive on the scene and the 
last to leave behind the Japanese colonial project. What is most striking 
about this community is the fact that they were not merely pawns in the 
great game of Japanese state-centered policy making, nor were they always 
the innocent victims of a national policy gone awry. The Japanese resident 
community possessed considerable agency in the evolution of national 
policy on the continent.
Again, the history of the consular police is replete with evidence of 
this fact. It was the demands of local Japanese residents that brought the 
first Japanese consular police to treaty port Korea in 1880. In almost every 
case of police expansion in Korea after that point, and in China later on 
for that matter, one can find petitions from Japanese resident organiza-
tions demanding that expansion. Their influence, however, went beyond 
filing simple pleas for support from their home government. As described 
in earlier chapters, the entire system of assistant patrolmen, which when 
factored in to the total equation of consular police manpower estimates 
increases the number by two- or even threefold, was organized and fi-
nanced by local Japanese resident associations. The activism of local Japa-
nese residents in facilitating the imperial expansionism of their home 
government, then, further complicates our perception of the borders be-
tween state and societal agency and responsibility.
Fifth, one common criticism of much work on Japanese colonial his-
tory is the excessive subjectivity granted to the nation-state. One way to 
overcome this limitation is to view northeast Asia as a cohesive geo-
graphical region, rather than an amalgamation of “nations” with hard 
borders. A handful of recent studies have done much to breathe fresh 
air of this type into the field of Japanese imperial history by placing the 
Jiandao region or the Sea of Japan/East Sea more broadly at the geo-
graphical and conceptual center of complex political, economic, and 
social interactions between the polities of Japan, Korea, and China.8 
What these studies achieve is a reimagining of the political map in ways 
that facilitate non-national approaches to the dynamic interactions of 
competing societies in northeast Asia. An examination of Japan’s con-
sular police networks also contributes to this project of transcending 
national boundaries in order to develop a regional perspective on north-
east Asian political interactions during the prewar era. The Japanese 
consular police were simultaneously an extension of metropolitan and 
colonial sovereignty, and their mission to eliminate ideological threats 
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to the imperial state recognized no boundaries of national origin. Sup-
pressing the left from Tokyo to Shanghai, from Seoul to Harbin, was all 
part of the same process.9
The example of the Manchuria Peoples’ Protection Society from Chap-
ter 3 is perhaps the most suggestive case in point. Collaboration between a 
Chinese warlord regime, conservative Korean expatriates, and Japanese 
police forces is not easily explained by way of national identities. Rather, 
when we view that collaboration as emerging from the convergence of re-
gional and ideological interests among various political forces, it becomes 
easier to understand. Manshû hominkai ideologues saw the spiritual and 
cultural bankruptcy of contemporary Korean society as a problem far more 
severe than having their politically defined “nation-state” under the over-
lordship of Japanese imperialists. In other words, political ills could not be 
remedied if underlying social ills were allowed to fester untreated. The 
greatest of all social ills, in their view, was the infiltration of traditional Ko-
rean belief systems by foreign ideologies such as Christianity and Marxism. 
It was this mind-set that made it possible for these Korean “collaborators” 
to lend assistance to Japanese and Chinese security forces in their quest to 
exterminate radical Korean resistance activists in Manchuria, and this 
Pan-Asian vision reveals the problem of projecting postwar nation-based 
categories of identity onto prewar social groups that sought self-definition 
through non-national conceptual frameworks.10 
A nuanced interpretation of such complex political behavior, how-
ever, is not easy to sell in postwar East Asia. The legacies of collaboration 
can still sting in contemporary Korean society, for example, as the recent 
case of lawmaker Representative Kim Hee-sun made clear. In the fall of 
2004, a conservative monthly news magazine reported that not only were 
Kim’s long-claimed ties with the well-known independence activist Kim 
Hak-kyu unfounded, but her own father had in fact served as a police of-
ficer in Manchuria under the supervision of Japanese colonial authori-
ties.11 A greater scandal for an aspiring Korean politician is hard to 
imagine. The realities of colonial power, however, almost always reveal to 
some extent the efficacy of networks of local collaboration that defy the 
historiographic exigencies of postcolonial national identity formation.
Finally, attempts by scholars to cross the border between Japanese co-
lonial history and the experience of other modern Western imperial pow-
ers have been few and far between. A recent essay in the American Historical 
Review is representative of the lack of sincere interest in the Japanese case 
among historians of European colonialism, where the author explains 
that he has excluded Japanese imperialism from his discussion, “for rea-
sons of space.”12 Japanese colonial planners, however, certainly looked to 
models in the wider world of their day, so historians of Japanese expan-
sionism should be able to do the same.13 The problem of colonial security 
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in the British and French empires is one possible avenue of comparative 
analysis, since a substantial body of work exists concerning matters of po-
lice work in colonial Africa, India, and the Middle East.14 A particularly 
provocative example might be the case of the British Foreign Office, which 
used its facilities in the United States and Canada during the early twenti-
eth century to gather intelligence on the activities of Indian independence 
activists there.15 Great Britain, of course, did not possess extraterritorial 
rights in North America, however, so British security agents could not 
carry out counterinsurgency efforts to the degree of those Japan pursued 
in treaty port China and Manchuria. This limitation itself, furthermore, 
raises an important point about the comparative approach. While it can 
be useful to consider Japanese colonialism as one of many modern “colo-
nialisms” in East Asia, one should not ignore the particularities of Japan’s 
unique position as an Asian imperialist in Asia itself. 
Rather than using the British or French experience as the point of 
reference, it may be more useful instead to draw comparisons between 
twentieth-century Japanese policy in continental northeast Asia and 
United States policy in Central America. While such a comparison has not 
been developed explicitly here, the history of the Japanese consular police 
offers some suggestive interpretive possibilities. The United States, for ex-
ample, regularly infiltrated, disrupted, and even overthrew local govern-
ments throughout Latin America during the first half of the century, and 
on more than one occasion, the United States sent in Marines to quell 
uprisings and “protect” American citizens and interests.16 How should one 
appropriately compare, for example, U.S. military intervention in the San-
dinista uprising of 1927–1932 in Nicaragua with Japanese military and 
consular police intervention in radical Korean revolutionary activities 
during the 1920s? While one might be loath even to ponder it because 
contemporary Japanese expansionists encouraged the very same compari-
sons to justify their violations of Chinese and Korean sovereignty, the com-
parison is not a useless one. While the degree of difference between 
Japanese expansionism in East Asia and United States “imperialism” in 
Central America is undoubtedly vast, both nonetheless involved a dynamic 
of regionalism that cannot be ignored, and thus each might in some ways 
be more usefully compared with the other than with the management of 
far-flung overseas holdings by continental European imperial powers.
All of these themes are closely related to the vexing nationalist dilem-
mas that complicate representations of East Asian history today, over 
which there are so many battles raging. In China, the CCP encourages 
anti-Japanese demonstrations over textbook revisions to fuel a new nation-
alism that has replaced the party’s utterly meaningless communist iden-
tity, while simultaneously crushing the demonstrations of peasants 
fighting state programs of economic “development” that dislocate thou-
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sands from their ancestral livelihoods. In Korea, too, a new brand of post–
Cold War nationalism feeds in large part on official and popular 
expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment, as evidenced, for example, in the 
2002 World Cup soccer tournament where South Korean fans boisterously 
cheered Japan’s elimination from the contest. In Japan, nationalist histori-
ans and conservative politicians lambaste what they term “masochistic” 
history that depicts modern Japan’s colonial experience too harshly, while 
leftist teachers who in protest refuse to stand during the national anthem 
at school ceremonies find their paychecks docked in retaliation by Minis-
try of Education bureaucrats. As long as the national identities of these 
three societies continue to depend on negative depictions of one another, 
the history that so inextricably links them all will continue to be abused 
and manipulated for domestic political consumption. 
These battles over history are, of course, in no way unique to East 
Asian society. It is an inescapable function of historical knowledge to 
define and redefine a society’s sense of shared identity, and this process 
seems inevitably to include the devaluation of other societies in turn. 
But, this does not have to be the agenda served by historical scholarship 
and education. Toward a History beyond Borders, a recent book edited 
jointly by a Sino-Japanese trio of scholars, shows that there are many in 
East Asia today who understand the absolute necessity of moving be-
yond the limitations inherent in national historical narratives.17 This is 
an admirable, and hopefully not futile, mission from which observers 
within and beyond East Asia should at least try to learn.
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